Judicial review assesses procedural fairness rather than merit; the right to be heard does not guarantee an oral hearing.

Appeal

[1] This is the appellant's ("the plaintiff's) appeal against the decision of the Kuala Lumpur High Court which dismissed with costs the plaintiff's writ of summons seeking judicial review and declaration that the dismissal of the plaintiff from service was wrong in law, null and void.

[2] We now set out our grounds for dismissing the plaintiff's appeal.

Factual Background

[3] At the time of dismissal, the plaintiff was attached to the Royal Malaysian Police, Bukit Aman, as a police inspector. Disciplinary action was taken against him pursuant to General Order 26 ("GO 26") of the Public Officers (Conduct and Discipline) (Chapter "D") General Orders 1980 ("the 1980 GO").

[4] The first respondent ("the first defendant") had issued a show-cause letter dated 23 November 1992 ("the show-cause letter") to the plaintiff, informing him of the four grounds on which to take disciplinary action against him, with a view to dismissal from service. The plaintiff was given 16 days to submit his written representation to exculpate himself.

[5] By letter dated 12 December 1992, the plaintiff made his representation in response to the show-cause letter.

[6]Vide letter dated 6 April 1993, the first defendant informed the plaintiff that his representation did not exculpate himself and that the Disciplinary Authority ("the DA") had made a decision that he be dismissed with effect from 27 April 1993.

Judicial Review

[7] As the plaintiff is seeking judicial review, we find it useful to refer to Chief Constable of North Wales Police v. Evans [1982] 3 All ER 141, where the House of Lords held inter alia as follows:

Judicial review is not an appeal from a decision but a review of the manner in which the decision was made, and, therefore, the Court is not entitled on an application for judicial review to consider whether the decision itself was fair and reasonable.

Judicial review is concerned, not with the decision, but with the decision-making process. Unless the restriction on the power of the Court is observed, the Court will ... under the guise of preventing the abuse of power, be itself guilty of usurping power.

[8] The above passage was applied by this Court through the judgment of Alauddin Mohd Sheriff FCJ (now PCA) in T Ganeswaran lwn. Suruhanjaya Polis DiRaja Malaysia & Satu Lagi, 2005 MarsdenLR 2403 . (See also the Federal Court judgment delivered by Peh Swee Chin FCJ (as he then was) in Ng Hock Cheng v. Pengarah Am Penjara & Ors ; [1998] 1 MLJ 153 ; 1997 MarsdenLR 488 ; [1997] 4 AMR 4193 , 411b to 412d.)

[9] In determining whether to quash or declare a decision as wrong in law, null and void, it is only necessary for the Court to consider whether, in dismissing a public officer, the DA had failed to observe the rules of natural justice; apply the Wednesbury principles of unreasonableness; or failed to understand correctly the law that regulates his decision-making power, and give effect to it. The grounds for judicial review may be compendiously classified under three heads viz 'procedural impropriety', 'irrationality' and 'illegality': See Ghazi Mohd Sawi v. Mohd Haniff Omar, Ketua Polis Negara, Malaysia & Anor, 1994 MarsdenLR 1280 , 342 per Mohd Jemuri Serjan CJ (Borneo), applying the principles enunciated by Lord Diplock in Council of Civil Service Union v. Minister of Civil Service [1985] AC 374, 410 HL.

General Order 26

[10] Plaintiff's learned counsel Mr Haniff Khatri attacked the show-cause letter which he argued did not contain the grounds in support of the second defendant's finding and sanction of dismissal imposed on the plaintiff. He added that the defendants should set up a comm