2016 MarsdenLR 2705
COURT OF APPEAL PUTRAJAYA
LUA & MANSOR – Appellant
Versus
TAN AH KIM – Respondent
[Civil Appeal No: C-02(NCVC)(A)-640-04-2015]
Agreed legal fees as per the Legal Profession Act are not subject to taxation, and void orders necessitate no prior appeal to be set aside.
Headnote:The court examined the legality of a Taxation Order made in legal cost recovery proceedings concerning agreed fees as per the Legal Profession Act 1976 (LPA). The main issues centered around sections 116, 117, and 128 of the LPA, indicating that agreed fees are not subject to taxation. The court found the taxation order was made outside statutory timelines and thus erred, affirming the appeal and declaring the order void. The appellate court underscored that no appeal was necessary to contest a void order. The Taxation Order is hereby set aside.
| Table of Content |
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| 1. the taxation order in divorce proceedings is questioned. (Para 1 , 3 , 6) |
| 2. agreed fees conflict with taxation rules. (Para 4 , 5 , 17) |
| 3. accord and fees payments (Para 8 , 9) |
| 4. validity of taxation order (Para 11) |
| 5. statutory compliance and jurisdiction (Para 16 , 19) |
| 6. court jurisdiction on taxation orders is defined. (Para 18 , 20 , 21) |
[1] In the High Court at Temerloh, the appellant/plaintiff had applied to set aside a taxation order dated 14 July 2014 (Taxation Order). His application was dismissed. Dissatisfied with that decision, he filed an appeal to this Court. We had on 16 February 2016, allowed the appeal of the appellant and set aside the Taxation Order made by the learned trial judge. We set out below the reasons for our decision.
[2] We will refer to the parties as they were referred to, at the High Court.
[3] The impugned Taxation Order was made by the High Court relating to divorce proceedings of the defendant. In that divorce proceedings at the Temerloh High Court, the defendant's husband had petitioned for a divorce against her and a decree nisi dated 21 October 2009 was granted. The defendant however did not seek for any ancillary reliefs in that divorce proceedings.
[4] The defendant then by way of a letter dated 19 January 2010 (at pp 66 to 67 of Rekod Rayuan Jilid III) appointed the plaintiff's firm to represent her to claim for ancillary reliefs against her ex-husband. The letter of appointment states the agreed fees in the following terms:
"The following is the agreed fee exclusive of disbursement for filings, transportation etc:
(i) application for leave: RM5,000.00
(ii) application for ancillary relief proper ie for maintenance and sharing of assets - RM20,000.00. If the Court granted order against my ex-husband for any ancillary relief, I agree to pay 15% of my portions of the value of the property or payments under relief ordered in additional to the above fee."
[5] The plaintiff succeeded in obtaining leave from the Temerloh High Court to file for the ancillary reliefs, and proceeded to make claims for the defendant against her husband. The defendant's husband lodged an appeal against the said leave to the Court of Appeal but it was dismissed. Leave application was made to appeal to the Federal Court.
[6] Pending the hearing of the leave application, on 12 November 2010 both the defendant and her husband recorded consent judgment at Temerloh High Court on the ancillary reliefs. The Consent Order is as found at pp 69-71 Rekod Rayuan Jilid III. By that Consent Order, the defendant had obtained properties, car and cash estimated to be worth RM1.74 million. This estimated value was an estimate made by the defendant herself. The Consent Order had already been effected and the defendant had already received all the assets, cash and car as per the Consent Order.
[7] From the date of his appointment on 19 January 2010, up to the Consent Order obtained on 12 November 2010, the defendant had paid a total of RM7,000.00 as fees to the plaintiff. Out of this payment, RM2,000.00 was for disbursements and RM5,000.00 was for the agreed fees at leave stage.
[8] The defendant refused to pay the other part of the agreed fees and insisted for the plaintiff to issue a detailed bill of costs, which the plaintiff did. The Bill of Costs dated 30 December 2012 billed the defendant a sum of RM381,318.29 as costs inclusive of litigation fees at all levels, conveyancing fees for the transfer of two properties, as well as disbursements. The plaintiff intimated to the defendant in the said Bill that there was also an agreed success fees of RM261,000.00 premised upon 15% of the total value of the properties received by the defendant.
[9] The defendant refused to pay the Bill of Costs. Instead, she alleged that the fees charged by the plaintiff was a contingency fees and threatened to lodge a disciplinary complaint. A disciplinary complaint was indeed lodged by the defendant against the plaintiff pursuant to the Legal Pro