The has dismissed a (PIL) that sought to challenge the administrative oversight of imports under the (DFIA) scheme and curtail the authority of the (CESTAT) to interpret . The Division Bench, comprising Chief Justice Sushrut Arvind Dharmadhikari and Justice G. Arul Murugan, delivered a sharp rebuke to the petition, emphasizing that judicial intervention in broad economic policy requires substantive evidence rather than speculative, wide-ranging allegations.
The litigation, initiated by a 26-year-old resident of Chennai, had sought several sweeping directions from the Court. Among these was a request for the judiciary to mandate a detailed inquiry into customs officials regarding their past clearances of goods under the DFIA scheme, and to direct the issuance of to all importers and transferees who had benefited from such clearances. Additionally, the petitioner argued that the CESTAT, an under the , should be barred from interpreting the (FTP), positing that such interpretations should be reserved exclusively for the (DGFT).
In its dismissal of the petition, the Court highlighted the fundamental of the filing. The petitioner failed to identify a single importer by name, provide a specific bill of entry as evidence of the alleged wrongdoing, or quantify the financial loss claimed to have been incurred by the public exchequer. The Court noted that the reliance on online reports was an insufficient basis for the extraordinary relief requested through a public interest action.
The Bench observed that the judicial process cannot be used as an instrument for policy-setting or for reopening adjudicated matters in other forums without a concrete grievance. Addressing the petitioner's broad requests, the Court stated, “The prayer for an inquiry against officers is also unsustainable. No officer is named in the petition. The prayer for show cause notices to 'all importers' is much wider. Recovery of duty is governed by the . It needs a notice to a particular person, on particular facts, by the proper officer. A roving inquiry against unnamed persons cannot be ordered in a public interest petition.”
The ruling specifically addressed the jurisdiction of the , affirming that the Tribunal must necessarily engage with the provisions of the when determining the eligibility for customs duty exemptions. The Court underscored that Parliament, through the Customs Act, has vested the Tribunal with the jurisdiction to hear appeals, a power that cannot be curtailed by policy provisions within the FTP itself. As the Court noted, “A declaration that CESTAT can never interpret the FTP is far too wide. The Tribunals have jurisdiction under the Customs Act.”
Furthermore, the Bench dismissed the assertion that the DGFT’s interpretations should be considered absolute and binding upon all judicial bodies. It observed that while the designates the DGFT as an authority for policy clarification, this does not supersede the statutory appellate functions of the Tribunal. The Court emphasized that if the Revenue department itself felt aggrieved by any prior orders issued by the Tribunal, it had the right to seek recourse through the prescribed legal channels under Chapter XV of the Customs Act. Since the did not indicate any such grievance during these proceedings, the Court declined to permit a third party to challenge those judicial decisions via a PIL.
Regarding the petitioner's concerns over the implementation of and within the DFIA framework, the Court noted that a requires a clear and established legal duty. The Court found the legal force of the conditions mentioned in the petition to be in doubt, noting that if the executive branch determines such constraints are necessary to safeguard national revenue, it possesses the authority to implement them through proper notifications in the Official Gazette. The Court stated, “If the Central Government or the DGFT is of the opinion that such conditions are needed to protect revenue, the remedy is simple. They can issue the proper notification. Whether to do so or not is a matter of policy. This Court cannot direct the executive to frame it.”
The petitioner had also raised issues regarding the (RoDTEP) scheme, arguing that exporters were receiving dual benefits. However, because the primary request for a blanket inquiry and the structural challenge to the Tribunal’s jurisdiction were found to be legally untenable, the Court did not find grounds to entertain the grievance further.
The final order of the High Court concludes the litigation, with the Bench dismissing the writ petition in its entirety and closing the connected miscellaneous petition. The decision reinforces the principle that courts will not entertain wide-ranging, evidence-deficient that seeks to bypass established statutory channels for tax adjudication or to challenge the interpretive powers of . The parties, including the , the DGFT, and the , remain governed by the existing framework of the Customs Act and the as currently interpreted by appellate forums.
customs exemption interpretation - judicial review limitations