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Analysing the retrieved Case Laws
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The appointment of an administrator is critical; the limitation period does not start at the date of death but from the date they are granted letters of administration ["KULENDOEVELOE v. KANDEPERUMAL"].
Analysis and conclusion:
In probate and succession law, timing is everything. Missing a deadline can bar your claim forever. A common question arises: What law says that the time limitation starts to run when the administrator was appointed? This issue often surfaces in disputes over letters of administration, probate of wills, or related reliefs. Understanding the starting point of the limitation period is crucial for heirs, executors, and legal practitioners to avoid time-barred applications.
This article explores the legal framework under the Limitation Act, 1963, particularly Article 137, judicial interpretations, and practical implications. We'll draw from key cases and sources to clarify when the 'right to apply' accrues—typically tied to the date of appointment or probate. Note: This is general information, not specific legal advice. Consult a qualified lawyer for your situation.
Article 137 provides a three-year limitation period for any application where no specific period is prescribed. The clock starts ticking from the date when the right to apply first accruesSameer Kapoor VS State through Sub-Division Magistrate South, New Delhi - 2019 5 Supreme 286.
In probate or succession proceedings:- The right to apply for letters of administration or probate generally accrues on the date of the probate order or when the will is probated.- For administrators, it's linked to the date of appointment, as no right of action accrues until letters of administration are granted KULANTHAVELU v. KANDERPERUMAL et al..
As held: The crucial expression under Article 137 of the Limitation Act is ‘right to apply’. ... ‘right to apply’ under Section 228 of the Act had accrued ... on 21.11.1997 when the High Court ... passed an order for grant of probateSameer Kapoor VS State through Sub-Division Magistrate South, New Delhi - 2019 5 Supreme 286.
Courts, including the Supreme Court, have consistently ruled that limitation begins from the date of the relevant legal event, such as appointment or probate Sameer Kapoor VS State through Sub-Division Magistrate South, New Delhi - 2019 5 Supreme 286Jt. Registrar Of Co Operative Societies, Kerala VS T. A. Kuttappan - 2000 4 Supreme 226W. B. Essential Commodities Supply Corporation LTD. VS Swadesh Agro Farming And Storage Private LTD. - 1999 7 Supreme 629.
In a pivotal decision: once the will is probated, in that case, the period of limitation as provided under Article 137 of the Limitation Act would begin to run from the date on which the will is probatedSameer Kapoor VS State through Sub-Division Magistrate South, New Delhi - 2019 5 Supreme 286. Here, the right accrued on the probate grant date in 1997, requiring action within three years.
A Ceylon case (applicable in similar common law contexts) clarifies: No right of action accrues to an administrator till he has taken out letters of administration, and the Statute of Limitation only begins to run against him from the date of the grant of such letters. ... the period of limitation began to run on the date when plaintiff took out letters, namely, on 3rd July, 1901KULANTHAVELU v. KANDERPERUMAL et al.. This reinforces that for administrators, the appointment date is pivotal.
Other references affirm: Limitation runs from the date of judgment, decree, or appointment when the act becomes enforceable Jt. Registrar Of Co Operative Societies, Kerala VS T. A. Kuttappan - 2000 4 Supreme 226W. B. Essential Commodities Supply Corporation LTD. VS Swadesh Agro Farming And Storage Private LTD. - 1999 7 Supreme 629. In pendente lite appointments, it's from the order date THEOW SAY KOW @ TEOH KIANG SENG vs TEOH KHIAN GUAN & ORS (ENCLS 7 11 & 12) - 2025 MarsdenLR 2247.
While primarily probate-focused, similar principles apply in insolvency. Under the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code (IBC), Section 7 applications follow Article 137, accruing on default date, extendable by acknowledgments under Section 18 Babulal Vardharji Gurjar VS Veer Gurjar Aluminium Industries Private Limited - 2020 5 Supreme 159Jignesh Shah VS Union of India - 2018 Supreme(SC) 1070. However, recovery suits don't revive winding-up limitations LAXMI PAT SURANA VS UNION BANK OF INDIA - 2021 6 Supreme 379.
In company law, limitation for share rectification isn't dismissed at threshold without facts on accrual Auduth Modu Timblo VS Dilip Modu Timblo - 2015 Supreme(Bom) 1638. These highlight that accrual depends on the specific right to apply.
Not always straightforward:- Acknowledgments: Under Section 18, a signed liability acknowledgment restarts the period OVERSEA-CHINESE BANKING CORPN LTD vs PHILLIP WEEOVERSEA-CHINESE BANKING CORPN LTD vs PHILLIP WEE. E.g., the defendant's letter dated January 14, 1974 revives the time for suing ... and starts time to run afreshOVERSEA-CHINESE BANKING CORPN LTD vs PHILLIP WEE.- Awareness: May start from knowledge of the act RAMNATH VS DWARKA PRASAD - 1958 0 Supreme(Raj) 43.- Pendente Lite: Linked to pending probate THEOW SAY KOW @ TEOH KIANG SENG vs TEOH KHIAN GUAN & ORS (ENCLS 7 11 & 12) - 2025 MarsdenLR 2247.- No Initial Application Trigger: It's from legal completion, not filing requests.
IBC cases note: Limitation applies via Section 238A, but CIRP isn't recovery; default triggers it, condonable on facts Babulal Vardharji Gurjar VS Veer Gurjar Aluminium Industries Private Limited - 2020 5 Supreme 159.
To navigate these timelines:1. Verify Dates: Pinpoint the probate order or appointment grant date.2. Calculate Precisely: Three years from accrual under Article 137.3. Check Extensions: Look for acknowledgments or Section 18 applications.4. File Promptly: Courts strictly enforce bars; plead facts for extensions.5. Seek Evidence: Document orders and awareness dates.
In summary, the Limitation Act, 1963 (Article 137) dictates that the period runs from the date the right accrues, tied to the administrator's appointment. Heirs and executors must act swiftly post-appointment to preserve rights. For tailored guidance, consult a probate specialist.
References: Sameer Kapoor VS State through Sub-Division Magistrate South, New Delhi - 2019 5 Supreme 286, Jt. Registrar Of Co Operative Societies, Kerala VS T. A. Kuttappan - 2000 4 Supreme 226, W. B. Essential Commodities Supply Corporation LTD. VS Swadesh Agro Farming And Storage Private LTD. - 1999 7 Supreme 629, RAMNATH VS DWARKA PRASAD - 1958 0 Supreme(Raj) 43, THEOW SAY KOW @ TEOH KIANG SENG vs TEOH KHIAN GUAN & ORS (ENCLS 7 11 & 12) - 2025 MarsdenLR 2247, KULANTHAVELU v. KANDERPERUMAL et al., OVERSEA-CHINESE BANKING CORPN LTD vs PHILLIP WEE, Babulal Vardharji Gurjar VS Veer Gurjar Aluminium Industries Private Limited - 2020 5 Supreme 159, Auduth Modu Timblo VS Dilip Modu Timblo - 2015 Supreme(Bom) 1638
#LimitationAct #ProbateLaw #AdministratorAppointment
of whose chattels he shall be appointed administrator shall be deemed to claim as if there had been no interval of time between the death of such deceased and the grant of letters of administration, the words clearly referring merely to limitations of actions provided by the Act itself. ... In support of that contention he cites a passage from Williams on Executors, which discloses that in England, in view of section 6 of 3 and 4 William IV., c. 27, time begins to run against the admin....
or registeredknown to the Plaintiff The 3rd defendant says that time should begin to run from the date of the appointment of the plaintiff as the administrator of the estate of the deceased, that is 7 September 1987. ... when he was appointed the administrator for the estate of the deceased. ... The plaintiff was appointed the administrator of the deceased's estate on 7 September 1987. ... barred under the Limitation Ordinance as t....
And that time should begin to run when the issue or registration came to the knowledge of the plaintiff. And in this case learned counsel says that time should start to run from the knowledge of the registration and such could only have been known when the registration took place and not before. ... to the Plaintiff The 3rd defendant says that time should begin to run from the date of the appointment of the plaintiff as the #HL_STAR....
And that time should begin to run when the issue or registration came to the knowledge of the plaintiff. And in this case learned counsel says that time should start to run from the knowledge of the registration and such could only have been known when the registration took place and not before. ... when he was appointed the administrator for the estate of the deceased. ... The plaintiff was appointed the administrator#HL_....
And that time should begin to run when the issue or registration came to the knowledge of the plaintiff. And in this case learned counsel says that time should start to run from the knowledge of the registration and such could only have been known when the registration took place and not before. ... when he was appointed the administrator for the estate of the deceased. ... The plaintiff was appointed the administrator#HL_....
-No right of action accrues to an administrator till he has taken out letters of administration, and the Statute of Limitation only begins to run against him from the date of the grant of such letters. ... It is thus clear that in this case the period of limitation began to run on the date when plaintiff took out letters, namely, on 3rd July, 1901. ... IV., c. 27, is not law in Ceylon LASCELLES A.C.J. ... I think therefore that the claim which appears to come under section 8....
It was not his business to write the letter as at that time there was an administrator appointed, that was the Official Administrator and it relates to his account. He is clearly "the person accountable therefor …" under section 26(2) of the Ordinance. ... I am in agreement with counsel that the defendant's letter dated January 14, 1974 revives the time for suing by the plaintiff and starts time to run afresh. ... Michael Franks on Limitation of Act....
It was not his business to write the letter as at that time there was an administrator appointed, that was the Official Administrator and it relates to his account. He is clearly "the person accountable therefor …" under section 26(2) of the Ordinance. ... I am in agreement with counsel that the defendant's letter dated January 14, 1974 revives the time for suing by the plaintiff and starts time to run afresh. ... Michael Franks on Limitation of Act....
It was not his business to write the letter as at that time there was an administrator appointed, that was the Official Administrator and it relates to his account. He is clearly "the person accountable therefor …" under section 26(2) of the Ordinance. ... I am in agreement with counsel that the defendant's letter dated January 14, 1974 revives the time for suing by the plaintiff and starts time to run afresh. ... Michael Franks on Limitation of Act....
It was not his business to write the letter as at that time there was an administrator appointed, that was the Official Administrator and it relates to his account. He is clearly "the person accountable therefor …" under section 26(2) of the Ordinance. ... I am in agreement with counsel that the defendant's letter dated January 14, 1974 revives the time for suing by the plaintiff and starts time to run afresh. ... Michael Franks on Limitation of Act....
For example, an acknowledgment of liability under Section 18 of the Limitation Act would certainly extend the limitation period, but a suit for recovery, which is a separate and independent proceeding distinct from the remedy of winding up would, in no manner, impact the limitation within which the winding-up proceeding is to be filed, by somehow keeping the debt alive for the purpose of the winding-up proceeding." (emphasis supplied) In law, when time begins to run, it can only be extended in the manner provided in the Limitation Act. The aforesaid judgments correctly hold....
The aforesaid judgments correctly hold that a suit for recovery based upon a cause of action that is within limitation cannot in any manner impact the separate and independent remedy of a winding-up proceeding. Moreover, after reading the provisions contained in Sections 433(e,) and 434 of the Companies Act, 1956, for winding up in case of company being unable to pay its debts, this Court made yet further observations in Jignesh Shah (supra) that the trigger for limitation in such an action occurs when a default takes place after which the debt remains outstanding; and that date alone is rel....
The aforesaid judgments correctly hold that a suit for recovery based upon a cause of action that is within limitation cannot in any manner impact the separate and independent remedy of a winding up proceeding. For example, an acknowledgement of liability under Section 18 of the Limitation Act would certainly extend the limitation period, but a suit for recovery, which is a separate and independent proceeding distinct from the remedy of winding up would, in no manner, impact the limitation within which the winding up proceeding is to be filed, by somehow keeping the debt alive for the purpos....
I have set out the rival contentions on the point of limitation and/or delay and laches, in order to show that indeed, a disputed question of fact as to the knowledge, in the context of the point of time when the right to apply accrues, would arise in the company petition. If that be so, no exception can be taken to the refusal by the CLB to frame and decide the issue of limitation and/or delay and laches as a preliminary issue. I would hasten to add that no opinion is expressed nor one is called for at this stage, on merits of the rival contentions. This is because, even under Art....
What is important to be noted is, Article 65 of the Limitation Act, 1963 makes it clear that the time will start to run when the possession of the defendant becomes adverse to the plaintiff. However, the respondents are coming with a case as stated above that they are claiming adverse possession since the period of 25 years from their father. The grant came to be effected in favour of the appellants in the year 1955 and, therefore, the said adverse possession is to be considered as against the individual and therefore, the limitation would start running from 30th June 1955 ....
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