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: Right to Compound FCRA Offence Cannot Be Denied To
The has ruled that the right to seek of an offence under the cannot be denied to an accused once the accusations are confined to compoundable provisions. The order came in an interim application filed by , which sought the email ID of the and details of the online portal to electronically submit its application.
A Case of Shifting Charges
In 2020, the , Mumbai registered an FIR against under the , the , and the FCRA. After detailed investigation, the filed a charge sheet in Case No. 740/PW/2025, restricting the allegations to offences under the FCRA—specifically . The IPC and PC Act charges were dropped.
then filed a writ petition seeking quashing of the entire criminal proceedings. In the meantime, it also filed an interim application under , seeking permission to compound the offence. The applicant submitted that it had made multiple requests to the to provide the email ID and the FCRA portal user credentials required to file the application, but received no response. The Ministry through a letter dated declined the request, stating that the matter was “.”
Arguments: A Statutory Right v s. Procedural Hurdles
for the applicants argued that the only surviving charge was under , which is compoundable. He contended that the Ministry’s refusal to provide the portal detals efecively blocked the applicant’s statutory right to compound the offence. Desai pointed out that the application fee of ₹3,000 had already been paid or was ready to be paid online, but the applicants had no way to access the FCRA portal. He also offered to file the application offline if the online route was not feasible.
for the opposed the motion, arguing that the pendency of the quashing petition should preclude the process. He also raised a procedural objection regarding the annexation of the charge sheet to the quashing proceedings.
Court’s Legal Analysis: Right Cannot Be Denied
Justice Milind N. Jadhav examined the scope of . The court noted that the rule allows an accused to make an application for of the offence to the Secretary, , in electronic form, accompanied by a fee of ₹3,000. The court observed that the Ministry’s reliance on the pendency of the quashing petition to deny the portal access was misplaced. “Pendency of the matter or the matter being subjudiced cannot preclude the Applicants from filing the said Application or for that matter they be denided permission for ,” the court remarkd.
The court further held that since the only charge against the applicants was under , a valuable right accrued to them under Rule 21, which could not be denided. The court directed the Ministry to provide the email ID and portal detals within one week. It also allowed the applicants to amend the quashing petition by appending the entire charge sheet.
Key Observations
“Considering the provisions of Rule 21 of the FCRA Rules 2011, I am of the opinion that once the said Rule has been complied with and most importantly in view of the only charge against the Applicants being that under , then a valuable right accrues to the Applicants for seeking of the said offence, which cannot be denid.”
“Pendency of the matter or the matter being subjudiced cannot preclude the Applicants from filing the said Application or for that matter they be denid permission for .”
Final Direction nd Implications
Justice Milind N. Jadhav allowed the interim application in terms of prayer claues (a) and (b), directing the Ministry to provide the email ID and the website/portal for filing the application within one week. Once the application is filed, the trial court is to hear it expeditiously and preferably within four weeks. The court clarified that all contentions of the parties are kept open and no opinion on the merits of the case has been expressd. The main writ petition seeking quashing of the criminal proceedings will be heard on .
This decision reinforces the principle that a statutory right to compound an offence cannot be thwarted by mere pendency of parallel proceedings, and that the authorities must facilitate, not obstruct, the exercise of such rights. It also underscores that the Ministry cannot cite subjudice as a ground to deny access to procedural mechanisms expressly provided by law.
