The push for decentralized justice has entered a new phase following a formal request from Tamil Nadu Chief Minister C Joseph Vijay to the Prime Minister of India. The request, submitted on November 4, advocates for the establishment of a Supreme Court of India bench in Chennai, highlighting the practical difficulties faced by litigants in southern states who currently must travel to New Delhi to access the apex court’s jurisdiction under Article 32 of the Constitution. This development has reignited a long-standing debate regarding the geographical accessibility of India’s highest judicial authority and the potential for structural reform within the judiciary.

The administration’s call for a regional bench arrives alongside separate efforts by the Union Ministry of Law and Justice to address court congestion. Just six days after the Chief Minister’s letter, Union Minister of State for Law and Justice Arjun Ram Meghwal announced plans to pilot "evening courts" in Delhi, Bihar, and Andhra Pradesh. These courts, designed to operate beyond standard business hours, are intended to streamline case management and reduce backlogs. While these initiatives focus on enhancing efficiency, the underlying question of whether the Supreme Court can be decentralized remains a distinct and complex constitutional challenge that has persisted for decades.

The demand for regional benches is not a novel proposal; it is supported by multiple reports from the Law Commission of India—specifically the 95th, 125th, and 229th Reports—as well as several Parliamentary Standing Committee recommendations, including the 2nd, 6th, 15th, 20th, and 133rd Reports. Despite this sustained institutional support, the implementation of such a measure faces significant legal hurdles. Under Article 130 of the Constitution, the Chief Justice of India holds the authority to designate alternative places of sitting, subject to the approval of the President. However, the Full Court has historically resisted these proposals, rejecting the concept in August 2007 and reaffirming that stance in February 2010. A subsequent reference to a Constitution Bench, initiated in 2016, currently remains pending, leaving the executive branch without the clear path required to grant the Chief Minister’s request through standard administrative channels.

Leveraging Underutilized Constitutional Provisions

As debates over the establishment of a permanent regional bench continue to stall within the judiciary, legal experts are pointing toward the potential activation of Article 32(3) as a viable alternative route. This provision, which has remained largely dormant since the adoption of the Constitution 76 years ago, offers a structural framework that functions independently of the Chief Justice’s consent. Article 32(3) grants Parliament the authority to enact legislation empowering "any other court" to exercise the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court, specifically regarding the issuance of writs for the enforcement of fundamental rights.

The constitutional design of this provision is tripartite. First, it permits Parliament to authorize lower courts to handle writ petitions under the same fundamental rights framework currently managed by the Supreme Court. Second, such a court would operate within the "local limits of its jurisdiction ," effectively decentralizing the process. Third, the powers granted could be partial, as the text permits the delegation of "all or any" of the writ jurisdiction . This approach would focus primarily on rights enshrined in Part III , such as the fundamental protections of Article 21 , rather than attempting to replicate the broader, existing jurisdiction of High Courts under Article 226 .

Historically, this provision was viewed as a safeguard for the impoverished litigant. During the Constituent Assembly debates on December 9, 1948, members such as Naziruddin Ahmad questioned the necessity of forcing poor litigants to traverse long distances to reach the central seat of power for basic constitutional relief. Despite these early warnings and the clear textual permission within the Constitution, Parliament has yet to draft or pass the legislation required to operationalize this specific mechanism.

The Path Toward Judicial Modernization

The ongoing dialogue between the state government and the Union highlights a broader tension between the centralized nature of India's judicial structure and the evolving needs of its citizens. While the executive government’s pilot program for evening courts focuses on procedural efficiency, the deeper call for regional benches touches upon fundamental issues of equity and access. The current procedural stalemate underscores a reality where the Supreme Court’s physical location remains an immutable constraint in the eyes of the judiciary, even as political pressure for change intensifies.

The next steps for this proposal remain uncertain. With a reference to a Constitution Bench still pending and no current legislative move to invoke the powers under Article 32(3), the prospect of a Chennai bench rests in a state of constitutional suspense. For now, the legal community continues to observe whether the executive will attempt to bridge the distance between the governed and the guardians of the Constitution through legislative reform or if the established judicial hierarchy will remain unchanged. The outcome of these discussions will likely dictate the future of regional access to fundamental rights litigation in India, setting a precedent for how the state might navigate the complex relationship between the central seat of justice and the diverse, regional populations it serves. Until such a decision is reached, the current structure requires litigants to remain reliant on the centralized framework of the apex court, notwithstanding the persistent administrative and political calls for a more accessible judicial system.