1996(6) Supreme 104
SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
A.M. Ahmadi, C.J.I., A.S. Anand and S.B. Majmudar, JJ.
J.H. Patel -Appellant
versus
Subhan Khan -Respondent
Civil Appeal No. 1795 of 1996
with
Civil Appeal No. 3677 of 1996
Decided on 24-7-1996
Counsel for the Parties :
For the Appearing Parties : S.J. Sorabjee, K.N. Bhatt, Sr. Advocates, S. Sukumaran Advocate for M/s. JBD & Co., Raju Ramachandran, Ejaz Maqbool, B.K. Mishra, Ms. Shabana Tarannum, and Joseph Pookett, Advocates.
(ii) ELECTION LAW-Constitution of India-Article 173-Nomination-Oath once taken for any constituency would be valid for election to concerned assembly-Non-disclosure of fact of having subscribed an oath on an earlier date prior to scrutiny-Effect of-Nomination rejected-Fresh plea raised for proving factum and validity of oath taken-Whether High Court was right in allowing fresh plea ?-(No)-Rejection of nomination paper was a planned action-High Court was wrong in setting aside election of appellant on ground of improper rejection of nomination of respondent.
Held that an election petition, being original proceedings and not appellate proceedings, the High Court s jurisdiction cannot be confined to the grounds on which the Returning Officer rejected the nomination. We agree with the High Court that it was not precluded from considering any other ground or fresh material bearing on the question of the rejection of the nomination paper. (Para 16)
Further held that the potential for mischief as pointed out by Mr. Sorabjee is real and not imaginary. The Court must, therefore, bear in mind this fact while deciding whether or not to entertain a fresh plea which was not put forward before the Returning Officer at the time of scrutiny of the nomination paper and the rejection thereof. (Para 20)
It is not merely a question of equity but a question of principle that a person who deliberately and designedly fails to disclose information within his special knowledge and fails to produce material in that behalf thereby virtually engineering the rejection of his nomination cannot be permitted to raise a fresh ground which would adversely affect the opposite party. A party which does not come to court with clean hands cannot seek such an indulgence. In the circumstances of this case, a serious doubt arises as to the bona fides of the respondent in omitting to produce the material evidence before the Returning Officer. We feel reasonably sure that the respondent had planned the rejection of his nomination. We are, therefore, of the opinion that the High Court was wrong in setting aside the election of the appellant on that ground. (Para 21)
21. Secondly, the mere production of the certificate Ex. P.1 on the record of the present proceedings cannot satisfy the requirement of Article 173 of the Constitution. That certificate merely states that he had taken an oath as required by Article 173 but what is important is the text of that document i.e., whether it was in the prescribed form or not. The Returning Officer at Chinnagiri would have to satisfy himself that the oath taken at Davanagere was in the form presscribed under Article 173 of the Constitution and a mere certificate to the effect that he had taken oath would not suffice. We are, therefore, of the opinion that even the production of Ex. P.1 would not have been sufficient to invalidate the election of the appellant. (Para 21)
JUDGMENT
A.M. Ahmadi, CJI - By an order dated March 20, 1996, Civil Appeal No. 1795/96 was allowed and the impugned order of the High Court dated Janaury 3, 1996, was set aside. The Civil Appeal No. 3677/96 which was actually cross objections filed by the respondent in Civil Appeal No. 1795/96 was dismissed. The election petition from which the present appeals arose was consequently dismissed. The present judgment is to provide reasons for the above order.
2. First, the facts in brief. Shri Subhan, Khan, the respondent in Civil Appeal No. 1795/96, (hereinafter referred to as the respondent), filed the election petition challenging the election of Shri J.H. Patel, the appellant in C.A. No. 1795/96, from 158 Channagiri Legislative Assembly Constituency on the ground that his (respondent s) nomination paper was improperly rejected by the Returning Officer. One Sri E. Shekharappa, a voter from the same constituency, filed a nomination paper proposing the respondent s name on October 29, 1994. The Returning Officer issued a notice to the respondent to make and subscribe the oath or affirmation before the dated appointed for scrutiny of the nomination paper, that is, November 3, 1994. The preceding two days i.e., November 1, 1994 & November 2, 1994, were public holidays. The respondent came to the office of the Returning Officer on November 3, 1994 at 9.00 a.m. and took oath under Article 173 of the Constitution of India at 10.55 a.m. before the Tehsildar, Channagiri Taluk. The scrutiny was to commence at 11.00 a.m. when the respondent produced the certificate of having taken oath. The Returning Officer rejected the nomination of the respondent. Elections were held on November 26, 1994 and on December 9, 1994, the appellant was declared elected. The respondent challenged the election as void on the ground that the rejection of his nomination was improper. The election petition was contested by the appellant. The High Court held that the oath taken on November 3, 1994, at 10.55 a.m. was not sufficient but that the oath taken on October 27, 1994 at Davanagere Constituency, as required by Article 173 of the Constitution of India as evidenced by Ex. P.1, although not brought to the notice of the Returning Officer at the time of scrutiny, would qualify him to contest the election from the concerned constituency. The High Court further held that the respondent was entitled to raise any fresh ground or produce any fresh material to prove the fact that his nomination paper was improperly rejected and that the fact that the respondent did not bring this fact to the notice of the Returning Officer woud not disentitle him to rely on the fact before the High Court. The High Court accordingly concluded that the rejection of the nomination paper of the respondent was improper and hence set aside the election.
3. The impugned judgment is challenged on the ground that the decision of the High Court in accepting fresh material produced for the first time before it was based on an erroneous understanding of the judgments of this Court in N.T. Veluswami Thevar v. G. Raja Nainar and Others1 and Birad Mal Sanghvi v. Anand Purohit2, that the reasoning of the High Court if accepted would lead to absurb results as mischievous elements could then file nomination at one place and take oath at another and later challenge the rejection of the nomination; that the Returning Officer was right in rejecting the nomination paper on the basis of material placed before him and that the plea of the respondent in the face of his unfair and improper conduct would amount to misuse of the electoral process.
4. In the cross-objections filed by the respondent, he reiterates that the oath taken at 10.55 a.m. on November 3, 1994 was valid and that the finding of the High Court to the effect that he had not brought to the notice of the Returning Officer about the affirmation at Davanagere is incorrect.
5. From the above narration, one question of fact comes up for consideration, na
N.T. Veluswami Thevar v. G. Raja Nainar and Others
Birad Mal Singhvi v. Anand Purohit
Khaje Khanavar Khaderkhan Hussain Khan & Ors. v. Siddavanballi Nijalingappa & Anr.
The main legal point established in the judgment is the binding effect of the settlement between the parties, the waiver of the right to seek re-employment by the workmen, and the entitlement of the ....
A lockout is justified if it is declared in response to an illegal strike or a strike that is in breach of a settlement or award.
The combination of eyewitness testimonies, recovery of the weapon used, and forensic examination results can establish guilt in criminal cases, even based on circumstantial evidence.
The conviction of an accused person under Section 27(3) of the Arms Act is not permissible in law if the accused is also charged with committing murder under Section 302 of the Indian Penal Code.
The court can enhance compensation based on the deceased's income and family dependency, and adjust the multiplier used by the Tribunal if found unjustified.
Login now and unlock free premium legal research
Login to SupremeToday AI and access free legal analysis, AI highlights, and smart tools.
Login
now!
India’s Legal research and Law Firm App, Download now!
Copyright © 2023 Vikas Info Solution Pvt Ltd. All Rights Reserved.