1997 Supreme(SC) 1620

1997(10) Supreme 319
SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
(From Allahabad High Court)
Sujata V. Manohar & G.T. Nanavati, JJ.
The Commissioner, Agra & Ors. -Appellants
versus
Rohtas Singh & Ors. -Respondents
Civil Appeal Nos. 8588-89 of 1997
Decided on 9-12-1997
Counsel for the Parties :
For the Appellants, Ashok H. Desai, Attorney General, R.B. Misra, Kamlendra Misra, Arvind Verma, Advocates.
For the Respondent in C.A. No. 8588/97, Tripurari Ray, Prashant Kumar, Joseph Pokkatt, Advocates.

VERY IMPORTANT POINTS
1. The State is entitled to authorise a law officer to appear in cases where the contempt consists of disobedience of an order of the court by an official or employee of the State.
2. In contempt cases, where the conduct of the concerned official is contumacious, the Court can direct him to pay costs personally, if the facts and circumstances of the case so warrant, but a general direction that in all such cases the legal expenses should be borne personally by the alleged contemnor except when he is honourably acquitted, cannot be sustained.

Headnote:CONTEMPT OF COURT-Civil Contempt-Disobedience of an order of court by an official or employee of the State-State is entitled to authorise a law officer to appear in such cases-Where conduct of concerned official is contumacious-Court can direct him to pay costs personally, if facts and circumstances of the case so warrant-A general direction that in all such cases the legal expenses should be borne personally by the alleged contemnor-Except when he is honourably acquitted-Unwarranted, not sustainable-Judgment of Allahabad High Court holding that Government Advocates and Standing Counsel for State of Uttar Pradesh cannot be allowed to appear and defend Government officials against whom notices for contempt of court are issued-Not legally sustainable-Foundation of High Court s reasoning is not sound. (Constitution of India-Arts. 129 & 215-Contempt of Courts Act).

       Held : The High Court seems to have proceeded on the basis that it is for the State to prosecute contemnors. Therefore, counsel for the State cannot appear for the "accused contemnor. This foundation of the High Court s reasoning is unfortunately not sound. A contempt proceeding is often described as a quasi-criminal proceeding because it results in punishment for the contemnor. The proceeding, however, cannot be equated with the prosecution of a criminal by the State. Contempt proceedings are essentially a matter between the court and the contemnor. Contempt jurisdiction enables the court to ensure proper administration of justice and maintenance of the Rule of Law. It is meant to ensure that the courts are able to discharge their functions properly, unhampered and unsullied by wanton attacks on the system of administration of justice or on officials who administer it, and to prevent wilful defiance of orders of the court or undertakings given to the court. That is why the Supreme Court and the High Court have an inherent power to punish for contempt even dehors legislation pertaining to contempt of court. (Para 6)

       The courts power to punish for contempt is a power which is required in furtherance of proper administration of justice and preserving the authority of the court. This power is expressly preserved under Articles 129 and 215 of the Constitution. That is why the question of contempt is a question which is essentially between the court and the contemnor. (Para 7)

       It is on account of the mistaken notion that the State has to prosecute an action for contempt of court against the contemnor that the High Court, in the present case, came to the conclusion that the Advocates appointed by the State to represent it in courts of law cannot appear for an officer of the State who is charged with contempt. It is, therefore, open to the State to nominate its advocates to appear for its officials in contempt proceedings. (Para 9)

       The further directions given by the High Court that in all such cases the legal expenses should be borne personally by the alleged contemnor except when he is honourably acquitted also appear to be unwarranted. The High Court seems to have been moved into issuing such a direction because of the large number of contempt cases pending in that court against the officers of the State for their failure to carry out the orders of the Court. It is indeed a disturbing situation. Where the conduct of the concerned official is contumacious, the Court can direct him to pay costs personally, if the facts and circumstances of the case so warrant. But a general direction of the kind given by the High Court cannot be sustained. (Para 12)