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1998 Supreme(SC) 376

1998(3) Supreme 308
Supreme Court of India
(From T.N. Land Reforms Special Appellate Tribunal, Madras)
K. Venkataswami and M. Jagannadha Rao, JJ.
A.G. Varadarajulu & Anr. -Appellants
versus
State of Tamil Nadu & Ors. -Respondents
Civil Appeal No. 1714 of 1998
(Arising out of SLP (C) No. 20249 of 1996)
Decided on 23-3-1998
Counsel for the Parties :
For the Appellants : S. Sivasubramaniam, Sr. Advocate and T. Raja, Advocate.
For the Respondents : M.A. Krishna Moorthy, Advocate.

Important Points
1. Non-obstante clause in Section 21A of T.N. Land Reforms (Fixation of Ceiling Land) Act, 1961 does not override anything in Section 3(42) of the said Act.
2. It is not permissible to resort to the personal laws while inter­preting definitions in land ceiling laws.
3. The word ‘held’ in Section 3(42) of T.N. Land Reforms (Fixation of Ceiling Land) Act, 1961 is used in the sense that the female must be in possession of the land as owner or with some element of title on 15.2.1970, the date of commencement of the Act.
4. A right to claim maintenance against certain property of the joint family cannot be equated with ‘holding’ Stridhana land as on 15.2.1970, the date of commencement of the Act.
5. Section 5(3) of T.N. Land Reforms (Fixation of Ceiling Land) Act, 1961 read with the Explanation permits notional computation only in respect of those who ‘hold’ an undivided interest in the joint family property on the date of com­mencement of the Act.
6. A wife or a mother in a Hindu joint family does not basically have a share in the joint family property and she has only a right to maintenance and the mere existence of such a right against the joint family property as on 15.2.1970, the date of commencement of the Act, could not, in law, be treated as being equivalent to ‘holding’ a share in the joint family property, as on that date so as to constitute ‘stridhana’ within the meaning of Section 3(42) of T.N. Land Reforms (Fixation of Land Ceiling) Act, 1961.

Headnote:T.N. Land Reforms (Fixation of Ceiling on Land) Act, 1961-Sec­tions 3(19), 3(42), 5(4), 21A-‘Stridhana land’-‘To hold’-Inter­pretation of-Non-obstante clause in Section 21A-Does not override provisions of Section 3(42)-Defi­nition of ‘stridhana land’ under Land Ceiling Laws-Not governed by personal laws-Allotment of land to mother by son under partition-Cannot be deemed to be ‘holding land’ as owner on 15.2.1970, the date of commencement of Act-Mere existence of a right to maintenance by mother against joint family property which later crystallised into allotment in her favour through partition-Is not ‘holding stridhana land’ on 15.2.1970 with­in meaning of Section 3(42) of the Act. Land allotted to mother cannot be excluded from the hold­ing of family.

       Held : Section 3(42) does not deal with invalidity of partition or transfers but deals with stridhana land. The subject matter of the enacting part of Section 21A does not have any connection with subject matter of Section 3(42). Hence it is clear that the non-obstante clause in Section 21A was not intended to override any thing in Section 3(42). (Para 16)

       Unless the ‘definitions’ in land ceiling laws themselves refer to personal laws, it is not permissible to resort to the personal laws while interpreting ‘definitions’ in land ceiling laws. It may be that for purposes of computation of the ceiling area, the land ceiling law may itself refer to the personal laws or it may be necessary to refer to personal laws but that is different. (Para 19

       According to Section 3(19), a person is said to hold land if he owns land as owner or possesses or enjoys land as possessory mortgagee or as tenant or as intermediary or in one or more of those capacities. In the context of Section 3(42) defining ‘strid­hana land’, a person can be said to hold the land if she owns as owner or possesses the same with elements of title. (Para 24)

       The word ‘held’ in Section 3(42) is used in the sense that the female must be in possession of the land as owner or with some element of title on 15.2.1970, the date of commencement of the Act. (Para 27)

       In our opinion, it is not sufficient that as on 15.2.1970, the second appellant had a right to maintenance under the customary Hindu law against this property in satisfaction of which this extent of land was allotted to her on 24.9.1970. A right to claim maintenance against certain property of the joint family cannot be equated with ‘holding’ the land as on 15.2.1970. (Para 28)

       Section 5(3) read with the Explanation permits notional computation only in respect of those who ‘hold’ an undivided interest in the joint family property at the date of commencement of the Act. The second appellant before us had no basic right to a share in the joint family property inhering in her on 15.2.1970 and she cannot therefore be said to be ‘holding’ ‘strid­hana land’ as on the date of commencement of the Act. i.e. 15.2.1970, within Section 3(42) of the Act. Therefore the fact that she had, as on 15.2.1970, a right to maintenance against this property which later crystal*­lised into the allotment of this property in her favour on 24.9.1970 is not sufficient. Neither under the customary Hindu law, nor under the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 nor under the Hindu Succession Act, 1956 nor under the Hindu Adoptions and Maintenance Act, 1956 is there any provision which gives a share to a wife in the joint family property held her husband nor to a mother in the joint family property allotted to her son in a partition. (Para 30)

       Consequently held : We are of the view, as already stated that a wife or a mother in a Hindu joint family does not basically have a share in the joint property and she has only a right to maintenance and the mere existence of such a right against the joint family property as on 15.2.1970 could not, in law, be treated as being equiv­alent to ‘holding’ a share in the joint family property, as on that date. The fact that the land was reduced to the possession of the second appellant on 24.9.1970, could not be equated with her posses­sion on 15.2.1970. (Para 31)

       

Judgment

M. Jagannadha Rao, J.-Leave granted.

2. This appeal is preferred by the two appellants namely A.G. Varada­rajulu and Srimati V. Jayalakshmi who are respectively, husband and wife, against the order passed by the Tamilnadu Land Reforms Special Appellate Tribunal, Madras in TRP No. 82 of 1994 dated 25th April, 1995. The case arises under the Tamil Nadu Land Reforms (Fixation of Ceiling on Land) Act, 1961 (hereinafter called the Act)

3. The 1st appellant is the declarant. The 1st appellant’s plea is that land of an extent of acres 36.74 allotted in favour of his wife, the second appellant Smt. V. Jayalakshmi in a partition Deed dated 25.9.1970 executed between the appellants’ son. Bala­guruswamy and his wife should be excluded from his (the 1st appellant) holding as being ‘Stridhana land’ of his wife, within the meaning of the said expres­sion in Section 3(42) of the Act, to the extent permissible under Section 5(4) of the Act.

4. The following are the facts:

There was a partition deed between the first appellant and his son Balaguruswamy in the year 1959. Under the said document, each of them was allotted certain extent of the joint family property. On the basis that the wife of the first appellant was not allotted any property towards her right to maintenance against the joint family property, another partition deed dated 24.9.1970 was executed between the minor son, the said Balaguruswamy and his mother, i.e. wife of first appel­lant. Under this document towards the right to maintenance, the said Balaguruswamy allotted acres 36.74 in favour of his mother. At the time of execution of said partition deed dated 24.9.1970, the son Balaguruswamy, being a minor, was represented by his father, the first appellant, as guardian.

5. The land ceiling authorities started proceedings under the Act for computing the admissible ceiling area which could be allocated to the first appellant under the Act. While doing so, the Authorised Officer by his order dated 18.9.1985 held that even though the partition deed dated 24.9.1970 was a ‘valid’ document having been executed between 15.2.1970 and 2.10.1970 as permitted by Section 21 A, still inasmuch as the second appellant was not in possession of this allotted land at the time of commencement of this Act on 15.2.1970 as required by Section 3(42), the same could not be treated as her ‘stridhana’. It was consequently held that no part of it could be excluded from the ‘holding’ of the first appellant even to the extent permitted by Section 5(4) of the Act. This was the decision of the Authorised Officer made on 18.9.1985.

6. A preliminary statement to that effect was published in the Gazette in Form 7 on 18.9.1985. No objections were received from the appel­lants. A final statement was published in the gazette on 22.1.1986 under Section 12 of the Act and thereafter a final notification was published in the Gazette on 12.2.1986 under Section 18(1) of the Act.

7. Against the said final notification, a revision was preferred by both the appellants before the Land Commissioner at Madras. The revi­sion was rejected on 25.9.1986 holding again that the above-said extent allotted to the second appellant in the partition Deed dated 24.9.1970 could not be treated as ‘stridhana’ inasmuch as it was not in her possession at the time of commencement of the Act i.e. 15.2.1970 as required by Section 3(42) and that it was not sufficient that she had a pre-existing right of maintenance as on 15.2.1970. It was held that it was rightly included in the holding of the first appellant by the Authorised Officer.

8. Against the said order of the Land Commissioner dated 25.9.86 W.P. No. 11055/86 was filed in the Madras High Court which was transferred to the Tamil Nadu Land Reforms Special Appellate Tribunal, after its Constitution and numbered as TRP No. 82/94. After the TRP was dis­missed by the Special Tribunal by its judgment dated 25.4.95, the appellants have preferred this appeal against the said judgment.

9. We have he




















































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