1998(9) Supreme 70
Supreme Court of India
(From Karnataka High Court)
M.K. Mukherjee, G.T. Nanavati & B.N. Kirpal, JJ.
Smt. Mallawwa etc. -Appellants
versus
The Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd & Ors. -Respondents
Civil Appeal No. 3659 of 1993
With
C.A.Nos. 880/86, 1478/87, 6001/90, 6002/90, 2098/96, 5872/74
And
C.A Nos. 5965, 5966, 5967 & 5968/98
(@ SLP (C) Nos. 10745, 10747, 10748/95 & 9727/89 respectively)
Decided on 27-11-1998
Counsel for the Parties :
For the Appearing Parties : S.C. Dhanda, H.K. Puri, Ujjal Banerejee, Rajesh Srivastava, B.R. Sabharwal, Sunil Kapoor, M.K. Dua, S.K. Paul, Salil Paul, Atul Chitale, Ravikesh Sinha, Abijit P. Mehd, B.V. Desai, N.G.J.R. Luwang, Ms. Shashi Sohari, P.I. Mehta, (S.K. Jain) Adv. (RR-8), (B.D. Sharma) Adv. (RR-161, 165), P.K. Seth, S.K. Gupta, K.K. Gupta, S.C. Birla, Ms. Sushma Suri, Sudhir Kr. Gupta, Ms. Suchitra Atul Chitale, K.R. Nagaraja, Ms. Indra Sawhney and Ms. Meenakshi Arora, Advocate.
Held : What is important to be noted in Section 195, as it stood before it was amended by Act 56 of 1969, is that the legislature, after providing generally in Clause (b) of Sub-section (1) in wide terms so as to include ‘any person’ and every motor ‘vehicle’ within its sweep, carved out certain exception by adding a proviso to that clause. By proviso (ii), if restricted the generality of the main provision by confining the requirement to cases where “the vehicle is a vehicle in which passengers are carried for hire or reward or by reason of or in pursuance of a contract of employment”. In absence of the proviso the main provision would have included all classes of vehicle including goods vehicles and all passengers whether carried for hire or reward or by reason of or in pursuance of a contract of employment or otherwise. That is the reason why there is a reference to different classes of vehicles in proviso (i). It refers to “vehicle”, “public service vehicle” and “goods vehicle” The words “any person” in the main provision would have included the employee of the person insured, and therefore an exception was made by enacting proviso (i) so as to restrict liability of the insurer in respect of his employees. Both those exceptions were made as the legislature did not want to widen the liability of the insurer and the insured by making it more than what it was under the English Act, upon which Section 95 was based. (Para 7)
Again turning back to proviso (ii), we find that it in clear terms restricted the scope of the main provision by confining its application to that vehicle which is “a vehicle in which passengers are carried for hire or reward or by reason of or in pursuance of a contract of employment’. In the first instance, the vehicle had to be a vehicle of that class in which passengers were carried. If that was not the intention of the Legislature, it would not have used the phraseology “the vehicle is a vehicle in which passengers are carried” and would have simply provided that “except where passengers are carried for hire or reward....” So also the compulsory coverage was not intended for all passengers and, therefore, it was provided that “passengers are carried for hire or reward or by reason of or in pursuance of a contract of employment. Thus, the confinement of the operation of the main provision was in respect of vehicles and also passengers. And that was consistent with the English Law on which Section 95 was based. After the Section 95 was amended by Act 56 of 1969, the proviso remained as it was. The object of the Legislature in making that amendment was to cover the risk in respect of passengers of public service vehicles. The Legislature, therefore, made a special provision in sub-clause (ii) of clause (b), leaving the rest of sub-section (1) including the proviso as it was. If this background is kept in mind, it becomes apparent that the Legislature did not want to make any change in the position of law except to provide specifically for covering risk to passengers of public service vehicles. Though apparently, it looked as if the Legislature by introducing two sub-clauses in clause (b) had tried to make a distinction between passengers and non-passengers, that was not really so. Though the proviso appeared after sub-clause (ii) of clause (b), it really remained a proviso to the earlier clause (b) which after the amendment became clause (b)(i). Neither the object of introducing sub-clause (ii) in clause (b) nor the language of the proviso indicate that the proviso was to act as a proviso to sub-clause (ii) also. Even earlier, the passengers of a public service vehicle were required to be covered compulsorily as they answered the description of passengers carried for hire or reward. The only effect of making a special provision for passengers of a public service vehicle was taht proviso (ii) thereafter remained applicable vehicles other than public service vehicles. (Paras 8 & 9)
For the purposes of Section 95, ordinarily a vehicle could have been regarded as a vehicle in which passengers have carried if the vehicle was of that class. Keeping in mind the classification of vehicles, by the Act, the requirement of registration with particular including the class to which it belonged, requirement of obtaining a permit for using the vehicle for different purposes and compulsory coverage of insurance risk, it would not proper to consider a goods vehicle as a passenger vehicle on the basis of a single use or use on some stray occasions at that vehicle for carrying passengers for hire or reward. For the purpose of construing a provision like proviso (ii) to Section 95(1)(b), the correct test to determine whether a passenger was carried for hire or reward, would be whether there has been a systematic carrying of passengers. Only if the vehicle is so used then that vehicle can be said to be a vehicle in which passengers are carried for hire or reward. (Para 10)
Judgment
Nanavati, J.-These appeals were earlier placed for hearing before a Division Bench consisting of our learned Brothers Bharucha and Majmudar, JJ. on 20.2.1996. Upon hearing the counsel, the Division Bench passed the following order:
“What we are concerned with in these matters is the correct interpretation of Section 95 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939. The question arises, specifically, in the context of the death of the owner of goods being carried in a goods vehicle, and the question is whether the insurer of the goods’ vehicle is liable to pay the compensation awarded to his legal heirs. We note that there are divergent views expressed by the High Courts. Apart from that, in our view, a decision of a bench of two learned Judges in Pushpabai Parshottam Udeshi & Ors. v. M/s. Ranjit Ginning & Pressing Co. Pvt. Ltd. & Anr., AIR 1977 SC 1735, needs to be reconsidered in greater detail. In these circumstances, it is appropriate that these matters should be heard and disposed of by a bench of three learned Judges.”
2. Accordingly, they have been placed before us for final disposal. In Civil Appeal Nos. 3659 of 1993 and 880/86, the deceased were owners of the goods and as such were carried in the goods vehicles which had met with accidents. In C.A. Nos. 1478/87, 6001/90, 6002/90, 2098/96, 5872/94, SLP (C) Nos. 10745, 10747 and 10748 of 1995 the deceased were travelling in goods vehicles as passengers on payment of fare. In SLP (C) No. 9727 of 1989 the deceased was a gratuitous passenger.
3. In CA Nos. 3659 of 1993 the facts are that on 6.11.90 while Suresh was travelling in a goods carriage vehicle from Belgaum to Bagewadi, died as it met with an accident. His widow Mallawa, therefore, filed a claim petition claiming compensation. The claimant also made an application under Section 140 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 for interim compensation. The Motor Accident Claims Tribunal, Belgaum, awarded Rs. 25,000/- under Section 140 and directed the insurance company to pay that amount. The insurance company filed an appeal before the Karnataka High Court against that interim award. The High Court set aside the order holding that under a motor vehicle insurance policy issued by an insurance company in conformity with Section 147 of the 1988 Act, the insurance company is not liable to pay compensation in respect of death of or bodily injury to any person travelling in goods carriage as passenger whether as a hirer or otherwise. It also held that under the insurance policy there is no extra coverage in respect of a passenger like an owner or hirer travelling in the vehicle and, therefore also, the insurance company is not liable to pay compensation to the claimants either on the ground of fault liability or on the ground of no fault liability. Aggrieved by the judgment of the High Court, the claimant has filed this appeal.
4. In Civil Appeal No. 880 of 1986, one Poonam Chand when he was travelling with his goods vehicle died as that vehicle met with an accident. The Motor Accident Claim Tribunal, Kota, dismissed the claim petition on the ground that the accident had not occurred as a result of rash and negligent driving of the vehicle by its driver. It also held that the insurance company was exempted from any liability as the deceased was travelling in a goods vehicle contrary to the Motor Vehicle Rules. Aggrieved by that order, the claimants filed an appeal to the High Court of Rajasthan. It was first heard by a Single Judge who referred it along with other connected appeals, to a larger Bench for deciding the question of liability of the insurance company under Sections 95 and 96 of the Act in respect of death or bodily injury caused to persons travelling in a goods vehicle with goods or without goods and pursuant to the contract of service with the owner’s vehicle or otherwise. The Full Bench held that (1) in case of gratuitous passenger going on a joy-ride or on his own responsibility, insurance company is not liable; (2) in ca
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