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2000 Supreme(SC) 1446

2000(6) Supreme 125
SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
(From Madras High Court)
S.S. Mohammed Quadri and Y.K. Sabharwal, JJ.
Lakshmi Narayanan -Appellant
versus
S.S. Pandian -Respondent
Civil Appeal Nos. 7809-7810 of 1997
Decided on 4-9-2000.
Counsel for the Parties :
For the Appellant : T.L.V. Iyer, Sr. Advocate, Ms. N. Annapoorani and Nagbhushan, Advocates.
For the Respondent : S. Sivasubramaniam, Sr. Advocate, Ramasubbaraju, S. Srinivasan, P.R. Salvaraj, J.B. Ravi, Advocates.

Headnote:(i) Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 -Order 21 Rules 2 and 3-Payment or adjustment out of Court-Condition precedent to recognise-When decree can be said to be extinguished and became inexecutable-Recording of compromise as contemplated in Rule is a must-Effect of compromise on executability of decree depends upon intention of parties-It is a mixed question of law and fact and has to be determined by executing Court on an application under Section 47.

       After the rights of the parties are crystallised on passing of a decree by a competent court, in law they are not precluded from settling their disputes outside the court. But to have the compromise recognised by a Court, it has to be recorded under Rule 2 of Order 21, C.P.C. The consequence of not having it so recorded is contained in Rule 3 of Order 21 of the C.P.C. Sub-rules 1 and 2 requires that where any money payable under a decree is paid out of Court or the decree of any kind is otherwise adjusted in whole or in part to the satisfaction of the decree-holder, he shall certify that payment or adjustment in the Court which is to execute the decree and the Court is enjoined to record the same. Sub-rule (2) thereof enables the judgment-debtor or a person who has become surety for him to inform the Court of such payment or adjustment and prescribes the procedure to have it recorded. Rule 3 prohibits every Court executing the decree from recognising a payment or adjustment which has not been certified or recorded by the Court under the aforementioned sub-rules. (Paras 7 & 8)

       Where in any execution proceedings objection to executability a decree is taken under Section 47 of the C.P.C. on the ground that by virtue of a compromise, the decree got extinguished and became inexecutable, the germane question that should be asked is whether the compromise was recorded by the court whose duty it is to execute the decree. (Para 10)

       In a case where parties compromise after the decree in a case has been passed, the effect of the compromise on the executability of the decree depends upon the intention of the parties, which is a mixed question of law and fact and has to be determined by the executing court on an application under Section 47 of the C.P.C. on interpretation of the decree and the compromise in the light of the facts and circumstances of each case. If on such determination it is gathered that the intention of the parties is to extinguish the decree and either the decree holder or the judgment-debtor got the compromise recorded under Rule 2 of Order 21 of the C.P.C. by the court whose duty it is to execute the decree, the execution of the decree cannot be proceeded with by the executing court. But if the intention of the parties is to keep the decree alive and to give effect to it in the manner agreed upon between the parties in the compromise, the decree will be given effect to accordingly or executed as it is depending upon whether the compromise is recorded by the court as aforementioned or not. (Para 12)

       (ii) Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 -Order 21, Rules 2 and 3-Compromise out of Court-Effect of-Eviction decree-Execution proceedings-Compromise-Part of premises given to landlord-Three years time given under compromise to vacate remaining portion-On filing compromise E.P. dismissed as not pressed-No recording of compromised as contemplated under Rule 2 of Order 21- Court cannot recognise compromise. (Para 12)

       (iii) Code of Civil Procedure, 1908-Order 21, Rules 2 and 3-Compromise-Recording of-Compromise outside Court-On filing compromise in Court execution petition dismissed as not pressed-No specific order recording compromise -Order dismissing execution petition cannot be taken as recording of compromise by executing Court. (Para 16)

       (iv) Code of Civil Procedure, 1908-Order 21, Rules 2 and 3- Compromise execution of eviction decree-Parties entering into compromise outside Court-Tenant giving possession of part of premises and landlord giving 3 years time to vacate rest of premises-Compromise stipulating that landlord could execute decree on failure of tenant to vacate and handover possession after three years-Existing decree not extinguished but time of enforcement of decree by satisfying decree in part and postponing execution of decree in respect of remaining part by three years-No bar for execution of decree in view of proviso of Rule 3 of Order 21. (Paras 13, 14, 15 & 16)

       

JUDGMENT

Syed Shah Mohammed Quadri, J.- These appeals, by special leave, are directed against the common order of the High Court of judicature at Madras passed in C.R.P. Nos. 2705 and 2706 of 1996 on June 19, 1997 confirming the order of the Small Causes Court at Madras (Executing Court) dated February 20, 1995.

2. The appellant is the owner of premises Nos. 31 and 32, measuring four thousand feet, of Namasivaya Chetty Lane, Madras (for short, the suit premises ) and the respondent is the tenant on a monthly rent of Rs. 5,000/-. The appellant filed eviction petition (R.C.O.P. No. 2852 of 1989) under the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease & Rent Control) Act, 1960 for eviction of the respondent, which was decreed ex parte on May 2, 1990. The appellant (decree holder) filed E.P. No. 459 of 1990 in the Small Causes Court at Madras for execution of the said ex parte decree to have the respondent (judgment-debtor) evicted from the suit premises. During the pendency of the execution proceedings the parties entered into a compromise outside the court on November 7, 1990. Pursuant thereto, the respondent surrendered possession of the front portion of Door No. 32, measuring 840 square feet, and for the rest of the suit premises, viz., Door No. 31 and a back portion of Door No. 32 (for short, the premises ), the parties entered into an agreement of lease for three years, rate of rent remaining the same. The compromise, inter alia, provides that if the respondent fails to vacate the premises on the expiry of the said period, the appellant will be entitled to have the decree executed against him and get possession of the same. On filing the memo of compromise in the court, the E.P. was dismissed as not pressed .

3. Just before the expiry of the said period, the appellant by a written notice, sent by his advocate, asked the respondent to hand over vacant possession of the premises on November 6, 1993, the date on which the period of three years would expire. On the respondent failing to do so, the appellant filed a fresh E.P. (No. 664 of 1993), for execution of the decree for recovery of possession of the premises and the executing court ordered delivery of possession on November 16, 1993. While so, the respondent filed E.A. No. 973 of 1993, praying for recalling the order of November 16, 1993 and for dismissal of the E.P. The appellant also filed E.A. No. 299 of 1994 for permission to amend the description of the property in the execution petition. On February 20, 1995 the executing court by a common order dismissed the appellant s petition and allowed the respondent s petition. The appellant filed the aforementioned two Civil Revision Petitions in the High Court challenging the validity of the said common order. The High Court dismissed the revision petitions by the impugned order and thus the appellant is before us in these appeals.

4. Mr. T.L.V. Iyer, learned senior counsel appearing for the appellant, argued that the compromise between the parties did not extinguish the decree itself; it merely postponed that execution of the decree and as the respondent did not vacate the premises on the expiry of three years granted to him, the appellant is entitled to have the decree executed and recover possession of the premises. In any event, submits the learned senior counsel, as the compromise/adjustment of the decree was not recorded by the executing court in view of Rule 3 of Order 21, the Court cannot recognise the same and hold that the decree was extinguished in proceeding under Section 47 of the Code of 4 Civil Procedure (for short, the C.P.C. ).

5. Mr. S. Sivasubramaniam, learned senior counsel appearing for the respondent, contended that the compromise and execution of a new lease deed for three years, during the pendency of the execution proceedings, extinguished the decree; as the respondent would be enjoying the protection of the Act, he was not liable to be evicted under the existing decree. He argued that Order 21 Rule 2 of the C.P.C. was





























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