IMPORTANT POINT
Requirement of obtaining consent in writing of the Advocate-General for making motion for contempt of Court by any person is mandatory and motion u/s 15 of Contempt of Courts Act not in confirmity with requirement of that section is not maintainable.

Headnote:Contempt of Courts Act, 1971-Section 15-Conviction of appellant for criminal contempt-Contempt petition was filed by respondent with allegations that appellant in a public speech scandalised the Court or that offending speech had tendency to scandalise or lower the authority of Court-Contempt petition were filed without obtaining consent of Advocate General-Requirement of obtaining consent in writing of Advocate-General for making motion by any person was mandatory-Record showed that Court had not taken suo-motu action against appellant-In absence of compliance of mandatory requirement of Section 15, petitions were not maintainable-Conviction was liable to be set aside.
       Held : Now, the question is whether in these matters the High Court initiated contempt action on its own motion or on motions made by the respondents. It is not in dispute that the two contempt petitions (Contempt Petition No.12 and Contempt Petition No. 13 of 1996) were filed in the High Court against the appellant under Section 15 of the Act for having committed contempt of court as postulated under Section 2(c) of the Act for having made a public speech. According to the petitions, the appellant scandalised the court or at least the offending speech had the tendency to scandalise or lower the authority of the Court. The contempt petitions were filed without obtaining the consent of the Advocate-General. In one of the petitions consent had not even been sought for and besides the prayer for holding the appellant guilty of contempt, further prayers were also made for suitable inquiry being made in the allegations made by the appellant in the speech and for issue of directions to him to appear before Court and reveal the truth and for prosecuting him. The applicant before the High Court, it seems clear from the averments made in the contempt petition was in an opposite political camp. The petition was based on utterances made by appellant in public meetings held on 21st October, 1996. It is well settled that the requirement of obtaining consent in writing of the Advocate-General for making motion by any person is mandatory. A motion under Section 15 not in confirmity with the requirements of that Section is not maintainable. [State of Kerala v. M.S. Mani and Others [(2001) 8 SCC 82]. In Contempt Petition No.12 an application dated 22nd October, 1996 was submitted to the Advocate-General along with proposed contempt petition stating that the applicant wanted to file petition by 2nd December, 1996 and, therefore, the permission may be granted before that date and further stating that if no answer is received from the Advocate-General it would be presumed that permission has been granted and the applicant will proceed with the intended contempt proceedings. Such a course is not permissible under Section 15 of the Act. There is no question of any presumption. In fact, Contempt Petition No.12 was filed on 2nd December, without the consent of the Advocate-General. It further appears that the application seeking permission of the Advocate-General was received by him on 26th November, 1996. It also appears that the Advocate-General appeared before the Court on 3rd February, 1997 and stated that he can decide the question of consent within a reasonable time. The impugned judgment holding appellant guilty of contempt and inflicting simple imprisonment for a period of one week and fine of Rs. 2000/- was passed on 7th February, 1997. (Para 19 to 21)
       In these matters, the question is not about compliance or non-compliance of the principles of natural justice by granting adequate opportunity to the appellant but is about compliance of the mandatory requirements of Section 15 of the Act. As already noticed the procedure of Section 15 is required to be followed even when petition is filed by a party under Article 215 of the Constitution, though in these matters petitions filed were under Section 15 of the Act. From the material on record, it is not possible to accept the contention of the respondents that the Court had taken suo motu action. Of course, the Court had the power and jurisdiction to initiate contempt proceedings suo motu and for that purpose consent of the Advocate-General was not necessary. At the same time, it is also to be borne in mind that the Courts normally take suo motu action in rare cases. In the present case, it is evident that the proceedings before the High Court were initiated by the respondents by filing contempt petitions under Section 15. The petitions were vigorously pursued and strenuously argued as private petitions. The same were never treated as suo motu petitions. In absence of compliance of mandatory requirement of Section 15, the petitions were not maintainable. As a result of aforesaid view, it is unnecessary to examine in the present case, the effect of non-compliance of the directions issued in Duda s case by placing the informative papers before the Chief Justice of the High Court. For the foregoing reasons we set aside the impugned judgment and allow the appeals. Fine, if deposited by the appellant shall be refunded to him. (Para 23 to 25)

JUDGMENT

Y.K. Sabharwal, J.-Action for contempt is divisible into two categories, namely, that initiated suo motu by the Court and that instituted otherwise than on the court s own motion. The mode of initiation in each case would necessarily be different. While in the case of suo motu proceedings, it is the Court itself which must initiate by issuing a notice, in the other cases initiation can only be by a party filing an application. [Pallav Sheth v. Custodian and Others, (2001) 7 SCC 549].

2. The main issue for determination in these appeals is whether contempt proceedings were initiated against the appellant suo motu by the court or by respondents. First we may note the background under which these matters were referred to a larger Bench.

3. Delhi High Court in the case of Anil Kumar Gupta v. K. Suba Rao & Anr. [ILR (1974) 1 Del.1] issued following directions:

"The office is to take note that in future if any information is lodged even in the form of a petition inviting this Court to take action under the Contempt of Courts Act or Article 215 of the Constitution, where the informant is not one of the persons named in Section 15 of the said Act, it should not be styled as a petition and should not be placed for admission on the judicial side. Such a petition should be placed before the Chief Justice for orders in Chambers and the Chief Justice may decide either by himself or in consultation with the other judges of the Court whether to take any cognizance of the information."

4. In P.N. Duda v. P. Shiv Shanker & Ors. [(1988) 3 SCC 167] this Court approving the aforesaid observation of Delhi High Court directed as under:

"...the direction given by the Delhi High Court sets out the proper procedure in such cases and may be adopted, at least in future, as a practice direction or as a rule, by this Court and other High Courts."

5. Challenging the conviction of the appellant for offence under Section 15 of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 (for short the Act ) it was, inter alia, contended that the directions in P.N. Duda s case (supra) were not followed by the High Court inasmuch as the informative papers styled as contempt petitions were not placed before the Chief Justice of the High Court for suo motu action and, therefore, the exercise was uncalled for and beyond legal sanctity. This aspect assumed significant importance because admittedly the contempt petitions were filed in the High Court without the consent of the Advocate-General and, therefore, not competent except when the court finds that the contempt action was taken by the court on its own motion. The two-judge bench hearing the appeals expressed the view that the aforesaid directions approved by this Court in P.N. Duda s case are of far-reaching consequences. The Bench observed that the power under Section 15 of the Act to punish contemners for contempt rests with the court and in Duda s case, they seem to have been denuded to rest with the Chief Justice on the administrative side. Expressing doubts about the correctness of the observations made in Duda s case, and observing that the same require reconsideration, these appeals were directed to be referred for decision by a larger Bench. Under this background, these matters have been placed before us.

6. For determination of the main issue in these appeals including the aforesaid aspect arising out of Duda s case, it is necessary to briefly note the object of the power of the Court to punish a person for contempt.

7. Every High Court besides powers under the Act has also the power to punish for contempt as provided in Article 215 of the Constitution of India. Repealing the Contempt of Courts Act, 1952, the Act was enacted, inter alia, providing definition of civil and criminal contempt and also providing for filtering of criminal contempt petitions. The Act laws down contempt of court to mean civil contempt or criminal contempt. We are concerned with criminal contempt. Criminal contempt is defined in Section 2(c) of the

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2004 Supreme(SC) 1484

IMPORTANT POINTRequirement of obtaining consent in writing of the Advocate-General for making motion for contempt of Court by any person is mandatory and motion u/s 15 of Contempt of Courts Act not in confirmity with requirement of that section is not maintainable.

Cases Referred (9)

IMPORTANT POINT
Requirement of obtaining consent in writing of the Advocate-General for making motion for contempt of Court by any person is mandatory and motion u/s 15 of Contempt of Courts Act not in confirmity with requirement of that section is not maintainable.