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1992 Supreme(SC) 178

SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
S. Ratnavel Pandian and K. Jayachandra
Reddy, JJ.
Pritam Pal - Appellant
versus
High Court of Madhya Pradesh - Respondent
Crl. Appeal No. 258 of 1981
Decided on 19.2.1992
Counsel for the parties:
For the Appellant: In person.
For the Respondent: Uma Nath Singh.

IMPORTANT POINTS
1. Power of criminal contempt conferred upon the Supreme, Court and the High Court being Courts of Record under Articles 129 and 215 of the Constitution of India respectively is an inherent power and it cannot be abridged by any ordinary legislation including the provisions of the Contempt of Courts Act. 1971.
2. To punish an Advocate for contempt of Court no doubt must be regarded as an extreme measure but to preserve the proceedings of the Courts from being deflected or interfered with and to keep the streams Of justice pure serene and undefiled it becomes the duty of the Court to punish the contemner in order to preserve its dignity.

Headnote:(i) Constitution of India, 1950- Arts 129 and 215 - Contempt Jurisdiction - Constitutional jurisdiction of the Supreme Court and the High Court under Articles 129 and 215 cannot be curtailed by the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 - Their inherent power is elastic, unfettered and not subjected to any limit - Limitation - The power should be used sparingly and that the procedure to be followed should be fair - The contemner should be made aware of the charge against him and given a reasonable opportunity to defend him.

       Held: If we examine the facts of the present case in the backdrop of the proposition of law, the contentions raised by the appellant challenging the procedure followed by the High Court do not merit any consideration since the appellant has been served with a notice of contempt and thereafter permitted to go through the records and finally has been afforded a fair opportunity of putting forth his explanation for the charge leveled against him. Incidentally, we may say that the submission of the contemner that the impugned order is vitiated on the ground of procedural irregularities and that Article 215 of the Constitution of India is to be read in conjunction with the provisions of Sections 15 and 17 of the Act of 1971, cannot be countenanced and it has to be summarily rejected as being devoid of any merit. (Para 13)

       (ii) Constitution of India, 1950 - Art 215 Criminal contempt - Conviction - Appeal against - The contemner, a practicing Advocate after having failed to get a decision in his favor in his own cause making libelous allegations against the learned Judges of the High Court - The offending criticism and the scandalizing allegations made are most fatal and dangerous obstruction of justice shaking the confidence of the public in the distraction of justice - In such a case, it becomes the duty of the Court, though painful to punish an Advocate, to punish the contemner in order to preserve its dignity - Conviction confirmed - Sentence of 2 months imprisonment awarded by High court does not call for interference.

       Held: To punish an Advocate for Contempt of Court, no doubt, must be regarded as an extreme measure, but to preserve the proceedings of the Courts from being deflected or interfered with, and to keep the streams of justice pure, serene and undefiled, it becomes the duty of the Court, though painful, to punish the contemner in order to preserve its dignity. No one can claim immunity from the operation of the law of contempt, if his act or conduct in relation to Court or Court proceedings interferes with or is calculated to obstruct the due course of justice. (Para 20)

       Further held: Coming to the question of sentence, it appears from the order of the High Court that the appellant had adopted a defiant attitude and tried to justify the aspersions made by him even without thinking it necessary to apologize. Before this Court also, the appellant has neither expressed any contrition nor has he any repentance for the vicious allegations made against the learned Judges of the High Coon. But on the other hand, he has exhibited a dogged determination to pursue the matter, come what may. A reading of his memorandum of grounds and the written and signed arguments show that he has ventured into another bout of allegations against the High Court Judges and persisted in his campaign of vilification. His present conduct has aggravated rather than mitigating his offence. (Para 21)

JUDGMENT

S. Ratnavel Pandian, J.- The appellant, Mr. Pritam Pal Dhingra is a practicing Advocate in the High Court of Madhya Pradesh at Jabalpur, having joined the Bar on 4.2.1979. Earlier to joining the Bar he was serving in the Army and retired on 23.12.1965. Thereafter, he was re-employed in the Defence Accounts Department on 7.2.1966 as U.D.C. (Auditor). On 29.2.1976, the appellant served three months notice of resignation upon the departmental authorities for the reasons mentioned in the said notice and also requested to pay him the contributory provident fund benefits for his 10 years service though the date of his super annuation in the said post was 30.9.1986. The Department not only refused to accept his resignation but also did not relieve him even after the expiry of three months. According to the appellant, there was neither any departmental enquiry pending nor contemplated against him during those three months i.e. between 29.2.1976 and 31.5.1976. However, a charge sheet dated 21.12.1976 for imposing a major penalty on a complaint by it. C.D.A. Vehicle Factory was served on him to which he submitted his written statement. Then he served a final quit notice w.e.f. 8.1.1977. Though on the basis of the show cause notice, an enquiry was started, nothing came out of it. Therefore, the appellant moved the High Court of Madhya Pradesh at Jabalpur by filing Writ Petition M.P. No. 786 of 1978 under Article 226 of the Constitution of India sworn on 27.11.1978 requesting several prayers inclusive of issuance of directions to the respondent therein (the departmental authorities) to accept his resignation so as to enable him to take any other profession of his liking and to declare the retention of his service against his will after 31.5.1976 as illegal and mala-fide and to re-imburse pay and allowances for the period of his enforced absence after the expiry of three months notice period etc. The High Court issued show cause notice to the respondents 1 to 3 in the Writ Petition. The respondent No.3 thereafter accepted the resignation dated 29.2.1976 of the appellant w.e.f. 15.1.1979 by which time the appellant claims to have completed 31 years of combined military and civil service i.e. from 29.11.1947 to 15.1.1979. Meanwhile, the departmental enquiry initiated against him was dropped.

Then the appellant submitted supplemental applications praying that his resignation should be converted into one of voluntary retirement and that his military services should be counted with civil service and that he should be given all service benefits like pension, gratuity etc. as well as consequential benefits on account of the delay in acceptance of his resignation. Two applications being I.A. No: 908/79 and I.A. No. 4246/78 were filed by the appellant, they being one for amendment of the petition and the other for taking some additional grounds. Both applications were allowed by a Division Bench of the High Court comprising of Mr. Justice J.S. Verma (as he then was) and Mr. Justice U.N. Bachawat, as the counsel for the respondents had no objection and granted one week time for incorporating the amendments in the petition. At the request of the counsel for the respondent, Shri R.P. Sinha, the Court granted two weeks time to file the additional return by order dated 16.3.1979. The case was listed for further hearing on 2.4.1979 on which date the writ petition was dismissed. The appellant then on 16.4.1979 moved an application to review the order dated 2.4.1979. The application was registered as M.C.C. No. 209 of 1979. This application was too dismissed on 23.4.1979 with the following observation:

"The grievance of the petitioner in this review petition is that the writ petition (M.P. No. 786/78) was dismissed in motion hearing without hearing the petitioner.

The substance of the order dismissing the Writ Petition in motion hearing as stated earlier indicates that this averment made by the petitioner is not correct. We also distinctly recollec













































































































































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