1951 Supreme(SC) 5

SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
 25th January 1951
H.J. KANIA C.J.I., FAZL ALI, PATANJALI SASTRI, B.K. MUKHERJEA, S.R. DAS AND CHANDRASEKHARA AIYAR, JJ.
Tarapada De and others - Appellants
Versus
The State of W.B.
Criminal Case No. 24 of 1950.
Advocates appeared
Shri Atul Chandra Gupta and Shri Sudhansu Sekhar Mukherjee. Senior Advocates, (Shri Arun Kumar Datta and Shri S. N. Mukherjea, Advocates, with them), instructed by Shri P. K. Chatterjee, Agent -for Appellants; Shri ,M. C. Setalvad , Attorney-General for India, (Shri B. Sen Advocate, with him), instructed by Shri P. K. Bose, Agent - for the State of West Bengal

Headnote:Article 22(5)-Meaning of "as Soon as may be".

       Under the Bengal Criminal Law Amendment Act 1930, a very large number of persons were detained. The validity of that Act was being challenged in the High Court and the judgment was expected to be delivered towards the end of February, 1950. The Preventive Detention Act, 1950, was passed by the Parliament of India in the last week of February, 1950, and the impugned orders on all the detenus were served on 26-2-1950. It was contended by the appellants that the communication of the grounds dated the 14th March was not a compliance with Art. 22(5) of the Constitution as those grounds were not communicated "as soon as may be."

       Held: The detention of the appellants could not be accepted having regard to the fact that the Provincial Government had thus suddenly to deal with a large number of cases on one day. - Article 22(5)-Vagueness of grounds-Satisfaction of authority-Communication of supplementary grounds-Preventive Detention Act (1950). Ss. 3,7 -Large number of detention orders passed overnight-Satisfaction.

       Held : (1 ) "Vague Grounds" do not stand on the same footing as "irrelevant grounds". An irrelevant ground has no connection at all with the satisfaction of the Provincial Government which makes the order of detention. For the reasons stated in that judgment we are also unable to accept the contention that if the grounds are vague and no representation is possible there can be no satisfaction of the authority as required under S. 3, Prevention Detention Act. This argument mixes up two objects. The sufficiency of the grounds, which gives rise to the satisfaction of the Provincial Government is not a matter for examination by the Ct. The sufficiency of the grounds to give the detained person the earliest opportunity to make a representation can be examined by Ct., but only from that point of view. We are, therefore, unable to accept the contention that the quality and characteristic of the grounds should be the same for both tests. On the question of satisfaction, as has been stated, one person may be but another may not be satisfied on the same grounds. That aspect, however, is not for the determination of the Ct. having regard to the words used in the Act. The second part of the inquiry is clearly open to the Ct. under Art. 22 (5). We are, therefore, unable to accept the argument that if the grounds are not sufficient or adequate for making the representation the grounds cannot be sufficient for the subjective satisfaction of the authority." (Per Kania C.].)

       (2) When the authorities sent their second communication dated 16-7-1950 to the applts. they described as "in continuation of the grounds already furnished" and as "the supplementary grounds for your detention". Relaying on the wording of this communication it was argued that these were additional grounds which were furnished to the detenu and therefore, the procedure prescribed under Art. 22(5) has not been followed. It was argued that the obligation to communicate grounds "as soon as may be" was absolute. The grounds for detention must be before the Provincial Government before they could be satisfied about the necessity for making the detention order. If the grounds before the detaining authorities on 26-2-1950 were only those which they communicated on the 14th of March, they cannot support the detention on additional grounds which were not before them on that day and which they set out in the second communication four months later. It was also contented that the fact of this communication showed that the authorities were not satisfied on the original grounds and had, therefore, put forth these supplementary grounds as an afterthought. In our opinion these arguments cannot be accepted. A description of the contents of the second communication as "supplementary grounds" does not necessarily make them additional or new grounds. One has to look at the contents to find out whether they are new grounds as explained in our judgment in case No. 22 of 1950. Examining the contents of the After communication in that way we find that they only furnish details of the second heads of the grounds furnished to the appropriate applt. on 14-3-1950 in respect of his activities. We are unable to treat them as new grounds and we agree with the RC. in its conclusion that these are not fresh or new grounds. We do not think it proper to consider the true effect of the communication only by reading its opening words. The whole of it must be read and considered together. The contention that the authorities were not satisfied on the original grounds and therefore put forth this communication as the supplemental grounds is again unsound. The fact that these details were communicated later does not necessarily show that they were not within the knowledge of the authorities when they sent the communication dated the 14th of March." (per Kania C.J.)

       (3) "One additional point raised in this appeal was that the fact that a large number of fresh orders of detention were made "overnight" indicates bad faith on the part of the authorities, for the authorities could not have applied their minds to each individual case. I am unable to accept this contention as correct. The authorities had already applied their minds to the suspected activities of each of the detenus and were satisfied that with a view to prevent them from doing some prejudicial act of a particular kind it was necessary to make an order of detention against them under the local Acts. There being doubt as to the validity of the local Acts and the Preventive Detention Act having been passed in the meantime the question was to make a fresh order under the new Act. The minds of the authorities having already been made up as to the expediency of making an order of detention against them, an elaborate application of mind, such as is now suggested, does not appear to be necessary at all. I do not think there was any failure of duty on the part of the authorities which will establish bad faith on their part."(Per Das J.) Sections 3, 7- Vagueness of grounds-Satisfaction of authority -Communication of supplementary grounds-Validity-Constitution of India, Art. 22(5).