Judgement

 Patanjali Sastri, C.J.I.

This is an application under Art. 32 of the Constitution seeking protection of the petitioner s fundamental right under Art. 15 (1) against alleged violation thereof by the respondents.

2. The petitioners are three residents of Etah in Uttar Pradesh. They complain that at the by-elections to the Municipal Board of Etah held on 2-11-1951, 8-12-1951 and 17-3-1952, at which respondents 4, 11 and12 were respectively elected, the petitioners were deprived of their rights to exercise their votes and to seek their election as candidates, as those by-elections were held on communal lines on the basis of separate electorates contrary to the provisions of the Constitution. They also allege that the nomination of respondent 3 as a member of the Board by the Government was an illegal exercise of its powers, as the interest which that respondent was nominated to represent in the Board was already sufficiently represented. The petitioners accordingly pray for the issue of writs of quo waranto , mandamus and other appropriate writs or directions to respondents, 3, 4, 11 and 12 to show under what authority they are acting as members of the Board and to prevent them from acting as such members. The petitioners also ask for writs on the District Magistrate and the Civil Judge of Etah, respondents 2 and 13 respectively, directing them not to hold or permit the holding of any meeting of the Board which is said to be illegally constituted.

3. Now, it cannot be seriously disputed that any law providing for elections on the basis of separate electorates for members of different religious communities offends against Art. 15 (1) of the Constitution which runs thus :

"15 (1) The State shall not discriminate against any citizen on grounds only of religion,race, caste, sex, place of birth or any of them."

4. This constitutional mandate to the State not to discriminate against any citizen on the ground, "inter alia , of religion clearly extends to political as well as to other rights, and any election held after the Constitution in pursuance of such a law, subject to Cl. (4), must be held void as being repugnant to the Constitution. But the question is whether the petitioners are now entitled to the relief they seek in this application under Art. 32.

5. It is true, as pointed out in the Cross Roads case ; - Romesh Thappar v. State of Madras , AIR 1950 SC 124 (A), that Art. 32 provides, in some respects, for a more effective remedy through this Court than Art. 226 does through the High Courts. But the scope of the remedy is clearly narrower in that it is restricted solely to enforcement of fundamental rights conferred by Part III of the Constitution. Any right, for instance, which the petitioners may have as rate-payers in the Municipality to insist that the Board should be legally constituted and that respondents 3, 4, 11 and 12, who are not properly elected or nominated members, should not be permitted to take part in the proceedings of the Board, is outside the purview of Art. 32. as such right, even if it exists, is not a fundamental right conferred by Part III.

6. Petitioners learned counsel, however, contended that the fundamental right conferred by Art. 15 (1) on the petitioners as citizens of India was violated by the elections in question having been held on a basis which discriminated against the petitioners on the ground of their religion in that it precluded them from exercising their franchise in relation to all the candidates and from contesting the elections without regard to the reservation of seats on communal basis. Learned counsel also submitted that the delimitation of the constituencies on communal lines was a denial of equality to the petitioners in the matter of their political rights and in that respect also infringed their fundamental right under Art, 14. We are unable to accede to these contentions.

7. It is plain that the fundamental right conferred by Art. 15 (1) is conferred on a citizen as an