Judgment

GHULAM HASAN, J.: The question involved in this appeal relates to the constitutional validity of clause 25 of the Rajasthan Food grains Control Order, 1949, hereinafter called the Control Order, and arises in the following circumstances:

2. The respondents, who are grain merchants at Raniwara in Jodhpur Division, Rajasthan State, held licences for dealing in foodgrains. They held considerable stocks of bajra in the ordinary course of business but on October 7, 1950, their stocks were frozen by the Deputy Commissioner, Civil Supplies, Jodhpur through the Sub-Divisional Officer. It is not disputed that the market price then prevailing was about Rs. 18/- per maund. The State, however, requisitioned the stocks at the rate of Rs. 9/- per maund and sold them at Rs. 13/5/4 per maund. The respondents claimed that they had purchased the bajra at the prevailing market rate of Rs. 17/- to Rs. 18/- per maund. They filed a petition on January 23, 1951, for the issue of a writ under Article 226 of the Constitution before the High Court of Rajasthan contending that clause 25 of the Control Order was void under Article 14, 19(1)(g) and 31(2) of the Constitution.

The High Court held that clause 25 was void inasmuch as it is a restriction upon the fundamental right of the respondents to carry on business under Article 19(1)(g) of the Constitution, that the restriction is not reasonable and is not saved by clause (6) of Article 19. The High Court further held that clause 25 was also hit by Article 31(2) as fair compensation had not been fixed the law for the acquisition of the foodgrains. As the grains had already been disposed of by the Government, the High Court holding that Rs. 17/- a maund was fair compensation directed that the State of Rajasthan shall pay compensation at that rate. The State has preferred the present appeal on a certificate granted by the High Court.

3. The impugned clause 25 is as follows :

"25. Notwithstanding anything contained in this Order, the Commissioner, the Director, the Deputy Commissioner, the Nazim, the Assistant Commissioner, the Sub-Divisional Officer, the Senior Officer of a jurisdictional Thikana, the Enforcement Officer or such other officer as may be authorised by the Commissioner in this behalf, may freeze any stocks of food grains held by any person, whether in his own behalf or not, and such person shall not dispose of any food grains out of the stock so freezed except with the permission of the said authority. Such stocks shall also be liable to be requisitioned or disposed of under orders of the said authority at the rate fixed for purposes of Government procurement.

4. It is not disputed that bajra is an essential commodity within the meaning of the Essential Supplies Act (No. 24 of 1946). The question that arises for consideration is how far and in what respects clause 25 can be said to be void as violating Part III of the Constitution. The clause authorises the Commissioner and various other authorities mentioned therein and such other officers as may be authorised by the Commissioner to freeze any stock of food grains held by a person. It is true that the authority of the Commissioner to delegate his powers to any other officer at his discretion is expressed in somewhat wide terms but we need not decide that that per se would be sufficient to invalidate the clause.

Admittedly that power has not been exercised in the present case. Nor do we think that the power to freeze the stocks of food grains is arbitrary or based on no reasonable basis. It is not disputed that the clause does not state in express terms the circumstances in or the grounds on which the stocks may be freezed but it should be read along with Section 3 of the Essential Supplies Act which lays down the policy for controlling the production, supply and distribution of essential commodities. Section 3 in so far as it is material says:

"The Central Government, so far as it appears to it to be necessary or expedient for maintain