1956 Supreme(SC) 60

SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
17th September 1956
S.R. DAS, C.J.I., VENKATARAMA AYYAR, B.P. SINHA, S.K. DAS AND GOVINDA MENON J.
Shamrao Vishnu Parulekar and another, Petitioners,
Versus
The District Magistrate, Thana and others Respondents.
Petns. Nos 100 and 101 of 1956.
Advocates appeared
Mr. N C. Chatterjee, Sr. Advocate (Mr.Sadhan Chandra Gupta and Mr. Janardhan Sharma, Advocates, with him), for Petitioners; My. C.K. Daphtary, Solicitor-General for India (Mr. Porus A. Mehta and Mr R. H. Dhebar Advocates, with him), for respondents.

Headnote:Same Word occuring ion different parts of statute

       Held: It is, at all events, reasonable to presume that the same meaning is implied by the use of the same expression in every part of an Act. This rule of construction is only one element in deciding what the true import of the enactment is to ascertain which it is necessary to have regard to the purpose behind the particular provision and its setting in the scheme of the statute. The presumption that same words are used in the same meaning is however very slight, and it is proper if sufficient reason can be assigned, to construe a word in one part of an Act in a different sense from that which it bears in another part of an Act. - Preventive Detention Act, 1950, Sections 3 (3) and 7 (1)Meaning of "grounds on which the order has been made" -Difference in meaning of the expression in the two sections-Sufficient compliance with the provisions.

       It was in evidence on the basis of the affidavit on behalf of the District Magistrate that when the District Magistrate sent a report under S. 3 (3) of the Preventive Detention Act, 1950, on 28-1-1956, he did send a report not merely of the fact of the making of the order of detention, but also of the materials on which he had made the order. The contention of the petitioners was that the grounds which were formulated on 30-1-1956 and communicated on 31-1-1956 should also have been sent along with the report.

       Held: (1) The words "grounds on which the order has been made" occurring in S. 3 (3) of the Act when construed in their natural and ordinary sense, would include any information or material on which the order was based.

       (2) The provisions of S. 3 (3) of the Act are intended to regulate the course of business between the State Government and the authordities subordinate to it exercising its power under statutory delegation; and their scope is altogether different from that of S. 7 which deals with the right of the detenue as against the State Government and its subordinate authorities. Section 3 (3) of the Act requires the authority to communicate the grounds of its order to the State Government, so that the latter might satisfy itself whether detention should be approved. Section 7 requires the statement of grounds to be sent to the detenue so that he might make a representation against the order. The purpose of the sections is so different that it cannot be presumed that the expression "the grounds on which the order has been made" is used in S. 3 (3) in the same sense which it bears in S. 7.

       Whereas under S. 7 (2) it is open to the authority not to disclose to the detenue facts if it considers that it would be against public interest so to do it is these facts that will figure prominently in a report by the subordinate authority to the State Government under S. 3 (3), and form the basis for approval. If the grounds which are furnished under S. 3 (3) could contain matters which need not be communicated to the detenue under S. 7, the expression "grounds on which the order has been made cannot bear the same meaning in both the sections.

       It is obvious that the communication that has to be served on the detenue under S. 7 of the Act is a personal document setting out the grounds for the order and the particulars in support thereof, subject, of course, to S. 7 (2), whereas the report to the State under S. 3 (3) is a less formal document in the nature of a confidential inter- departmental communication, which is to contain the particulars on which the order was made. It could not have been intended that the contents of the two communications which are so dissimilar in their scope and intendment should be identical.

       (3) Accordingly, the failure on the part of the District Magistrate to send along with his report under S. 3 (3), the very ground" which he subsequently communicated to the detenue under S. 7 was not a breach of the requirements of that sub-section, and that it was sufficiently complied with when he reported the materials on which he made the order. - Preventive Detention Act, 1950, Section 7-Grounds of detention- Vagueness.

       The communication that was sent to the petitioners ran as follows:

       "During the monsoon in the year 1955, you held secret meeting of adivasis in Umbergaon, Dhanu, Palghar and Jawahar Talue kas of Thana District at which you incited and instigated them to have recourse to intimidation, violence and arson in order to prevent the labourers from outside villages hired by landlords from working for landlords. As a direct, result of your incitement and instigation, there were several cases of intimidation, violence and arson in which the Adivasis from these Talukas indulged. Some of these cases are described below.

       Then followed a detailed statement of the cases. The particulars which followed gave the dates on which the several incidents took place. The communication further stated that it was not in the public interest to disclose further facts.

       Held: The communication as a whole was not vague and with sufficiently definite to apprise the petitioners of what they were charged with and to enable them to give their explanation therefore.