Judgment

S. R. DAS CJI. : We have had the advantage of perusing the judgment prepared by our learned Brother Subba Rao and we agree with the order proposed by him, namely, that all the above appeals should be dismissed with costs, although we, do not subscribe to all the reasons advanced by him.

2. The relevant facts and the several points raised by learned counsel for the appellants and the petitioners in support of the appeals have been fully set out in the judgment which our learned Brother will presently deliver and it is not necessary for us to set out the same here. Without committing ourselves to all the reasons adopted by our learned Brother, we agree with his following conclusions, namely, (1) that the Uttar Pradesh Transport Service (Development) Act 1955 (Act IX of 1955), hereinafter referred to as the U. P. Act, did not, on the passing of the Motor Vehicles (Amendment) Act, 1956 (100 of 1956), hereinafter referred to as the Central Act, become wholly void under Art. 254 (1) of the Constitution but continued to be a valid & subsisting law supporting the scheme already framed under the U. P. Act; (2) that, even if the Central Act be construed as amounting, under Art. 254 (2), to a repeal of the U. P. Act, such repeal did not destroy or efface the scheme ready framed under the U. P. Act, for the provisions of S. 6 of the General Clauses Act saved the same; (3) that the U. P. Act did not offend the provisions of Art. 31 of the Constitution, as it stood before the Constitution (4th Amendment) Act, 1955, for the U. P. Act and in particular S. 11(5) thereof provided for the payment of adequate compensation. These finding are quite sufficient to dispose of the points urged by Mr. Nambiyar and Mr. Naunit Lal in support of the claims and contentions of their respective clients.

3. In view of the aforesaid finding that the U. P. Act did not infringe the fundamental rights guaranteed by Art. 31, it is wholly unnecessary to discuss the following questions, namely, (a) whether the provisions of Part III the Constitution enshrining the fundamental rights are mere checks or limitations on the legislative competency conferred on Parliament and the State Legislatures by Arts. 245 and 246 read with the relevant entries in the Lists in the Seventh Schedule to the Constitution or are an integral part of the provisions defining prescribing and conferring the legislative competency itself and (b) whether the doctrine of eclipse is applicable only to pre-Constitution laws or can apply also to any post-Constitution law which falls under Art. 13(2) of the Constitution. As, however, our learned Brother has thought fit to embark upon a discussion of these questions, we desire to guard ourselves against being understood as accepting or acquiescing in the conclusion that the doctrine of eclipse cannot apply to any post-Constitution law. A post-Constitution law may infringe either a fundamental right conferred on citizens only or a fundamental right conferred on any person, citizen or non-citizen. In the first case the law will not stand in the way of the exercise by the citizens of that fundamental right and, therefore, will not have any operation on the rights of the citizens, but it will be quite effective as regards non-citizens. In such a case the fundamental right will, qua the citizens, throw a shadow on the law which will nevertheless be on the Statute Book as a valid law binding on non-citizens and if that shadow is removed by a constitutional amendment the law will 653 immediately be applicable even to the citizens without being re-enacted. The decision in John M. Wilkerson v. Charles A. Rahrer, (1891) 140 US 545: 35 Law Ed 572 cited by our learned Brother is squarely in point. In other words the doctrine of eclipse as explained by this Court in Bhikaji Naraki Dhakras v. State of Madhya Pradesh, 195-52 SCR 589 also applies to a post-Constitution law of this kind. Whether a post-Constitution law of the other kind, namely, which infringes a