Judgment

SUBBA RAO, J. : This appeal by special leave raises the question of true construction of the provisions of S. 123(7) of the Representation of the People Act, 1951, (hereinafter called "the Act"). The material facts may be briefly stated: Sardar Gurmej Singh, the appellant, Sardar Pratap Singh Kairon, the present Chief Minister of the State of Punjab and respondent herein, and others were the contesting candidates in the general election held in February 1957 from the Sarhali constituency. The respondent secured the highest number of votes and was duly declared elected to the Punjab Legislative Assembly. On 11-4-1957, the appellant filed an election petition (Election Petition No. 22 of 1957) for the declaration that the election of the respondent was void under Section 100 of the Act. It was, inter alia, alleged by him that the respondent and his election agent had appointed a number of persons as the respondent s counting and polling agents at different centres and that the said persons were, at the material time, working as lambardars, and, therefore, the respondent was guilty of corrupt practice within the meaning of S. 123 of the Act. The respondent denied the material allegations made in the petition. On the pleading as many as 12 issues were framed, and issues 3 and 8 were taken up for trial as preliminary issues. Issue 8, which is the only relevant issue for the present enquiry, reads:

"Is Lambardar a person in the service of Government or is it covered by any of the clauses of S. 123(7) of the Representation of the People Act, 1951?"

The Election Tribunal held against the respondent on both the preliminary issues. On issue 8 it held that a lambardar was a revenue officer and village accountant in the service of Government within the meaning of cl. (f) of sub-sec. (7) of S. 123 of the Act. On the basis of the findings on the preliminary issues, the Tribunal directed that the remaining issues be set down for hearing. The respondent canvassed the correctness of that order by filing a petition in the High Court of Punjab at Chandigarh under Arts. 226 and 227 of the Constitution. The petition was heard by a division bench of the Punjab High Court, consisting of Falshaw and Mehar Singh, JJ. The learned Judges by their order dated 12-3-1959, confirmed the order of the Election Tribunal on issue 3, but set aside its order on issue 8. The learned Judges held that

"Lambardars are undoubtedly a class of revenue officers appointed by the Government for the purpose of collecting the land revenue and receiving a statutory percentage on the sum realised by them as their remuneration for so doing, but whereas they were included along with village accountants who are called Patwaris in this State and by other names set out in the Section in other parts of India, they are clearly excluded by the provision of clause (f).

Though the scope of this finding was subject to some controversy, it is clear that the learned Judges intended to hold that, though a lambardar was disqualified under the corresponding sub-s. (8) of S. 123 of the Act before it was amended in 1956, he was excluded from the operation of that Section by cl. (f) of sub-sec. (7) of the amended Section. On the basis of that finding, the High Court set aside the decision of the Tribunal on issue 8 and confirmed the same in other respects. The appellant filed the present appeal by obtaining the special leave of this Court.

2. Mr. N. C. Chatterjee, the learned Counsel for the appellant, contends that a lambardar is both a revenue officer and village accountant within the meaning of cl. (f) of sub-s. (7) of S. 123 of the Act, and, therefore, the respondent in engaging the lambardars as his counting and polling agents for different centres in his constituency, was guilty of a corrupt practice. On the other hand, Mr. Pathak, the learned Counsel for the respondent, contends that a lambardar is neither a revenue officer nor a village accountant within the meaning of the said clau