Judgment

S. K. DAS, J. (On behalf of himself, B. P. Sinha C. J. and Rajagopala Ayyangar, J,) : These four appeals which have been brought to this Court on certificates granted by the then High Court of Saurashtra under Art. 133 of the Constitution fall into three groups, and have been heard together. The essential facts relating to these appeals are the same, and a common question of law now falls for determination on those facts.

2. The State of Gujarat, within whose territories the disputed properties are now situate, is the appellant in the appeals. The respondents and in some cases their ancestors, obtained grants from the then Nawab of Junagadh, which was then a ruling State, in respect of lands and, in one case, of a building known as Datar Manzil . These grants were repudiated or cancelled and the property, subject of the grant, was resumed by the Administrator who took over charge of the administration of Junagadh on behalf of the Dominion of India in 1947 in circumstances which we shall presently state. The respondents brought suits challenging the validity of the orders made by the Administrator. These suits were decreed by the lower court and the decrees were substantially upheld by the High Court of Saurashtra. The principal point for decision in these appeals is whether the impugned orders made by the Administrator arose out of and during an act of State which was not justiciable in the municipal courts. This is the only point which has been agitated before us on behalf of the appellant-State and very strong reliance has been placed on the decision of this Court in the State of Saurashtra v. Memon Haji Ismail Haji, 1960-l SCR 537, where, in circumstances same as those of the appeals before us, it was held that the act of the Dominion of India in assuming the administration of Junagadh was an act of State pure and simple and the resumption of the grant in question therein having been made by the Administrator before that act was completed and at a time when the people of Junagadh were aliens outside the State, the act of resumption, however arbitrary, was an act of State on behalf of the Government of India and was not, therefore, justiciable in the municipal courts. It may be here noted that by that decision this Court overruled the earlier decision of the Saurashtra High Court in State of Saurashtra ,v. Haji Ismail, AIR 1953 Sau 180, a decision on the basis of which the High Court decided the cases under consideration in these appeals.

3. The learned Attorney General has submitted that the -decision of this Court in 1960-1 SCR 537, completely covers and concludes the present appeals. On behalf of the respondents it has been contended that the decision aforesaid proceeded on a finding that the act of State was not completed before the impugned orders were made and that finding being a finding of fact does not bind the respondents who were not parties in the case in which the decision was rendered, In the appeals before its the main contention on behalf of the respondents his been that the impugned orders were made after the assumption of sovereignty by the Dominion of India was completed, and therefore the decision of this Court in 1960-1 SCR 537 is not determinative of the problem which arises in these appeals. It has been further argued that after full sovereignty had been assumed by the Dominion of India, the position of the people of Junagadh including the respondents was not that of aliens outside the State, but their position on such assumption of sovereignty was that of citizens of India against whom there could be no act of State and they had rights as such citizens in respect of which they could ask for relief in the municipal courts.

4. We have set out above, in brief outline, the principal point. which falls for decision in these appeals and the respective contentions of the parties relating thereto in order to high-light the main problem presented for solution in these appeals.

5. But we must first set out