1. Succession dispute over Atiyat grants — Challenge to the validity of Section 13(2) of the Hyderabad Atiyat Enquiries Act, 1952 — Validation of executive orders. (Para 1 , 2 , 3 , 4 , 5 , 6 , 7 , 8 , 9 , 10 )
1961 Supreme(SC) 408
SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
20th December, 1961
B.P. SINHA, C.J.I., P.B. GAJENDRAGADKAR, K.N. WANCHOO, M. HIDAYATULLAH AND J.C. SHAH, JJ.
Sikander Jehan Begum and another, Appellants Petitioners
Versus
Andhra Pradesh State Government and others (in both the Appeal and the Petition), Respondents.
Civil Appeal No. 279 of 1960 with Writ Petn. No. 197 of 1956.
Advocates appeared
Mr. M. C. Setalvad, Attorney-General for India (Mr. J. B. Dadachanji, Advocate, and M/s. S. N. Andley, Rameshwar Nath and P. L. Vohra, Advocates of M/s. Rajinder and Co., with him), for Appellants/Petitioners; Mr. A. V. Viswanatha Sastri, Senior Advocate (M/s. T. V. R. Tatachari and T. M. Sen, Advocates, with him), for Respondents Nos. 1 to 4 (In the Appeal), and 1 to 5 (In the Petition); M/s. Danial A. Latifi and Sardar Bahdur, Advocates, for Respondents Nos. 8 to 13 In the Appeal) and 6 to 11 (In the Petition.
Section 13(2) of the Hyderabad Atiyat Enquiries Act, 1952 is constitutional because Jagir grants are non-heritable usufructuary rights subject to State discretion. Denying Civil Court jurisdiction over such regrants does not violate Article 14 as no inherent right to succession exists.
Headnote:(A) Hyderabad Atiyat Enquiries Act, 1952 - Section 13(2) - Constitution of India - Article 14 and Article 19(1)(f) - Validity of provision barring challenge to executive orders regarding succession to Atiyat grants - Jagir grants held to be non-heritable usufructuary rights subject to resumption and regrant by the State - Denial of right to approach Civil Court for such grants does not violate Article 14 as there is no inherent right to succession. (Paras 13-20)
(B) Distinction between heritable property and Atiyat grants - Where property is heritable, succession is governed by personal law and protected; however, where property is a grant subject to the discretion of the State, the State may validate executive decisions regarding its allotment without violating constitutional guarantees of equality. (Paras 15, 18-20)
(C) Non-Atiyat estate - Orders passed under the Act regarding Atiyat grants do not extend to non-Atiyat estates, and disputes regarding the latter must be adjudicated by Civil Courts according to personal law. (Para 22)
Facts of the case:
Petitioners challenged the validity of a statutory provision that deemed orders passed by executive authorities during a specific transitional period regarding succession to certain grants as final and unquestionable in any court. The dispute arose from the distribution of the estate of a deceased holder, comprising both grant-based and non-grant-based properties, where the executive authority had confirmed a report regarding the shares of the heirs.
Findings of Court:
The court found that the grants in question were not heritable properties but usufructuary rights that reverted to the State upon the death of the holder. The regrant of such estates was at the absolute discretion of the State. Therefore, the statutory bar on questioning these executive orders in court did not violate the right to equality. It was further clarified that the order of the executive authority did not cover non-Atiyat estates.
Issues: Whether the provision validating executive orders passed between two specific dates regarding succession to grants violates Article 14 of the Constitution by denying the right to seek adjudication in a Civil Court.
Ratio Decidendi: The court reasoned that since the grants were not heritable and the right to receive a regrant was not a matter of right but of State discretion, the petitioners had no vested right to have the matter tried by a Civil Court. Thus, the classification of orders passed during the specified period was rational and did not constitute discrimination under Article 14.
Result: Petition & Appeal dismissed.
Legal Category Hierarchy
Table of Contents
2. Section 13(2) violates Article 14 — Denial of right to Civil Court adjudication for succession — Irrational classification between decided and undecided cases. (Para 14 , 15 , 16 , 17 )
3. Jagir estates are non-heritable usufructuary rights subject to State regrant — Validation of orders during a specific historical period does not constitute unconstitutional discrimination. (Para 14 , 15 , 16 , 18 , 19 , 20 )
4. Succession to Atiyat property is a regrant by the State, not a heritable right; thus, excluding Civil Court jurisdiction does not contravene Article 14. (Para 18 , 19 , 20 )
5. Writ petition and appeal dismissed — Clarification that non-Atiyat estate disputes remain triable by Civil Courts. (Para 22 , 23 )
6. Does the validation of executive orders regarding succession to Atiyat grants under Section 13(2) violate Article 14?
No. The legislature may treat orders passed during a period of unusual historical significance as a distinct class. Since Jagir grants are not heritable but are regrants by the State, denying Civil Court adjudication for such succession does not constitute unconstitutional discrimination. (Para 14 , 18 , 19 , 20 )
7. What is the legal nature of Jagir estates regarding succession and heritability?
Jagir tenure consists of usufructuary rights in land that are inalienable and terminable upon the death of the grantee. Succession is not a matter of right; the estate reverts to the State and is regranted at the absolute discretion of the grantor. (Para 18 , 19 )
8. Does the validation of executive orders for Atiyat grants extend to non-Atiyat estates?
No. Executive orders regarding succession to Atiyat grants do not cover non-Atiyat estates. Disputes concerning the title and succession of non-Atiyat property must be adjudicated by ordinary Civil Courts according to the personal law of the parties. (Para 22 )
Judgment
GAJENDRAGADKAR, J. : Writ Petition No. 197 of 1956 and Civil Appeal by Special Leave No. 279 of 1960 arise between the same parties and they raise a short question about the validity of Section 13, sub-section (2) of the HYDERABAD ATIYAT ENQUIRIES ACT , 1952 (No. X of 1952) (hereinafter called the Act). The decision of this question lies within a narrow compass but the facts leading up to the Civil Appeal and the Writ Petition are somewhat complicated and they must be slated at the outset in order that the background of the dispute may be properly appreciated.
2. Sikander Jehan Begum and Khurshid Jehan Teleyawar Begum are the petitioners in the Writ Petition and the appellants in the Civil Appeal. They are the legitimate sisters of Nawab Kamal Yar Jung who died on January 26, 1944. According to the petition, the said Nawab left behind him three legitimate wives and two legitimate sisters but no legitimate children. He had, however, a number of Khawases (concubines) and three illegitimate sons and an illegitimate daughter. These are respondents Nos. 6-9 in the Writ petition. The said illegitimate children were the issues of respondent Nos. 10 & 11 who were the concubines of the Nawab. Respondent Nos. 6-11, however, claimed to be the legitimate heirs of the said Nawab because according to them, respondent Nos. 10 & 11 were the legitimate wives of the Nawab. A dispute as to succession to, the estate of the said Nawab has given rise to the present controversy.
3. The said Nawab belonged to a leading family of Nobles in the Hyderabad State and was possessed of large Jagir and non-Jagir properties. Soon after his death, the Nizam appointed a Commission of Enquiry to hold a regular enquiry into the Virasat of the late Nawab Kamal Yar Jung on February 8, 1944. By the Firman issued by the Nizam in that behalf a direction was given that the Government should take the estate of the late Nawab under its supervision so that after the declaration of the successor, arrangements may be made about its delivery to the proper person. It appears that the Government accordingly took possession of the properties of the Nawab and continued in possession thereafter.
4. On September 17, 1949, Police action commenced and it ended on the 26th September on which date the Military Governor took charge of the administration of the Hyderabad State. On November 9, 1948, the Commission of Enquiry which had been appointed by the Nizam made its report. The report showed that according to the Commission, Husain Khan, Tahawar Husain Khan, Sadiq Husain, Khatija Beg were the legitimate and lawful sons and daughter of the late Nawab, with the result that except for Riyasatunnisa Begum, Lal Bee and Azizunisa Begum who were the wives of the late Nawab, none else could be held entitled to succeed to his estate. It appears that the report thus submitted by the Enquiry Commission did not receive the sanction or approval of the Nizam.
5. Subsequently, on November 22, 1948, the Nizam issued a Firman whereby a new Special Tribunal was constituted according to the opinion of the Military Governor and it was asked to hear the Virasat enquiry of the late Nawab. The Tribunal was given authority to record fresh evidence, if necessary. This Tribunal made its report on April 3, 1949. The majority of this Tribunal took the view that the three widows of the late Nawab were his legitimate wives and ought to get together As-/2 share. They also expressed the opinion that Sheerin Bua and Parichehra Bua were the Mutha wives and their sons Syed Mohd. Hussain Khan, Syed Tahawar Hussain Khan and Syed Sadiq Hussain Khan were the legitimate sons of the late Nawab and so they should all together get As. -/12/ share. The remaining As.-/2-/ share should go to Khedja Begum who, in the opinion of the majority, was the legitimate daughter of the late Nawab.
6. It appears that after the Military Governor was put in charge of the administration of the State of Hyderabad, the Nizam issued a Firman