Judgment

GAJENDRAGADKAR, J.: These three appeals have been placed for hearing together because the respective respondents in the said appeals have raised the same preliminary objection against their competence. Civil Appeals Nos. 182 and 183/1962 have been filed against the award pronounced by Mr. D.V. Vyas on the 8th April, 1960 in a dispute between the appellants, the Engineering Mazdoor Sabha and another, and the respondent The Hind Cycles Limited, Bombay. This dispute was voluntarily referred to Mr. Vyas under S. 10A of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (No. 14 of 1947) (hereinafter called the Act.) by the parties by their agreement of the 3rd December, 1959. The Arbitrator entered upon the reference on the 14th December, 1959 and pronounced his award on the 8th of April, 1960. By their appeals, the Appellants have challenged the validity and the propriety of the said award on several ground and the appeals have been brought to this Court by special leave. The respondent contends that the arbitrator whose award is challenged was not a Tribunal under Art. 136 of the Constitution and so, an appeal by special leave is not competent.

2. Civil Appeal No. 204/1962 has been filed by the appellant, the Anglo-American Direct Tea Trading Co, Ltd., against the respondents, its workmen, and by its appeal, the appellant seeks to challenge the validity and the correctness of the award pronounced by Dr. T. V. Sivanandam to whom the dispute between the parties was voluntarily referred under S. 10-A of the Act. The award was pronounced on the 27th August 1961, and by special leave the appellant has come to this Court. The respondents urge that the appeal is incompetent because the arbitrator is not a Tribunal under Art. 136 of the Constitution. That is how the question which arises for our decision on these preliminary objections is whether an arbitrator to whom parties have voluntarily referred their disputes for arbitration is a Tribunal under Art. 136

3. Article 136 (I) provides that notwithstanding anything in this Chapter, the SC may, in its discretion, grant special leave to appeal from any judgment, decree, determination, sentence or order in any cause or matter passed or made by any court or tribunal in the territory of India. Sub-article (2) excludes from the scope of sub-Art. (1) any judgment, determination, sentence or order passed or made by any court or tribunal constituted by or under any law relating to the Armed Forces. It is clear that Art. 136 (1) confers very wide powers on this Court and as such, its provisions have to be liberally construed. The Constitution- makers thought it necessary to clothe this Court with very wide powers to deal with all orders and adjudications made by Courts and Tribunals in the territory of India in order to ensure fair administration of justice in this country. It is significant that whereas Arts. 133 (1) and 134 (1) provide for appeals to this Court against judgments, decrees or final orders passed by the High Courts, no such limitation is prescribed by Art,. 136 (1). All Courts and all tribunals in the territory of India except those in cl. (2) are subject to the appellate jurisdiction of this Court under Art. 136 (1.). It is also cleat that whereas the appellate jurisdiction of this Court under Arts. 133 (1) and 134 (1) can be invoked only against final orders, no such limitation is imposed by Art. 136 (1). In other words, the appellate jurisdiction o this Court under this latter provision can be exercised even against an interlocutory order or decision. Causes or matters covered by Art. 136(1) are all causes and matters that are brought for adjudication before Courts or Tribunals. The sweep of this provision is thus very wide. It is true that in exercising its powers under this Article, this Court in its discretion refuses to entertain applications for special leave where it appears to the Court that interference with the orders sought to be appealed against may not be necessary in the int