Judgment

GAJENDRAGADKAR, C.J.I. : The short question which arises in these appeals by special leave is whether S. 1 (3) of the Employees State insurance Act, 1948 (No. 34 of 1948) (hereinafter called the Act) is invalid. By their writ petitions filed before the Patna High Court, the appellants who are the workmen of the three respondent concerns, the Eagle Rolling Mills Ltd., the Kumardhubi Engineering Works Ltd., and Kumardhubi Fire Clay and Silica Works Ltd., respectively, alleged that the impugned Section has contravened Art. 14 of the Constitution, and suffers from the vice of excessive delegation, and as such is invalid. These employers were impleaded as responded No. 1 respectively in the three writ petitions. The High Court has rejected the plea and the writ petitions filed by the appellants have accordingly been dismissed. It is against this decision of the High Court that the appellants have come to this Court and have impleaded the three employers respectively. The three appeals proceed on similar facts and raise an identical question of law and have, therefore, been heard together.

2. It appears that respondents No. 1 in all the three appeals are under the management of M/s. Bird and Co. Ltd., through a General Manager, and the appellants are their workmen. As such workmen, the appellants were getting satisfactory medical benefits of a very high order free of any charge. Respondent No. 1 in each appeal maintained a well furnished hospital with provision for 60 permanent beds for the workmen, their families and their dependents. The main grievance made by the appellants is that as a result of S. 1 (3) of the Act, the appellants have now to be content with medical benefits of a less satisfactory nature. That is why they challenged the validity of the impugned Section and contest the propriety and legality of the notification issued under it. To these writ petitions as well as to the appeals, the Employee s State Insurance Corporation and the Union of India have been impleaded as respondents 2 and 3 respectively.

3. On the 22nd August, 1960, respondent No. 3 issued a notification under S. 1, sub-sec. (3) appointing the 28th August, 1960 as the date on which some provisions of the Act should come into force in certain areas of the State of Bihar. By this notification, the area in which the appellants are working came within the scope of the Act. In pursuance of the said notification, the Chief Executive Officer of respondent No. 1 informed the appellants on the 25th August, 1960 that the medical benefits including indoor and outdoor treatment upon the extent admissible under the Act will cease to be provided to insurable persons from the appointed day. A notice in that behalf was duly issued and published by the said Officer. Similar notices were issued indicating to the appellants that medical benefits would thereafter be governed by the relevant provisions of the Act and not by the arrangements which had been made earlier by respondent No. 1 in that behalf. That, in brief, is the genesis of the present writ petitions and the nature of the dispute between the parties.

4. The first point which Mr. Chatterjee has raised before us is that S. 1 (3) of the Act suffers from excessive delegation and is, therefore, invalid. In order to consider the validity of this argument, it is necessary to read S. 1, sub-sec. (3) : -

"The Act shall come into force on such date or dates as the Central Government may, by notification in the Official Gazette, appoint, and different dates may be appointed for different provisions of this Act and for different States or for different parts thereof .

The argument is that the power given to the Central Government to apply the provisions of the Act by notification, confers on the Central Government absolute discretion, the exercise of which is not guided by any legislative provision and is, therefore, invalid. The Act does not prescribe any considerations in the light of which the Central Government c