1. Challenge to a religious institution administration scheme framed under the Madras Act II of 1927, subsequently deemed settled under the Madras Act XIX of 1951. (Para 1 , 2 , 3 )
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1964 Supreme(SC) 173
SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
P.B. GAJENDRAGADKAR, C.J.I., M. HIDAYATULLAH, J.C. SHAH, RAGHUBAR DAYAL AND S.M. SIKRI, JJ.
Sri Jagadguru Kari Basava Rajendraswami of Govimutt, Appellant
Versus
Commissioner of Hindu Religious and Charitable Endowments, Hyderabad and another, Respondents.
Civil Appeal No. 745 of 1963.
Advocates appeared
Mr. A. V. Vishwanatha Sastri, Senior Advocate, (M/s. K. Rajendra Chaudhury and K.R. Chaudhuri, Advocate, with him), for Appellant; M/s. R. Ganapathy Iyer and B. R. G. K. Achar, Advocates, for Respondents.
Advocates:
A.V.VISHWANATHA SASTRI, B.R.G.K.Achar, K.R.CHAUDHARY, K.RAJENDRA CHAUDHARY, R.Ganapathy Iyer
A.V.VISHWANATHA SASTRI, B.R.G.K.Achar, K.R.CHAUDHARY, K.RAJENDRA CHAUDHARY, R.Ganapathy Iyer
Fundamental rights are not retrospective; a valid scheme framed before the Constitution's commencement cannot be challenged under Article 19 solely because implementation occurred later. Furthermore, a deeming provision continuing a scheme under a new Act does not necessitate a re-examination for consistency unless explicitly required by the statute.
Headnote:(A) Constitution of India - Article 19(1)(f) and Article 13(1) - Fundamental Rights - Retrospective operation - A valid scheme framed under a valid law before the Constitution came into force cannot be challenged on the ground that it contravenes fundamental rights simply because the scheme continued to operate or was implemented after the commencement of the Constitution. Fundamental rights are not retrospective in operation. (Paras 11-13)
(B) Statutory Interpretation - Deeming Provision - When a provision of a subsequent Act deems a scheme settled under a repealed Act to have been settled under the new Act, and such provision does not explicitly require the scheme to be consistent with the new Act (unlike other provisions in the same section that do), the scheme is continued without the necessity of re-examining its consistency with the new Act. (Paras 9-10)
Facts of the case:
A scheme for the administration of a religious institution was framed in 1939 under an earlier Act. The scheme was challenged in court but was confirmed. However, the scheme was not effectively implemented until 1952, when the administration of the institution's properties was sought to be taken over. The appellant challenged the scheme on two grounds: first, that it violated fundamental rights guaranteed under the Constitution (which came into force in 1950), and second, that the scheme was inconsistent with a latter Act that had repealed and replaced the earlier Act.
Findings of Court:
The court found that the deeming provision of the latter Act merely made the scheme operative as if framed under the new Act and did not mandate a re-examination for consistency. Regarding the constitutional challenge, the court held that since the scheme was valid when framed and the legal right to the property had been taken away at that time, the subsequent commencement of the Constitution did not render the scheme void.
Issues: 1. Whether a scheme deemed to have been settled under a subsequent Act by a deeming provision must be examined for consistency with the provisions of that subsequent Act to remain valid. 2. Whether a valid scheme framed before the commencement of the Constitution can be challenged under Article 19(1)(f) if its actual implementation occurred after the Constitution came into force.
Ratio Decidendi: 1. A deeming clause that states a scheme shall be deemed to have been settled under a new Act, without qualifying it with a requirement of consistency (especially when other clauses in the same section contain such a requirement), does not necessitate a re-evaluation of the scheme's validity against the new Act. (Paras 9-10) 2. Fundamental rights are not retrospective. If a person's rights were legally deprived by a valid scheme under a valid law before the Constitution, the mere fact that the scheme continued to operate or was implemented after the Constitution's commencement does not make it void under Article 13(1) or Article 19. (Paras 11-13)
Result: Appeal dismissed.
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2. Whether a deemed scheme must be consistent with the repealing Act and whether delayed implementation allows a challenge based on fundamental rights under Article 19(1)(f). (Para 7 , 11 )
3. Deeming provisions for schemes do not inherently require consistency checks; fundamental rights are not retrospective and cannot invalidate valid pre-constitutional schemes due to delayed implementation. (Para 9 , 10 , 13 )
4. Statutory deeming provisions for the continuance of schemes do not necessitate re-examination for consistency unless specified; fundamental rights do not operate retrospectively to invalidate prior valid laws. (Para 9 , 13 )
5. Appeal dismissed with costs. (Para 14 )
6. Does a deeming provision treating a scheme as settled under a new Act require the scheme to be consistent with the new Act's provisions?
No. Unless the statute explicitly requires consistency, a deeming provision merely makes the scheme operative as if framed under the new Act without necessitating a re-examination of its consistency with the new Act's provisions. (Para 9 )
7. How can a scheme deemed to be settled under the Madras Hindu Religious and Charitable Endowments Act, 1951, be modified?
Such schemes may be modified or cancelled by the Court upon an application made by the Commissioner, the trustee, or any person having an interest, pursuant to Section 62(3)(a). (Para 10 )
8. Can a valid pre-constitutional scheme be challenged under Article 19 if its actual implementation occurs after the Constitution comes into force?
No. Fundamental rights are not retrospective. If a scheme was validly framed and the legal right was taken away before the Constitution, the mere fact that implementation was delayed does not make it void under Article 13(1) or Article 19. (Para 13 )
Judgment
GAJENDRAGADKAR, C.J.I. :
The appellant Sri Jagadguru Kari Besava Rajendraswami of Gavi Mutt is the Matadhipati of Sri Gavi Mutt which is a religious institution dedicated to the propagation and promotion of the tenets of the Veara Saiva cult of Hinduism. This Mutt is sitauted at Uravakonda in the District of Anantpur. It appears that on the 6th September, 1939, the Board of Hindu Religious Endowments constituted under the Madras Act II of 1927 (hereinafter called the earlier Act ) framed a scheme under S. 63 of the said Act for the proper administration of the said Mutt and its endowments. The predecessor-in-office of the appellant then filed suit No. 21 of 1939 on the file of the District Judge Anantapur for getting the said scheme set aside. His suit substantially failed, because the District Court was persuaded to make only a few minor modifications in the scheme subject to which the scheme was confirmed. That decision was taken in appeal by the predecessor of the appellant to the High Court of Madras (A. S. No. 269 of 1945). During the pendency of the said appeal, the appellant s predecessor died, and the appellant then brought himself on the record as the legal preventative of his deceased predecessor. Ultimately, the appeal was withdrawn and, therefore, dismissed.
2. Though, a scheme had been formulated by the Board under S. 63 of the said Act, apparently no effective step was taken to take over the actual management of the Mutt and its endowments. The said management continued as before and the fact that an Executive Officer had been appointed under the scheme made no difference to the actual administration of the Mutt. It was on the 5th April, 1952, that the appellant was served with a memorandum asking him to hand over the charge of all the properties of the Mutt to the Executive Officer. A notice issued by the Executive Officer followed on the 16th April, 1952 by which the appellant was informed that the Executive Officer would take over possession. Meanwhile, what is known as the Sirur Mutt case was decided by the Madras High Court and the appellant felt justified in refusing to hand over possession to the Executive Officer on the ground that the scheme under which possession was sought to be taken over from him was invalid inasmuch as it contravened the appellant s fundamental rights guaranteed by the Constitution which had come into force from the 26th January, 1950.
3. In 1951, the Madras Hindu Religious and Charitable Endowments Act XIX of 1951 (hereinafter called the latter Act) repealed and replaced the earlier Act. The appellant moved the Madras High Court on the 28th April, 1952 by his writ petition and prayed for an appropriate writ quashing the notice served on him by the Executive Officer threatening to take over the administration of the Mutt and its properties under the scheme. This petition was heard by a single Judge of the said High Court and was allowed. The learned Judge took the view that some provisions of the scheme contravened the appellant s fundamental rights under Art. 19(1)(f), and so, it could not be enforced. It was no doubt urged before the learned Judge that the appellant s writ petition should not be entertained because he had a definite adequate alternative remedy under the latter Act, but this plea was rejected by the learned Judge with the observation that where the fundamental right is clearly infringed, it is the duty of the Court to interfere in favour of the citizen, unless there are reasons of policy which make it inexpedient to do so. Accordingly, the learned Judge directed that the scheme should be quashed. He, however took the precaution to make the observation that his order did not mean that the Government was not free to make a scheme in consonance with the Constitutional rights of the Matadhipati.
4. The respondent, the Commissioner of Hindu Religious and Charitable Endowments, who had been impleaded by the appellant to the writ petition along with the Executive Of
