1. Clerical employees challenge an order denying graduate allowance, alleging discrimination after a municipal resolution was partially implemented following a change in governing legislation. (Para 1 , 2 , 3 , 4 , 5 )
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1964 Supreme(SC) 230
SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
25th September 1964
P.B. GAJENDRAGADKAR, C.J.I., K.N. WANCHOO, M. HIDAYATULLAH, RAGHUBAR DAYAL AND J.R. MUDHOLKAR, JJ.
Shri Subhash Chandra and others, Petitioners
Versus
Municipal Corporation of Delhi and another, Respondents.
Writ Petn. No. 33 of 1964.
Advocates appeared
Mr. K. Baldeva Mehta, Advocate, for Petitioners; Mr. S. G. Patwardhan, Senior Advocate, (Mr. O. C. Mathur, Advocate of M/s. J. B. Dadachanji and Co. with him), for Respondents.
Important Points
The state government's power to prohibit an act "about to be done" under municipal law renders any subsequent resolution by the municipal committee to perform that act void and without jurisdiction, precluding any claim of discrimination based on the implementation of such a void resolution.
Subject
Administrative Law - Municipal Law
Act Referred
Headnote
(A) Punjab Municipal Act, 1911 - Section 232 - Power to prohibit an act "about to be done" - If the state government prohibits the granting of pecuniary benefits to employees, any subsequent resolution passed by a municipal committee to grant such benefits is without jurisdiction and legally invalid. (Paras 10, 11, 17)
(B) Punjab Municipal Act, 1911 - Section 235 - Opportunity to be heard - The requirement to provide an opportunity to the municipality to offer an explanation does not apply to orders passed by the state government itself. (Para 13)
(C) Punjab Municipal Act, 1911 - Section 232 and Section 236 - Overlapping powers - Where two sources of power are available to the state government to ensure proceedings are in conformity with law, the state government is free to avail itself of either source. (Para 15)
Facts of the case:
Clerical employees sought a graduate allowance based on a resolution passed by a municipal committee. The municipal committee had been replaced by a municipal corporation. The commissioner of the corporation granted the allowance only to a subset of employees who had prior permission to study, leading to a claim of discrimination. However, the state government had previously issued an order prohibiting the revision of pay scales or the granting of special pecuniary benefits to employees.
Findings of Court:
The order issued by the state government prohibiting the granting of pecuniary benefits was legal. Consequently, the resolution passed by the municipal committee to revive the graduate allowance was beyond its jurisdiction. Since the resolution was void, the subsequent order by the commissioner was also illegal, and the question of discrimination did not arise.
Issues: Whether the state government had the power under the relevant municipal act to prohibit the granting of pecuniary benefits in anticipation of such acts, and whether the failure to provide an opportunity to be heard under the act rendered the prohibition order void.
Ratio Decidendi: The power to prohibit an act "about to be done" includes the power to prevent a committee from entering into commitments that would bind its successor. Once an act is expressly prohibited by the state government, any resolution passed by the committee to perform that act is legally invalid. Furthermore, procedural requirements for hearing the municipality do not apply when the order is passed by the state government itself.
Result: Petition dismissed.
(B) Punjab Municipal Act, 1911 - Section 235 - Opportunity to be heard - The requirement to provide an opportunity to the municipality to offer an explanation does not apply to orders passed by the state government itself. (Para 13)
(C) Punjab Municipal Act, 1911 - Section 232 and Section 236 - Overlapping powers - Where two sources of power are available to the state government to ensure proceedings are in conformity with law, the state government is free to avail itself of either source. (Para 15)
Facts of the case:
Clerical employees sought a graduate allowance based on a resolution passed by a municipal committee. The municipal committee had been replaced by a municipal corporation. The commissioner of the corporation granted the allowance only to a subset of employees who had prior permission to study, leading to a claim of discrimination. However, the state government had previously issued an order prohibiting the revision of pay scales or the granting of special pecuniary benefits to employees.
Findings of Court:
The order issued by the state government prohibiting the granting of pecuniary benefits was legal. Consequently, the resolution passed by the municipal committee to revive the graduate allowance was beyond its jurisdiction. Since the resolution was void, the subsequent order by the commissioner was also illegal, and the question of discrimination did not arise.
Issues: Whether the state government had the power under the relevant municipal act to prohibit the granting of pecuniary benefits in anticipation of such acts, and whether the failure to provide an opportunity to be heard under the act rendered the prohibition order void.
Ratio Decidendi: The power to prohibit an act "about to be done" includes the power to prevent a committee from entering into commitments that would bind its successor. Once an act is expressly prohibited by the state government, any resolution passed by the committee to perform that act is legally invalid. Furthermore, procedural requirements for hearing the municipality do not apply when the order is passed by the state government itself.
Result: Petition dismissed.
Legal Category Hierarchy
Advocates:
J.B.DADACHAN, K.BALDEVA MEHTA, O.C.MATHUR, S.G.PATVARDHAN
J.B.DADACHAN, K.BALDEVA MEHTA, O.C.MATHUR, S.G.PATVARDHAN
Table of Contents
2. Petitioners allege discrimination and challenge the validity of a prohibition order; respondents argue the resolution was passed without jurisdiction due to a prior prohibition. (Para 6 , 8 , 10 , 11 , 13 , 14 , 16 )
3. The court analyzed the scope of statutory powers to prohibit acts in anticipation and the validity of resolutions passed in violation of such prohibitions. (Para 8 , 9 , 10 , 11 , 13 , 14 , 15 , 16 )
4. A resolution to perform an act expressly prohibited by a competent authority is legally invalid, and such prohibition can be issued in anticipation of the act. (Para 10 , 11 , 17 )
5. Petition dismissed. (Para 18 )
6. Does a power to prohibit the doing of an act also invalidate a resolution passed to perform that act?
Yes. When the doing of an act is prohibited, the Committee ceases to have the power to perform that act; consequently, any resolution passed to effectuate that act has no legal validity. (Para 10 )
7. Can a prohibition order be issued against acts that might occur in the future under the phrase about to be done?
Yes, provided there is an element of anticipation. If the authority anticipates that such acts will be performed, a prohibition order is valid even if the acts have not yet commenced. (Para 11 )
8. Is a State Government required to provide an opportunity to be heard before issuing an order under Section 232 of the Punjab Municipal Act?
No. Section 235 applies to orders made by authorities subordinate to the State Government and does not apply to orders made by the State Government itself. (Para 13 )
9. If both a general provision and a special provision grant the State Government power to modify proceedings, must the special provision be used exclusively?
No. Where two sources of power (such as Section 232 and Section 236) are available to the State Government, it is free to avail itself of either source. (Para 15 )
Judgment
MUDHOLKAR, J. : Eleven clerical employees serving with the Corporation of Delhi have moved this Court under Art. 32 of the Constitution for quashing an order dated November 5, 1958 made by the Commissioner of the Corporation of Delhi and issuing a writ of mandamus or other appropriate writ, order or direction requiring the respondents to give effect to a resolution dated November 1/8, 1957 passed by the Executive and Finance Sub-Committee of the now defunct Municipal Committee of Delhi. The main ground on which the reliefs are claimed is that the action of the commissioner in making the order has resulted in discrimination against the petitioners.
2. In order to appreciate the point some facts have to be stated. Prior to the year 1948 the Municipal Committee recruited matriculates and non-matriculates as clerks in the junior grade of Rs.35-2-65-3-95. In order to attract better qualified persons they offered Rs. 45 as starting salary for graduates in this grade. Thereafter the Committee, by its resolution dated September 16, 1948, revised the grades and scales of pay for its entire staff on the basis of the recommendations of the Central Pay Commission appointed by the Government of India. By this resolution the Committee created two junior grades for recruitment of clearks, a grade of Rs. 55-3-85-4-125-5-130 for matriculates and the grade of Rs. 45-2-55-3-95-4-105 for non-matriculates.
3. According to the petitioners the Committee, in order to attract graduates and persons of higher academic qualifications and for giving an impetus to the clerical employees for pursuing higher studies, decided by the same resolution, inter alia, that graduates working in the junior grade would be paid a "graduate allowance" of Rs. 20 p. m. Further according to them, this was sanctioned by the Chief Commissioner, Delhi, by memo. No. F. 2 (102) 48-L. S. G. dated July 26/27, 1949.
4. It is common ground that by resolution No. 447 dated July 16, 1954 as amended by resolution No. 550 dated July 30, 1954 the Committee stopped payment of the graduate allowance to future recruits but continued its payment to such of the permanent and temporary employees in the junior grade who were already in receipt of the allowance. Thirty employees of the Committee made representations to the Committee against confining the payment of the allowance only to those persons who were already in receipt of it and demanded that this allowance should be paid to every employee who passed his B. A. examination after 1954 as well as to every graduate employee recruited after 1954. This representation succeeded and by resolution No. 693 datetd November 1, 1957 the Committee resolved that the system of payment of personal pay of Rs. 20 per mensem to all graduates in the junior grade revived and that the necessary sanction of the Chief Commissioner to this proposal be obtained. On November 8, 1957 the Committee amended the aforesaid resolution by resolution No. 701 and directed that the words "Necessary sanction of the Chief Commissioner be obtained" appearing at the end of the resolution be deleted. According to the petitioners, therefore, this resolution came into operation immediately and they became entitled to payment of Rs. 20, with retrospective effect .
5. Before this resolution could be implemented the Municipal Committee of Delhi was replaced by the Municipal Corporation of Delhi by the coming into force of the Delhi Corporation Act, 1957 (66 of 1957). The petitioners, therefore, approached the Commissioner of the Corporation and requested him to give effect to the resolution of November 1, 1957 as amendeded by the resolution dated November 8, 1957. By Office Order No. 1343 EST (58) dated November 5, 1958 the Commissioner admitted the claim for payment of graduate allowance to those graduate junior grade clerks of the erstwhile Delhi Municipal Committee who had been granted permission to pursue higher studies before July 30, 1954, but not to the remaining 18 person
