1. Publication of defamatory statements alleging smuggling and criminal activity by a public official's son — Complaint under Section 500, Indian Penal Code. (Para 1 , 2 , 3 , 4 )
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1965 Supreme(SC) 66
SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
P.B. GAJENDRAGADKAR, C.J.i., RAGHUBAR DAYAL, AND V. RAMASWAMI, JJ.
Harbhajan Singh, Appellant
Versus
State of Punjab and another, Judgments.
Criminal Appeal No. 53 of 1961.
Advocates appeared
Mr. T. R. Bhasin, Mr. S. C. Malik, Miss. Sushma Malik and Mr. Ram Bheja Lal Malik, Advocates, for Appellant; Mr. R. N. Sachthey, Advocate, for Respondent No. 1; Mr. Ram Lal Anand, Senior Advocate, (M/s. Ajit Singh Johar, S. K. Mehta and K. L. Mehta, Advocates, with him), for Respondent No. 2.
Advocates:
AJIT SINGH JOHAR, K.L.Mehta, R.N.SACH, RAM BHEJALAL MALIK, RAM LAL ANAND, S.C.Malik Sayeed Uddin, S.K.MEHTA, Sushma Malik, T.R.Bhasin
AJIT SINGH JOHAR, K.L.Mehta, R.N.SACH, RAM BHEJALAL MALIK, RAM LAL ANAND, S.C.Malik Sayeed Uddin, S.K.MEHTA, Sushma Malik, T.R.Bhasin
In criminal defamation, an accused claiming Exception 9 to Section 499 IPC must prove "good faith" (due care and attention) by a preponderance of probability, not beyond reasonable doubt. Proof of the actual truth of the imputation is not a prerequisite for establishing good faith.
Headnote:(A) Indian Penal Code, 1860 - Sections 499, 500 and 52 - Evidence Act, 1872 - Section 105 - Criminal defamation - Burden of proof on accused claiming an Exception - Accused is not required to prove his case beyond reasonable doubt - Onus is discharged if the accused succeeds in proving a preponderance of probability (Paras 14-17).
(B) Indian Penal Code, 1860 - Section 499 - Exception 9 - Imputation made in good faith for public good - Distinction between Exception 1 and Exception 9 - Proof of truth is an ingredient of the First Exception but not of the Ninth Exception - To satisfy the Ninth Exception, it is immaterial whether the accused strictly proved the truth of the allegations (Paras 18, 32 and 34).
(C) Indian Penal Code, 1860 - Section 52 - Definition of "good faith" - Good faith requires due care and attention, not logical infallibility - Proper point is whether the accused was informed and had good reason after due care and attention to believe that such allegations were true (Paras 19-21).
Facts of the case:
The appellant published a statement in a magazine and newspapers alleging that the son of a high-ranking government official was a leader of smugglers and responsible for various crimes. This was done in response to a government press note challenging the public to name the official's son. The complainant filed a criminal complaint for defamation. The trial court and the High Court convicted the appellant, holding that he failed to prove "good faith" under the Ninth Exception to Section 499 of the Indian Penal Code.
Findings of Court:
The court found that the appellant had a rational basis for his belief based on the complainant's associations with known offenders and past conduct. The High Court erred by applying the strict standard of proof required for the prosecution to the accused and by confusing the requirements of the First Exception (truth) with the Ninth Exception (good faith).
Issues: Whether the standard of proof for an accused claiming an exception in a criminal trial is "beyond reasonable doubt" or "preponderance of probability," and whether the proof of truth is necessary to establish "good faith" under Exception 9 to Section 499 of the Indian Penal Code.
Ratio Decidendi: Under Section 105 of the Evidence Act, an accused claiming an exception needs only to establish a preponderance of probability. For the purpose of Exception 9 to Section 499 of the Indian Penal Code, "good faith" as defined in Section 52 of the Code requires due care and attention and a rational basis for belief, but does not necessitate the absolute proof of the truth of the imputation.
Result: Conviction set aside.
Legal Category Hierarchy
Table of Contents
2. Whether the imputations were made in good faith for public good under the Ninth Exception to Section 499, Indian Penal Code. (Para 7 , 13 )
3. The High Court misapplied the standard of proof for exceptions and confused the requirements of truth under Exception One with good faith under Exception Nine. (Para 11 , 13 , 18 , 21 , 22 , 32 , 34 )
4. An accused claiming an exception in criminal law needs only to prove the plea by a preponderance of probability, not beyond reasonable doubt. (Para 14 , 15 , 17 )
5. Appeal allowed — Conviction and sentence set aside. (Para 41 )
6. What is the standard of proof required for an accused person claiming the benefit of a statutory exception in a criminal trial?
The accused is not required to prove the exception beyond a reasonable doubt. The onus is discharged if the accused proves the claim by a preponderance of probability, after which the prosecution must still prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. (Para 14 , 15 , 17 )
7. What is the legal distinction between the First and Ninth Exceptions to Section 499 of the Indian Penal Code?
The First Exception requires proof that the statement was true and made for the public good. The Ninth Exception requires proof that the imputation was made in good faith for the protection of the person or the public good, regardless of the statement's actual truth. (Para 12 , 18 )
8. How is good faith determined under Section 52 of the Indian Penal Code in defamation cases?
Good faith requires due care and attention, not logical infallibility. The accused must show the belief had a rational basis and was not a blind belief, considering the circumstances, the nature of the imputation, and the person's capacity. (Para 19 , 20 , 21 )
9. Can a written statement filed by an accused after examination under Section 342 CrPC be dismissed as a mere afterthought?
Not as a general rule. While delay may affect the value of the pleas, written statements should not be disregarded simply because they are influenced by legal advice, provided they are supported by other evidence. (Para 22 , 24 )
Judgement
GAJENDRAGADKAR, C.J.I.: By this appeal, which has been brought to this Court by special leave, the appellant Harbhajan Singh challenges the correctness of his conviction for an offence under S. 500 of the Indian Penal Code, and the sentence imposed on him for the said offence. The criminal proceedings against the appellant were started on a complaint filed by Surinder Singh Kairon, son of S. Pratap Singh Kairon, who was at the relevant time the Chief Minister of the State of Punjab. In his complaint, the complainant Surinder Singh alleged that the appellant had published in the Press a statement against him which was highly defamatory of him. The said statement was published in the "Blitz", which is a Weekly Magazine of Bombay, on July 23, 1957 and extracts from it were given publicity in the "Times of India" and certain other papers. According to the complaint, the defamatory statement was absolutely untrue and by publishing it, the appellant had rendered himself liable to be punished under S. 500, I. P. C.
2. It appears that on July 22/23, 1957, the Punjab Government issued a Press note in which it was averred that certain Urdu Dailies from Jullundur were indulging in mischief and false propaganda, alleging complicity of a Minister s son in smuggling on the border. The Press note alleged that this was done with a view to malign the Government and to cause suspicion in the mind of public. The Punjab Government categorically denied the said allegation. The Press note added that the papers which were publishing the said false reports should come out openly with the name of the son of the Minister instead of repeatedly publishing things in a vague and indirect manner, and that they should not take shelter behind anonymity and should not be afraid of the consequences of the publication of these allegations. The Press note concluded with the statement that the Punjab Government had already taken steps to curb smuggling and they were determined to put it down with a firm hand.
3. It was in response to the challenge thus issued by the Punjab Government in its Press note that the appellant published the impugned statement which reads:-
"My attention has been drawn to a Punjab Government Press Note categorically denying the complicity of a Minister s son in smuggling. That Press Note also throws a challenge to some Urdu Dailies "to come out openly with the name of the son of the Minister" and then face the consequences. I don t know whether the newspapers concerned will take up this challenge of the Punjab Government or not, but as one of those who have been naming that son of the Minister as one of the leaders of the smugglers from Public platform, I hereby name that son as S. Surinder Singh Kairon son of S. Pratap Singh Kairon, Chief Minister. And I do so determined to face the consequences of the charge being openly levelled by me. I further allege that the son of our Chief Minister is not only a leader of smugglers but is responsible for a large number of crimes being committed in the Punjab. But because the culprit happens to be Chief Minister s son the cases are always shelved up.
If the Punjab Government accepts this challenge, it should do so by appointing an independent committee of impartial judges from outside the Punjab and then let us see who has to face the consequences. If the Punjab Government dare not do so, I would not mind serving a term in jail for having had the courage to come out with the truth. May I bring it to the notice of Punjab Government that Chief Minister s son is being discussed in almost every Punjab house, but people are afraid of talking about him in public lest they be punished for that."
It is this statement which has given rise to the present criminal proceedings.
4. After this statement was published, Mr. Ajaib Singh, Senior Superintendent of Police, Amritsar, issued a statement on the 25th July, 1957, which was published in the "Tribune" on the 26th July. By this statement, Mr. Ajaib Singh
