1. Dismissal of employee at head office of mining company — Application for compensation under Section 16, Central Provinces and Berar Industrial Disputes Settlement Act, 1947. (Para 1 , 2 )
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1965 Supreme(SC) 302
SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
P.B. GAJENDRAGADKAR, C.J.I., K.N. WANCHOO, V. RAMASWAMI AND P. SATYANARAYANA RAJU JJ.
Ballarpur Collieries Co., Appellant
Versus
State Industrial Court, Nagpur and others Respondents.
Civil Appeal No. 30 of 1965.
Advocates appeared
Mr. C. B. Agarwala, Senior Advocate, (Mr. O. P. Malhotra, Advocate, and M/s. J. B. Dadachanji, O. C. Mathur and Ravinder Narain, Advocates of M/s. J. B. Dadachanji and Co., with him), for Appellant : M/s. G. L. Sanghi and A. G. Ratnaparkhi Advocates, for Respondent No. 3.
Advocates:
A.G.Ratnaparkhi, C.B.AGARWAL, G.L.SANGHI, J.B.DADACHAN, O.C.MATHUR, O.P.MALHOTRA, Ravindra Narayan
A.G.Ratnaparkhi, C.B.AGARWAL, G.L.SANGHI, J.B.DADACHAN, O.C.MATHUR, O.P.MALHOTRA, Ravindra Narayan
A notification exempting "mines" from an industrial disputes act, when framed as an exception among "industries," exempts the entire mining industry, including the head office, provided the head office is part of the integrated activity of the business.
Headnote:(A) Central Provinces and Berar Industrial Disputes Settlement Act, 1947 - Section 1(3) and Section 16 - Interpretation of notification exempting certain industries - Whether the exemption of "mines" includes the head office of a mining company - Notification stating the Act shall come into force in "all the industries except the following" and listing "mines" as an exception - The word "mines" must be read as "industry of mines" or "mining industry" - Head office, being part of the integrated activity of producing, selling, and supplying coal, is an integral part of the mining industry - Therefore, the head office is exempt from the operation of the Act. (Para 8)
(B) Distinction between "mine" and "mining industry" - Where a notification exempts an industry, the exemption extends to all integrated activities of that industry, including administrative and sales functions handled by a head office, regardless of whether the head office is located at the site of extraction. (Para 10)
Facts of the case:
An employee working as a stenographer in the head office of a mining company was dismissed from service. The employee filed applications for compensation and reinstatement under the state industrial disputes settlement act. The employer challenged the jurisdiction of the authority, contending that the head office was exempt from the Act based on a government notification that excluded "mines" from the list of industries to which the Act applied.
Findings of Court:
The head office is part of the integrated activity of the company which carries on the business of producing coal and its sale and supply. Since the notification exempted the industry of mines, this exemption applies not only to the colliery where coal is raised but also to the head office from where coal is sold and distributed.
Issues: Whether the head office of a mining company is exempt from the application of the state industrial disputes settlement act under a notification that exempts "mines" from the list of industries.
Ratio Decidendi: The court held that the notification, by using the phrase "all the industries except the following," indicated that the listed exceptions were industries. Consequently, "mines" referred to the "mining industry." As the head office is an integral part of the mining industry's integrated activity, it is covered by the exemption.
Result: Appeal allowed.
Legal Category Hierarchy
Table of Contents
2. Whether the exemption of mines in the notification applies to the head office as part of an integrated mining industry or only to the colliery. (Para 6 , 7 )
3. The notification exempting mines refers to the mining industry as a whole, including integrated activities like sale and distribution managed by the head office. (Para 8 , 9 , 10 )
4. An exemption of an industry in a notification extends to all integrated activities of that industry, including the head office managing sale and distribution. (Para 8 , 10 )
5. Appeal allowed — Orders of lower courts set aside — Application under Section 16 of the Act dismissed. (Para 12 )
6. Does a notification exempting mines from an industrial disputes act include the head office of a mining company?
Yes, if the head office is part of the integrated activity of the company, such as the sale and distribution of coal, it is considered part of the mining industry and is therefore covered by the exemption. (Para 8 , 10 )
7. How does the specific phrasing of a notification affect the scope of an industry exemption?
Broad terms like industry of mines cover the entire integrated operation. In contrast, specific phrases like manufacture of sugar limit the exemption to the actual production process, excluding head office functions like sale and distribution. (Para 8 , 9 )
8. Does the definition of mine under the Mines Act necessarily apply to all notifications exempting mines from other industrial laws?
No; the court must interpret the specific language of the notification. An exemption of the industry of mines is broader than a reference to a mine as defined by the Mines Act. (Para 10 )
Judgement
WANCHOO, J. : The only question raised in this appeal by special leave is whether the CENTRAL PROVINCES AND BERAR INDUSTRIAL DISPUTES SETTLEMENT ACT , No. XXIII of 1947, (hereinafter referred to as the Act) is applicable to the head office of the appellant which is known as the Ballarpur Collieries Company. The head office is situate in Nagpur and has a staff of about 35 employees. The business of the head office is to look after the sale of coal extracted from the collieries.
2. The question arises in this way. Bapat respondent was a stenographer working in the head office at Nagpur. He was dismissed from service on July 31, 1959. It is not necessary for present purposes to go into the facts and circumstances leading to his dismissal. Suffice it to mention that an enquiry was said to have been held before the dismissal order was passed. While this enquiry was pending, Bapat made an application under S. 16 of the Act before the Assistant Commissioner of Labour, Nagpur, on July 21, 1959. In this application Bapat prayed that the employer should be ordered to pay him wages from the date of dismissal, discharge or removal to the date of the order under S. 16 in addition to a sum not exceeding Rs. 2,500 by way of compensation. It was also prayed that the employer should be ordered to pay retrenchment compensation under Chap. V-A of the Industrial Disputes Act, No. 14 of 1947 (hereinafter referred to as the Central Act No. 14). Though this application was headed as application for reinstatement and compensation etc., there was no prayer for reinstatement and Bapat was only content to ask for a sum of Rs. 2,500 by way of compensation. While this application was pending, Bapat was, as already indicated dismissed on July 31, 1959. Thereupon he filed another application under S. 16 of the Act on August 19, 1959. In this application he prayed for reinstatement or in the alternative for full compensation amounting to Rs. 2,500 and such other relief as he might be entitled to.
3. The main contention of the appellant before the Assistant Commissioner of Labour was that the Act did not apply to it and therefore the Assistant Commissioner had no jurisdiction to proceed in the matter. The Assistant Commissioner held that the Act applied and he had jurisdiction to deal with the matter. He therefore gave relief by setting aside the order of dismissal and directing that the employer should pay Rs. 2,000 as compensation and wages from the date of dismissal to the date of his order.
4. This order was taken in revision by the appellant to the State Industrial Court at Nagpur, and the main contention again urged there was that the Act did not apply to the appellant and the Assistant Commissioner had no jurisdiction to deal with the matter. This contention did not find favour with the State Industrial Court with the result that the revision was dismissed.
5. The appellant then filed a petition under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution in the High Court, and the same contention was raised that the Act did not apply and the Assistant Commissioner had no jurisdiction in the mater. The High Court held on a construction of the relevant provisions of the Act and the notification issued thereunder that the Act was applicable and in consequence the writ petition was dismissed. The High Court having refused to give leave to appeal to this Court, the appellant obtained special leave from this Court, and that is how the matter has come before us.
6. Section 1 of the Act came into force on June 2, 1947, and as provided by S. 1(3) thereof, the rest of the Act came into force on November 21, 1947, on a notification being issued by the State Government in that behalf. Section 1(3) lays down that "the State Government may by notification bring the remaining sections or any of them into force in such area or industry and on such date as may be specified in the notification." By virtue of the power conferred on the State Government by S. 1(3) the following n
