1. Dispute over alleged house trespass and assault causing minor injuries — conviction under Section 323, IPC — subsequent acquittal by High Court under Section 95, IPC. (Para 1 , 2 )
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1966 Supreme(SC) 125
SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
K.N. WANCHOO, J.C. SHAH AND S.M. SIKRI, JJ.
Mrs. Veeda Menezes, Appellant
Versus
Yusuf Khan Haji Ibrahim Khan and another, Respondents.
Criminal Appeal No. 209 of 1964.
Advocates appeared
M/s. I. C. Dalal, E. E. Jhirad and O. P. Rana, Advocates, for Appellant; Mr. S. G. Patwardhan, Senior Advocate, (Mr. B. Dutta, Advocate and M/s. J. B. Dadachanji, O. C. Mathur and Revinder Narain, Advocates of M/s. J. B. Dadachanji and Co., with him, for Respondent No. 1.
Advocates:
B.DUTTA, E.E.JHIRAD, I.C.DALAL, J.B.DADACHAN, O.C.MATHUR, O.P.RANA, Ravindra Narayan, S.G.PATVARDHAN
B.DUTTA, E.E.JHIRAD, I.C.DALAL, J.B.DADACHAN, O.C.MATHUR, O.P.RANA, Ravindra Narayan, S.G.PATVARDHAN
Section 95 of the Indian Penal Code exempts acts from being offences if the harm caused, intended, or known to be likely, is so trivial that a person of ordinary sense and temper would not complain. "Harm" includes physical injury, and triviality is determined contextually.
Headnote:(A) Indian Penal Code, 1860 - Section 95 - Trivial harm - Scope and application - Section 95 provides that nothing is an offence if the harm caused, intended, or known to be likely to be caused is so slight that no person of ordinary sense and temper would complain of such harm (Para 3) - The section is intended to exclude negligible wrongs or offences of trivial character from the operation of the Penal Code (Para 5) - The expression "harm" in Section 95 is not restricted and includes physical injury, as it is used in a wide connotation in other general exception sections of the Code (Para 4).
(B) Determination of triviality - Whether an act is trivial depends on the nature of the injury, the position of the parties, the knowledge or intention of the offender, and other related circumstances (Para 5) - There is no absolute standard of harm; it must be judged based on the station of life of the parties, their relationship, and the situation in which the harm was caused (Para 5).
Facts of the case:
A tenant, following a heated exchange of abusive words and provocation, slapped a servant and threw a file of papers which caused a scratch on the forearm of the house owner. The trial court convicted the tenant under Section 323 of the Indian Penal Code. The High Court subsequently acquitted the tenant, holding that the injuries were trivial and fell within the ambit of Section 95 of the Indian Penal Code.
Findings of Court:
The High Court was justified in holding that the harm caused was so slight that a person of ordinary sense and temper, placed in similar circumstances, would not reasonably have complained.
Issues: Whether Section 95 of the Indian Penal Code applies to cases where physical injury is intentionally caused and whether the injuries in the present case were trivial enough to warrant acquittal.
Ratio Decidendi: Section 95 applies regardless of whether the harm was accidental or intentional, provided the harm is so slight that a person of ordinary sense and temper would not complain. The term "harm" encompasses physical injury. Triviality is a contextual determination based on the nature of the injury and the circumstances surrounding the incident.
Result: Appeal dismissed.
Legal Category Hierarchy
Table of Contents
2. Whether Section 95, IPC applies only to accidental harm or excludes cases where physical injury is intentionally caused. (Para 3 )
3. Analysis of the term harm under Section 95, IPC and the criteria for determining whether an offence is trivial based on circumstances and party positions. (Para 4 , 5 , 6 )
4. Section 95, IPC excludes acts from being offences if the harm caused, intended, or known to be likely is so slight that an ordinary person would not complain. (Para 3 , 5 )
5. Appeal dismissed — order of acquittal maintained. (Para 7 )
6. Does Section 95 of the Indian Penal Code apply only to accidental harm?
No. Section 95 applies regardless of whether the harm was caused, intended to be caused, or known to be likely to be caused, provided the harm is so slight that no person of ordinary sense and temper would complain of it. (Para 3 )
7. Does the term harm in Section 95 of the Indian Penal Code include physical injury?
Yes. While not defined in the Code, the expression harm is used across various sections to include physical injury, mental reaction, or damage to reputation and property. There is no basis to restrict its meaning in Section 95 to exclude physical injury. (Para 4 )
8. How is it determined whether an act is trivial enough to fall under Section 95 of the Indian Penal Code?
Triviality depends on the nature of the injury, the position of the parties, the knowledge or intention of the offender, and other related circumstances. There is no absolute standard; it is judged by whether an ordinary person in those specific circumstances would reasonably complain. (Para 5 , 6 )
Judgement
SHAH, J.: The appellant Mrs. Menezes is the owner of a house in Bombay, and the wife of the first respondent. Yusuf Khan is a tenant of a part of the first floor in that house. On January 17, 1963, one Robert - a servant of the appellant, called the wife of the first respondent a thief and Halkat . On the next day the first respondent slapped the face of Robert. This was followed by a heated exchange of abusive words between the first respondent and the appellant s husband. The first respondent was annoyed and threw at the appellant s husband a "file of papers. The file did not hit the appellant s husband, but it hit the elbow of the appellant causing a "scratch . The appellant lodged information at the Bandra police station complaining that the first respondent had committed house trespass in order to the committing of an offence punishable with imprisonment, had thrown a shoe at her, had slapped the face of her servant Robert, and had also caused her a "bleeding incised wound on the forearm . The version of the appellant was a gross exaggeration of the incident. The Officer-in-charge of the police station was persuaded to enter upon an investigation on this information, which by charging the respondent with the offence of trespass was made to appear as if a cognizable offence was committed. The Sub-Inspector found that the appellant had suffered a mere scratch on her elbow. The appellant and Robert declined to go to a public hospital for examination or treatment, and were, it is claimed, examined by a private medical practitioner, who certified that the appellant had suffered a "bleeding incised wound, skin deep, size 1" in length on the right forearm , and that Robert had "a swelling about 11/2" in diameter, roundish, soft and tender , but no bruises.
2. The offence was petty, but was given undue importance. The case was transferred from the Court of the Presidency Magistrate, Bandra, to the Court of the Presidency Magistrate VI Court, Mazagaon, Bombay, and was entrusted to a special prosecutor on behalf of the State. The Trial Magistrate held that the story that the first respondent had trespassed into the house of the appellant was false and the charge of trespass was made only with a view to persuade the police officer to investigate it as a cognizable offence. The story of the appellant that the first respondent had hurled a shoe at her was also disbelieved. The Trial Magistrate held that simple injuries were caused to Robert and to the appellant and for causing those injuries he convicted the first respondent of the offence under S. 323, I. P. C. and sentenced him to pay a fine of Rs. 10 on each of the two counts. Against the order of conviction, a revisional application was preferred to the High Court of Judicature at Bombay. The appellant was no longer concerned with the proceedings in the High Court, but since there were some negotiations for compounding the offence, the appellant was impleaded as a party to the proceeding before the High Court. The High Court was of the view that the appellant had grossly exaggerated her story that the evidence of the medical practitioner who claimed to have examined the appellant and Robert and to have "certified the injuries" did "not inspire confidence , that the husband of the appellant had addressed provocative and insulting abuses, and that in a state of excitement the respondent hurled a "file of papers at the appellant s husband which missed him and caused a "scratch on the appellant s forearm. The injuries caused to the appellant and to Robert were in the view of the High Court "trivial and the case was one in which the injury intended to be caused was so slight that a person of ordinary sense and temper would not complain of the harm caused thereby. The High Court accordingly set aside the conviction and acquitted the first respondent.
3. Before us it was urged that the High Court had no power to act under S. 95, I. P. C, since by the act of the respo
