1. Dispute over whether premises constitute a public temple under the Hindu Religious and Charitable Endowments Act or private alienable property for valuation of leave to appeal. (Para 1 , 2 , 5 )
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1966 Supreme(SC) 129
SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
M. HIDAYATULLAH, J.R. MUDHOLKAR, R.S. BACHAWAT AND J.M. SHELAT, JJ.
T. D. Gopalan, Appellant
Versus
Commissioner for Hindu Religious and Charitable Endowments, Madras, Respondent.
Civil Appeal No. 230 of 1964.
Advocates appeared
M/s. R. Ganapathy Iyer and R. Thiagarajan, Advocates, for Appellant; Mr. A. V. Rangam, Advocate, for Respondent.
Advocates:
A.V.RANGAM, R.Ganapathy Iyer, R.THIAGARAJAN
A.V.RANGAM, R.Ganapathy Iyer, R.THIAGARAJAN
For determining the valuation of the subject-matter for leave to appeal, the court must refer to the plaintiff's claim in the plaint. If the plaintiff claims the property is private and alienable, it is capable of valuation, regardless of the defendant's claim that it is an inalienable public temple.
Headnote:(A) Constitution of India - Art. 133(1)(a) and (b) - Leave to appeal - Valuation of subject-matter - Where the dispute centers on whether a property is a private alienable property or a public temple, the subject-matter must be ascertained with reference to the claim made by the plaintiff in the plaint. If the plaintiff claims the property is private and alienable, it is capable of valuation, regardless of the respondent's contention that it is an inalienable public temple. (Para 7)
Facts of the case:
A dispute arose whether certain premises containing idols constituted a public temple under the relevant State Act or were the private property of a family. The trial court held it was private property, but the High Court reversed this. The appellant sought leave to appeal to the Supreme Court, claiming the property value exceeded the statutory threshold. The High Court refused leave, stating that whether the property was a private or public temple, it was incapable of market valuation.
Findings of Court:
The High Court erred in assuming the property was incapable of valuation. Since the appellant claimed the property was private and alienable, and provided evidence of rental income and property taxes, the property was capable of being valued.
Issues: Whether the High Court was correct in refusing leave to appeal on the ground that the subject-matter of the dispute (whether a property is a private or public temple) was incapable of valuation.
Ratio Decidendi: The valuation of the subject-matter of a dispute for the purpose of granting leave to appeal must be determined based on the claim made by the plaintiff in the plaint. If the plaintiff asserts the property is private and alienable, the court must value it accordingly, even if the opposing party claims it is an inalienable public temple. (Para 7)
Result: Appeal allowed.
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2. Appellant contends property is private alienable property with value exceeding statutory limits; respondents argue it is a public temple and thus incapable of market valuation. (Para 2 , 5 , 6 )
3. The court observed that since the plaintiff claimed the property was private and alienable, the High Court erred in assuming it was incapable of valuation. (Para 4 , 6 , 7 )
4. For determining leave to appeal, the subject-matter's value must be ascertained based on the claim made in the plaint, regardless of the respondent's opposing characterization. (Para 7 )
5. Appeal allowed; High Court order set aside and case remanded to decide the leave application based on the property's valuation. (Para 8 )
6. How should the value of a disputed property be determined for granting leave to appeal under Article 133(1)?
The value of the subject-matter of the dispute must be ascertained with reference to the claim made by the plaintiff in the plaint. If the plaintiff claims the property is private and alienable, the court should value it accordingly, even if the respondent claims it is inalienable. (Para 7 )
7. Can a property be deemed incapable of valuation simply because it might be a public temple?
No. If the dispute centers on whether the property is private alienable property or a public temple, the court cannot assume it is incapable of valuation. It must consider the plaintiff's claim of alienability to determine the market value. (Para 7 )
8. Does the payment of a fixed court fee in an initial application preclude the later contention that the property value exceeds a specific threshold for leave to appeal?
No. If the initial application was filed under a statute requiring only a fixed court fee, the party is still entitled to contend at the leave application stage that the property value exceeds the required threshold. (Para 4 )
Judgement
SHELAT, J.: This appeal by special leave is against the order of the High Court of Madras dated January 11, 1961 refusing the certificate under Art. 133 (1) (a) and (b) of the Constitution.
2. The authorities appointed under the Hindu Religious and Charitable Endowments Act. Madras Act II of 1927 having held that the premises No. 29 South Masi Street, Madurai wherein the idol of Sri Srinivasaparumal and certain other idols were located constituted a temple within the meaning of the said Act, the appellant filed an application in the District Court for a declaration that the said premises were private property and for an order setting aside the said decision. The said application was by an order of the High Court converted into a suit. The main question in the suit was whether the said premises could be said to be a temple as defined by Madras Act XIX of 1951. The District Judge, Madurai, decreed the suit in favour of the appellant holding that the aforesaid premises did not constitute a temple and set aside the decision of the said authorities. On appeal, the High Court reversed the said judgment and decree and found that the premises in question constituted a temple. The appellant thereupon fled a petition for leave to appeal to this Court and submitted that the value of the subject-matter of dispute in the District Court as also in appeal in the High Court was more than Rs. 20,000 and that the judgment of the High Court having reversed the judgment and decree of the Trial Court he was entitled to leave under Art. 133 (1) (a) and (b). The High Court dismissed that application on the following grounds: (a) that the subject-matter of the dispute, whether it was a private or a public temple could have no market value and, therefore, was incapable of valuation. (b) that Cl. (b) of Art. 133 (1) could not apply as the judgment and decree passed by it did not involve directly or indirectly a claim or question respecting property of the value of Rs. 20,000 or more, and (c) that the appeal did not involve any substantial question of law.
3. For the time being we are concerned with grounds (a) and (b) and not with ground (c) as the contention raised by Mr. Ganapathy Iyer for the appellant was that the refusal to grant leave by the High Court under either of the clauses (a) and (b) of Art. 133 (1) was not correct
4. The point for consideration is whether the High Court was right in holding that the property in question whether as a private or a public temple was incapable of valuation as it could have in either case no market value. It may be observed that the appellant claimed that the property belonged to the Thoguluva family and he was in management thereof for an on behalf of the family. The suit in the first instance was filed by him in the form of an application, being O. P. No. 37 of 1950 under Section 84 (2) of Madras Act II of 1927. Under that Act only a fixed Court-fee was payable. That being so, the appellant did not have to pay court-fees as it would in the case of an ordinary suit on a valuation made by him therefor. The application was subsequently converted into a suit by an order of the High Court. He was, therefore, entitled to contend at the time of the leave application that the property in dispute was of the value of not less than Rs. 20,000.
5. It does not appear to be in dispute that the site of the Mandapan and the structure standing thereon was originally the property of one Kuppaiyan and his undivided sons. The appellant s case was that in execution of the decree in suit No. 650 of 1882 passed against the said Kuppaiyan the property was sold by public auction and purchased by Thoguluva Thirumalayyan, the appellant s ancestor, for a sum of Rs. 1,060. The original mandapam was thereafter improved upon and some additional structures, e.g., shops and other constructions were added, the expenses for such repairs and additions having been met by the descendants of the said Thoguluva Thirumalayyan, and, therefore,
