State Of Punjab vs Major Singh - 1966 Supreme(SC) 145

Headnote:(A) Indian Penal Code, 1860 - Sections 354, 350, 10 and 7 - Assault or criminal force to woman with intent to outrage her modesty - The offence does not depend on the subjective reaction of the woman subjected to the assault or use of criminal force; the intention or knowledge of the offender is the essential ingredient (Paras 4, 13, 16) - The expression "woman" denotes a female human being of any age (Paras 3, 15) - When any act done to or in the presence of a woman is clearly suggestive of sex according to the common notions of mankind, such act falls within the mischief of Section 354 (Para 13).

(B) Modesty - Modesty is an attribute of the female sex from birth, regardless of whether the female has developed a sense of shame or awareness of sex (Paras 13, 16, 17).

Facts of the case:
The respondent used criminal force by interfering with the vagina of a seven-and-a-half-month-old female child, causing internal injuries. The respondent was initially convicted under Section 323 of the Indian Penal Code. An appeal was filed to determine if the act amounted to outraging the modesty of a woman under Section 354.

Findings of Court:
The act of interfering with the vagina of the infant was deliberate and suggestive of sex according to common notions of mankind. The court held that the offender intended to outrage the modesty of the victim, which is an attribute of her sex from birth.

Issues: Whether a female child of seven and a half months is capable of having her modesty outraged within the meaning of Section 354 of the Indian Penal Code, and whether the test for "outraging modesty" is the subjective reaction of the victim or an objective standard.

Ratio Decidendi: The court ruled that the offence under Section 354 IPC is based on the intention or knowledge of the accused and not the reaction of the victim. Modesty is an attribute of the female sex from birth. Any act clearly suggestive of sex according to common notions of mankind constitutes an outrage to modesty, irrespective of the victim's age, consciousness, or capacity to appreciate the act.

Result: Appeal allowed; conviction altered to one under Section 354 I.P.C.

Legal Category Hierarchy

1. Criminal force used on a female infant causing vaginal injury — Appeal against conviction under Section 323 IPC seeking conviction under Section 354 IPC. (Para 1 , 12 )

2. Whether outraging modesty under Section 354 IPC requires the victim to have a developed sense of modesty or depends on objective standards of public morality. (Para 3 , 12 )

3. The offence depends on the accused's intention or knowledge rather than the victim's reaction, though the victim's capacity for modesty may be relevant to that intention. (Para 4 , 5 , 13 , 16 )

4. An act suggestive of sex according to common notions of mankind, performed with intent to outrage modesty, constitutes an offence under Section 354 IPC regardless of victim's reaction. (Para 13 , 16 , 17 )

5. Appeal allowed — Conviction altered to Section 354 IPC — Sentence awarded as rigorous imprisonment for two years and a fine. (Para 14 , 18 , 19 )

6. Does the offence of outraging modesty under Section 354 IPC depend on the victim's reaction?

No. The offence depends on the intention or knowledge of the accused, not the feelings or reaction of the woman. If the intention to outrage modesty is proved, the fact that the woman did not feel outraged is irrelevant. (Para 4 , 13 , 16 )

7. How is the intention to outrage modesty determined under Section 354 IPC?

Intention is inferred from circumstances. The test is whether a reasonable man would think the act was done with the intention of outraging the modesty of the woman or with the knowledge that it was likely to do so. (Para 5 )

8. Can a female infant be a victim of outraging modesty under Section 354 IPC?

Yes. While a child may not have developed a subjective sense of shame, modesty is an attribute of her sex from birth. Acts clearly suggestive of sex according to common notions of mankind fall within the section. (Para 13 , 16 , 17 )

Judgment

A. K SARKAR, CJI : The question is whether the respondent who caused injury to the private parts of a female child of seven and half months is guilty under S. 354 of the Penal Code of the offence of outraging the modesty of a woman. In the High Court the matter was heard by three learned Judges two of whom answered the question in the negative anti the third answered it in the affirmative. Hence this appeal by the State.

2. It would be convenient to set out the section at once.

S. 354- "Whoever assaults or uses criminal force to any woman, intending to outrage or knowing it to be likely that he will thereby outrage her modesty shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to two years. Or with fine, or with both"

3. "Criminal force" is defined in S. 350 of the Code and it is not in dispute that such force had been used by the respondent to the child. It is also not in dispute that the child was a woman within the Code for in the Code that word is to be understood as meaning a female human being of any age: see Ss. 7 and 10. The difficulty in this case was caused by the words outrage her modesty . The majority of the learned Judges in the High Court held that these words showed that there must be a subjective element so far as the woman against whom criminal force was used is concerned. They appear to have taken the view that the offence could be said to have been committed only when the woman felt that her modesty had been outraged. If I have understood the judgment of these learned Judges correctly, the test of outrage of modesty was the reaction of the woman concerned. These learned Judges answered the question in the negative in the view that the woman to whom the force was used was of too tender an age and was physically incapable of having any sense of modesty. The third learned Judge who answered the question in the affirmative was of the view that the word modesty meant accepted notions of womanly modesty and not the notions of the woman against whom the offence was committed. He observed that the section was intended as much in the interest of the woman concerned as in the interest of public morality and decent behaviour and the object of the section could be achieved only if the word modesty was considered to be an attribute of a human female irrespective of whether she had developed enough understanding to realise that an act was offensive to decent female behaviour or not. The reported decisions on the question to which our attention was drawn do not furnish clear assistance. None of them deals with a case like the present. But I do not think that there is anything in them in conflict with what I propose to say in this judgment.

4. I would first observe that the offence does not in my opinion, depend on the reaction of the woman subjected to the assault or use of criminal force. The words used in the section are that the act has to be done intending to outrage or knowing it to be likely that he will thereby outrage her modesty. This intention or knowledge is the ingredient of the offence and not the woman s feelings, It would follow that if the intention or knowledge was not proved. proof of the fact that the woman felt that her modesty had been outraged would not satisfy the necessary ingredient of the offence, Likewise, if the intention or knowledge was proved, the fact that the woman did not feel that her modesty had been outraged would be irrelevant, for the necessary ingredient would then have been proved. The sense of modesty in all women is of course not the same; it varies from woman to woman. In many cases, the woman s sense of modesty would not be known to others. If the test of the offence was the reaction of the woman, then it would have to be proved that the offender knew the standard of the modesty of the woman concerned, as otherwise, it could not be proved that he had intended to outrage "her" modesty or knew it to be likely that his act would have th