Judgement

MUDHOLKAR, J. : This is an appeal by special leave from the judgment of the High Court of Patna upholding the appellant s conviction under S. 353, Indian Penal Code and the sentence passed against him.

2. The facts which are not in dispute are as follows:

3. On the evening of October 29, 1957, Mr. Bhupendra Narain Singh, Assistant Superintendent of Commercial Taxes, Patna Sadar circle, paid a surprise visit to the shop of Hazari Lall and Co., in Barah town in order to inspect the books of accounts maintained by the shop. At that time the appellant Hazari Lall was in the shop. Mr. Singh found that two sets of account books were kept in the shop. He took them up and started looking into them. The appellant snatched away both the books from him, passed them on to one of his servants who made them over to another servant who was on the upper floor. Mr. Singh directed his orderly peon to recover the books. The peon was, however, prevented by the appellant from going to the place where the account books had been taken and in the scuffle which ensued between the two, the orderly s shirt was torn. Thereafter Mr. Singh went to the police station to lodge a complaint. The appellant who was brought there by the Sub-Inspector, tendered an apology in writing and so Mr. Singh did not lodge a complaint. He, however, submitted a report in writing to the Superintendent of Commercial Taxes. The Superintendent thereupon reported the incident to the Deputy Superintendent of Police and eventually lodged a first information report on November 1.

4. It is urged before us by Mr. Sarjoo Prasad, who appears for the appellant, that mere snatching away of books does not amount to using force as contemplated by S. 349, I. P. C. and at any rate it does not amount to use of criminal force as contemplated by S. 350, Indian Penal Code. If, therefore, the act of the appellant did not constitute the use of criminal force, his conviction under S. 353, I. P. C. cannot be sustained. His contention is that no force was used against the person of Mr. Singh and, therefore, the requirements of S. 349, I. P. C. were not satisfied. Section 349, I. P. C. reads thus:

"Force-A person is said to use force to another if he causes motion, change of motion, or cessation of motion to that other, or if he causes to any substance such motion, or change of motion or cessation of motion as brings that substance into contact with any part of that other s body, or with anything which that other is wearing or carrying, or with anything so situated that such contact affects that other s sense of feeling:

Provided that the person causing the motion, or change of motion, or cessation of motion, causes that motion, change of motion, or cessation of motion in one of the three ways hereinafter described:

First. -By his own bodily power.

Secondly. - By disposing any substance in such a manner that the motion or change or cessation of motion takes place without any further act on his part, or on the part of any other person.

Thirdly. - By inducing any animal to move, to change its notion, or to cease to move".

It would he clear from a bare perusal of the section that one person can be said to have used force against another if he causes motion, change of motion or cessation of motion to that other. By snatching away the books which Mr. Singh was holding the appellant necessarily caused a jerk to the hand or hands of Mr. Singh in which he was holding the books. His act, therefore, may be said to have caused motion to Mr. Singh s hand or hands. Further, the natural effect of snatching the books from the hand or hands of Mr. Singh would be to affect the sense of feeling of the hand or hands of Mr. Singh. We have, therefore no doubt that the action of the appellant amounts to use of force as contemplated by S. 349, I. P. C

5. Mere use of force, however is not enough to bring an act within the terms of S. 353, I. P. C. It has further to be shown that force was used intentionally to any person witho