1. Challenge to land vesting under the Uttar Pradesh Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act — validity of retrospective amendment to the definition of estate. (Para 1 , 2 , 7 , 16 , 17 , 18 , 19 , 20 , 21 , 22 , 23 )
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1966 Supreme(SC) 205
SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
K. SUBBA RAO, C.J.I., M. HIDAYATULLAH, S.M. SIKRI, V. RAMASWAMI AND J.M. SHELAT, JJ.
State of U.P. and another (In C. As. Nos. 653 and 654 of 1964) and Respondents (In C. A. No. 655 of 1964), Appellants
Versus
Raja Anand Brahma Shah (In C. As. Nos. 653 and 654 of 1964 and Appellant (In C.. A. No. 655 of 1964), Respondent.
Civil Appeals Nos. 653 to 655 of 1964,D/- 16-9-1966
Advocates appeared
Mr.C.K. Daphtary, Attorney-General for India and Mr. Shanti Bhushan, Additional Advocate-General for the State of U. P., (Mr. O. P. Rana, Advocate, with them), for Appellants (In C. As. Nos. 653 and 654 of 1964) and Respondents (In C. A. No. 655 of 1964); M/s. A. K. Sen and B. R. L. Iyengar., Senior Advocates, (M/s. V. P. Misra, S. K. Mehta and K. L. Mehta, Advocates, with them), for Respondent (In C. As. Nos. 653 and 654 of 1964) and Appellant (In C. A. No. 655 of 1964).
Advocates:
A.K.SEN GUPTA, B.R.L.Iyengar, C.K.DAFTARY, K.L.Mehta, O.P.RANA, S.K.MEHTA, SHANTI BHUSHAN, V.P.MISRA
A.K.SEN GUPTA, B.R.L.Iyengar, C.K.DAFTARY, K.L.Mehta, O.P.RANA, S.K.MEHTA, SHANTI BHUSHAN, V.P.MISRA
Land held under a sovereign grant for services rendered constitutes a "Jagir" or "inam" under Article 31-A(2)(a)(i) of the Constitution. Waste or forest land is only an "estate" under Article 31-A(2)(a)(iii) if it is held for purposes ancillary to agriculture.
Headnote:(A) Constitution of India - Article 31-A(2) and Article 366(10) - Land Reforms Act - Definition of "estate" - Interpretation of "waste land" and "forest land" - Whether land held under a grant for services rendered constitutes a "Jagir" or "inam" - Protection of acquisition under Article 31-A.
(B) Article 31-A(2)(a)(iii) - Interpretation of "land held or let for purposes of agriculture or for purposes ancillary thereto, including waste land, forest land, land for pasture" - The word "including" is intended to clarify the concept of land held for purposes ancillary to agriculture; waste land or forest land cannot be deemed an "estate" unless it was held or let for purposes ancillary to agriculture. (Paras 13-15)
(C) Article 31-A(2)(a)(i) - Definition of "Jagir" or "inam" - A grant of land by a sovereign authority for services rendered, where possession is recovered or maintained through such grant, falls within the definition of a Jagir or inam, regardless of any asserted prior ancestral title. (Paras 24-27)
Facts of the case:
The State issued notifications for the vesting of estates under a land reforms act. The petitioner challenged the vesting of a specific area, contending it did not meet the statutory definition of an "estate" due to the absence of specific revenue records. Subsequently, the law was amended retrospectively to deem the disputed area as an estate. The petitioner challenged the validity of this amendment, arguing it was not for agrarian reform and exceeded the definition of "estate" under the Constitution.
Findings of Court:
The court found that while forest or waste land is not automatically an estate under Article 31-A(2)(a)(iii) unless used for purposes ancillary to agriculture, the disputed area in this case constituted a grant in the nature of a Jagir or inam because it was granted by the sovereign authority for services rendered.
Issues: Whether the retrospective amendment to the definition of "estate" in the land reforms act is protected under Article 31-A(2) of the Constitution, and whether the disputed area, including forest and waste lands, falls within the constitutional definition of an "estate".
Ratio Decidendi: The court held that for waste or forest land to be an "estate" under Article 31-A(2)(a)(iii), it must be held or let for purposes ancillary to agriculture. However, if the land is a Jagir, inam, or similar grant, it is an "estate" under Article 31-A(2)(a)(i). Since the disputed area was held under grants for services rendered, it was a Jagir/inam, and its acquisition was a necessary step for agrarian reform, thus falling within the protection of Article 31-A.
Result: The appeals filed by the State are accepted, the appeal filed by the petitioner is dismissed and the petition under Article 226 is dismissed.
Legal Category Hierarchy
Table of Contents
2. Whether the acquired area constitutes an estate under Article 31-A(2) of the Constitution and whether the acquisition was intended for agrarian reforms. (Para 8 , 9 )
3. Waste or forest land is an estate under Article 31-A(2)(a)(iii) only if held for purposes ancillary to agriculture; grants for services are Jagirs/Inams. (Para 11 , 12 , 13 , 14 , 15 , 26 , 27 )
4. Land granted for services rendered to the government constitutes a Jagir or Inam, qualifying as an estate under Article 31-A(2) for agrarian reform purposes. (Para 26 , 27 , 28 , 29 )
5. Appeals filed by the State accepted; appeal and petition filed by the petitioner dismissed. (Para 31 )
6. Does waste or forest land automatically qualify as an estate under Article 31-A(2)(a)(iii) of the Constitution?
No. Waste or forest land is deemed an estate under Article 31-A(2)(a)(iii) only if it is held or let for purposes of agriculture or purposes ancillary thereto. (Para 13 , 14 , 15 )
7. What constitutes a Jagir or Inam under Article 31-A(2)(a)(i) of the Constitution?
A Jagir or Inam includes grants of land or land revenue made by a superior to an inferior, including grants by the British for services rendered. (Para 24 , 25 , 26 )
8. Is the acquisition of a Jagir or Inam considered a valid step for agrarian reform under Article 31-A?
Yes. The acquisition of all Jagirs, inams, or similar grants is a necessary step in the implementation of agrarian reforms and is clearly contemplated under Article 31-A. (Para 28 , 29 )
Judgment
SIKRI, J. : These appeals by certificates granted by the High Could of Judicature at Allahabad raise one principal question : Whether the amendment of the definition of the word estate in clause (8) of S. 3 of the Uttar Pradesh Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act, 1950 (hereinafter referred to as the Reforms Act) made by S. 2 of the Uttar Pradesh Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms (Amendment) Act, 1963, hereinafter called the impugned Act, is within the definition of the word estate in Art. 31-A (2) of the Constitution?
2. These appeals arise out of a petition filed by Raja Anand Brahma Shah of Agori Barhar-Raj under Art. 226 of the Constitution. The State of Uttar Pradesh had issued a notification No. 3549/1/A-499 dated June 30, 1953, extending the provisions of Reforms Act, 1950, to apply to the areas to the South of Kaimur Range. It then issued another notification No. 3949/(1) A-499-1949 dated July 1953, directing the vesting of all estates situated to the south of Kaimur including the Pargana Agori, owned by the petitioner. The Pargana Agori is comprised of 123 villages. At the time the petition was filed and the judgment of the Single Judge, dated November 8, 1957, was delivered, S. 3 (8) of the Reforms Act stood as follows:
" Estate" means the area included under an entry in any of the registers prepared and maintained under clause (a), (b), (c) or (d) of S. 32 of the United Provinces Land Revenue Act, 1901, or in the registers maintained under clause (e) of the said Section in so far as it relates to a permanent tenure holder and includes share in or of an estate."
3. The case of the pensioner in short was that Pargana Agori was not an estate within S. 3 (8) of the Reforms Act because no records were prepared and maintained under the provisions of S. 32 of the Land Revenue Act, 1901, in respect of Pargana Agori, and the records alleged to have been prepared between 1840 to 1843 under the Bengal Regulations were unauthorised and he Government itself did not approve these records at any time. The learned Single Judge, keeping in view the definition in S. 3 (8) of the Reforms Act, came to the conclusion that the whole of 81 villages, including the cultivated area, the forest, the bill and everything else would vest in the State of Uttar Pradesh. He held that the Raja s name alone was entered in the khewats of 64 villages, and in the khewats of 17 villages although the names of underproprietors were written, the Raja was the proprietor of the entire villages because the Raja s name was mentioned as Malik Ala . With respect to the remaining 42 villages he held that only the areas mentioned in the khewats of the different villages and not the forests and hills attached to them fell within S. 3 (8). In the result he allowed the petition in part and issued a writ of mandamus directing the respondents not to take possession nor to interfere with the possession of the petitioner over the hills and jungle appertaining to the said 42 villages as distinguished from the areas mentioned in the khewats of these villages at the time the vesting order was issued. He dismissed the rest of the claim. The petitioner and the State of Uttar Pradesh both filed appeals, the petitioner claiming that the petition should be allowed in entirety, the State claiming that the petition should be dismissed.
4. During the pendency of the appeals (U. P. Act XIV of l958) substituted the following new S. 3 (8) in the Reforms Act, with retrospective effect from July, 1952:
"3 (8) "Estate" means and shall be deemed to have always meant the area under one entry in any of the registers described in clause (a), (b), (c) or (d) and, in so far as it relates to a permanent tenure holder in any register described in clause (e) of Section 32 of the U. P. Land Revenue Act, 190l, as it stood immediately prior to the coming into force of this Act, or, subject to the restriction mentioned with respect to the register described in clause (e) in any of the re
