Judgement

HEGDE, J.: In this appeal by certificate, the only question that arises for decision is as to the true scope of the expression "time requisite for obtaining a copy of the decree, sentence or order appealed from" found in sub-s. (2) of S. 12 of the Indian Limitation Act 1908 which will be hereinafter referred to as the Act. The said question arose for decision under the following circumstances: The respondents were tried for various offences before the learned Assistant Sessions Judge, Farrukhabad. The said learned Judge acquitted them. Against the order of acquittal the State went up in appeal to the High Court of Allahabad. The said appeal was dismissed as being barred by limitation. The correctness of that decision is in issue in this appeal.

2. Item 157 of the first schedule to the Act prescribes that the period of limitation for an appeal under the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898, from an order of acquittal is three months from the date of the order appealed from. But sub-s. (2) of S. 12 provides that in computing the period of limitation prescribed for an appeal the day on which the judgment complained of was pronounced and the time requisite for obtaining a copy of the order appealed from shall be excluded.

3. The memorandum of appeal was filed into court on March 29, 1963. The order appealed from had been delivered on November 10, l962. According to the information contained in the copy of the order produced along with the said memorandum the appeal was within time. It showed that that copy was applied for on November 15, 1962 and the same was ready on January 3, 1963.

4. It was contended on behalf of the respondents that the appeal was out of time in view of the fact that the appellant had applied for and obtained two other copies of the order appealed from and if time is calculated on the basis of those copies the appeal was beyond time. In addition to the copy referred to earlier, the appellant had applied for another copy of the order appealed from on December 3, 1962 and that copy was ready for delivery on December 20, 1962. The appellant also applied for yet another copy of the same order on December 21, 1962 and that copy was made ready on the same day. There is no dispute that if the period of limitation is computed on the basis of those copies the appeal was barred by limitation. But the point for consideration is whether the obtaining of those copies has any relevance in the matter of computing the period of limitation for the appeal.

5. The High Court of Allahabad accepted the contention of the respondents that in determining the time requisite for obtaining a copy of the order appealed from, it had to take into consideration the copies made available to the appellant on the 20th and 21st December, 1962. It opined that the expression requisite found in S. 12 (2) means "properly required", and hence the limitation has to be computed on the basis of the copy made available to the appellant in December 1962.

6. It was not disputed on behalf of the respondents that it was not necessary for the appellant to apply for a copy of the order appealed from immediately after the order was pronounced. The appellant could have, if it chose to take the risk, waited till the ninety days period allowed to it by the statute was almost exhausted. Even then the time required for obtaining a copy of the order would have been deducted in calculating the period of limitation for filing the appeal. Hence the expression time requisite cannot be understood as the time absolutely necessary for obtaining the copy of the order. What is deductible under S. 12 (2) is not the minimum time within which a copy of the order appealed against could have been obtained. It must he remembered that sub-s. (2) of S. 12 enlarges the period of limitation prescribed under entry 157 of schedule I. That section permits the appellant to deduct from the time taken for filing the appeal the time required for obtaining the copy of the order appealed