SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
J.M. SHELAT, V. BHARGAVA AND C.A. VAIDIALINGAM, JJ.
Management, Shahdara (Delhi) Saharanpur Light Railway Co. Ltd., Appellant
Versus
S. S. Railway Workers Union, Respondent.
Civil Appeal No. 27 of 1968,
D/- 18-9-1968.
Advocates appeared
Mr. H. R. Gokhale, Senior Advocate (Mr. B. Parthasarathy, Advocate and M/s. O. C. Mathur, J. B. Dadadchanji and Ravinder Narain, Advocates of M/s. J. B. Dadachanji and Co., with him), for Appellant; M/s. R. K. Garg and S. C. Agarwala, Advocates of M/s. Ramamurthi and Co., and Mr. Anil Kumar Gupta, Advocate, for Respondent.
Industrial Employment Act, 20 of 1946 - Section 10(2), 4 , 6, 10 (2), 10, 11, 12, 5 (2) , 12 , 11, 19 (4), (3), (6), 15, 2 (g), (c) and (a) - Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 - Bihar Shops and Establishments Act, 1953 – Constitution of India, 1950 - Article 136 and 311 - Company - Workmen - Terminate Services of Workman - Whether there is in any of these sections anything which would indicate such a restriction by necessary implication - Whether or not any modification of or addition to draft standing orders was necessary to render them certifiable - Whether modification was fair or reasonable could be raised - Whether standing orders are in consonance with model standing orders - Whether they are fair and reasonable - Whether there is a restriction, as suggested by counsel, to right to apply for modifications - Whether they work properly or not - Whether modification now applied for is fair and reasonable - Whether a modification on an application under Section l0 of Act should only be allowed on basis of facts or circumstances appearing subsequent to previous certification of Standing Orders - Whether, in dealing with application for modification, Certifying Officer and Appellate Authority can re-examine entire position - Whether Standing Orders submitted for certification conformed to Model Standing Orders or not - Whether Standing orders propos by employer were reasonable and fair – Held, Purpose of Act, as it was originally passed in 1946, was merely to require employers in industrial establishments to define with sufficient precision conditions of employment under them and to make said conditions known to workmen employed by them - To give effect to this purpose, Section 3 of Act gave power exclusively to employers to submit draft Standing Orders for certification - But, for same purpose, they also have alternative remedy of seeking redress under Industrial Disputes Act, in which case scope of their demand would be much wider - If proceedings go for adjudication under Industrial Disputes Act, workmen can claim alteratious of standing Orders not merely on ground of fairness or reasonableness, but even on other grounds, such as further liberalisation of terms and conditions of service, even though certified Standing orders may be otherwise fair and reasonable - Remedy provided by Act has, therefore, a limited scope only - There can, therefore, be reversed cases where draft Standing order submitted by an employer may be modified by Appellate Authority under Section 6 and, six months later, employer may again apply for modification so as to result in restoration of his original draft in hope that successor Appellate Authority would hold opinion that origin draft Standing Order proposed by employer was fair and reasonable and that modification made by his predecessor under Section 6 was not justified - Considering these circumstances, Court is of view that, when an application under Section 10 (2) of Act is made, Certifying Officer can modify Standing orders already certified, only if request is not made on basis of same material which existed at earlier stage when Standing orders were certified - Modification at item No. 1 in Standing Order 9 (a) had been specifically disallowed in appeal by Chief Labour Commissioner in his order when he first heard appeal under Section 6 and confirmed certification of original Standing Orders - Thus, in respect of item No.1, what present Chief Labour Commissioner has done is to permit modification because he considered it reasonable and fair, even though, on same material, his predecessor had disallowed this very modification on basis that, in his opinion, original draft Standing Order was fair and reasonable – Court set aside order of Chief Labour Commissioner permitting modifications mentioned by him in his Order at items Nos. 1, 3, 5 and 6 relating to Standing Orders 9 (a), 12 (A) and 11 (vii) - Appeal partly allowed.
Judgment
SHELAT, J. (for himself and Vaidialingam J.):- This appeal, by special leave, is by the employer and raises the question as to the scope of Section 10(2) of the Industrial Employment (Standing Orders) Act, 20 of 1946, as amended by Act 36 of 1956 (referred to hereinafter as the Act.)
2. The Standing Orders of the Appellant-company were certified on August 7, 1962 by the Regional Labour Commissioner, Central, under Section 4 of the Act. Both the company and the workmen filed appeals against the said order which were disposed of by the Appellate Authority under Section 6. Sometime thereafter the respondent-union applied for certain modifications, some of which were certified by the Regional Labour Commissioner by his order dated December 28, 1963. The Appellant-company filed an appeal against the said order which was disposed of by the Chief Labour Commissioner in April 1964. On April, 25, 1965 the respondent union made a further application for modifications. The Regional Labour Commissioner by his order dated September 2, 1965 allowed certain modifications but rejected the rest. The union thereupon appealed against the said order. After hearing the parties the Chief Labour Commissioner passed his impugned order dated October 27, 1967 ordering certification of certain modifications. Though the Appellant-company objected at first to all the modifications, Counsel pressed the appeal in respect of four modifications only. The first modification challenged is in Standing Order 9, clause (a) which, as unamended, read as follows:
"The railway under the terms of employment has the right to terminate the services of a permanent workman on giving him one month s notice in writing or one month s pay may be paid in lieu of notice."
The union claimed that the management should give reasons even when they terminated the services of an employee by a discharge simpliciter. The modification allowed directed reasons to be recorded in writing and communicated to the workman if he so desires at the time of discharge but not if the management considers it inadvisable. The second modification is in Standing Order 12, clause (A), which, in its unamended form, read as follows:
"When any of the penalties specified in O. 9 is imposed upon a workman an appeal shall lie to the authority next above that imposing the penalty. An appeal shall lie to the Managing Agents only on original orders passed by the General Manager
................"
The union s plea was that some time limit was necessary for the disposal of the appeals as the Managing Agents who are the Appellate Authority against the orders of the General Manager took months to dispose of such appeals thereby delaying the workman from raising an industrial dispute in time and seek timely relief. The modification allowed was that every such appeal shall be disposed of by the Appellate Authority within 60 days from the date of its receipt. The third modification is in Standing Order 11 (vii) which read as follows:
"Removal from service: A workman shall be liable to be removed from service in the following circumstances:
(a) Inefficiency.
........................." The modification allowed was as follows:
"In case of inefficiency due to physical unfitness the workman whom the management considers suitable for some alternative employment shall be offered the same on reasonable emoluments having regard to his former emoluments."
The modification contains, it will be noticed, four limitations: (1) it applies only to cause of removal on the ground of physical unfitness, (2) the consideration of suitability for an alternate employment is left to the management, (3) the existence of alternative post, and (4) the question as to what reasonable emoluments should be is left to the management. The fourth modification is in Standing Order 11 (vii) (c) which, in its unamended form, was as follows:
"Every person against whom departmental enquiry is being made shall be supplied with a copy of the findings in connecti
Login now and unlock free premium legal research
Login to SupremeToday AI and access free legal analysis, AI highlights, and smart tools.
Login
now!
India’s Legal research and Law Firm App, Download now!
Copyright © 2023 Vikas Info Solution Pvt Ltd. All Rights Reserved.