Judgment

HIDAYATULLAH, C.J.I. : I agree with the judgment delivered by my brother Mitter but in view of the importance of the question and the difference between my brethren I have chosen to express myself separately.

2. We heard this appeal on a preliminary point raised by the appellant that the appeal of the Advocate General of Maharashtra filed before the Bar Council of India was incompetent as the Advocate-General did not fall within the expression a person aggrieved to whom alone is given the right of appeal under Section 37 of the Advocates Act of 1961, against the orders of the Disciplinary Committee of the Bar Council of the State.

3. The facts necessary to bring out the controversy may be briefly stated The appellant is an advocate from Maharashtra. The Bar Council of the State of Maharashtra had called upon him suo motu to show cause why he should not be held guilty of misconduct. It appears that the appellant was convicted before a Summary Court in London on a charge of pilfering some articles from departmental stores and sentenced to a fine. The record of the proceedings in London was not before the Bar Council of the State and action was taken on the basis of a brief report of the incident in a newspaper. The appellant explained before the disciplinary committee of the Bar Council of the State that he was the victim of a misunderstanding but as he had no means of defending himself effectively he was found guilty and received a light sentence of fine. He explained how he had fallen into this unfortunate predicament and did not know how to extricate himself. The order of the Summary Court was not a speaking order and the proceedings were summary. The disciplinary committee were satisfied that there was no reason to hold him guilty of professional or other misconduct. They, therefore, ordered that proceedings be filed.

4. The Advocate-General of the State, who was sent a notice of the proceedings, as is required by the second sub-section of Section 35, and had appeared before the committee, purporting to act under Section 37 of the Act filed an appeal before the Bar Council of India. It was heard by the disciplinary committee of the Bar Council of India. The advocate objected that the Advocate-General had no locus standi to file the appeal. The objection was overruled and the appeal was accepted. The advocate was held guilty of misconduct and suspended for a year from practice. The advocate now appeals under Section 38 of the Act to this Court. His appeal raises questions of merit but he contends at the threshold that the Advocate. General was not competent to file the appeal under Section 37 of the Act.

5. The point in controversy before the disciplinary committee of the Bar Council of India and now before us, is a short one. It is : whether the Advocate-General can be said to be a person aggrieved by the order of the disciplinary committee of the Bar Council of the State? Having heard this point in detail we took time to consider. I am of the opinion that it must be held in favour of the advocate and the order of the disciplinary committee of the Bar Council of India, now under appeal before us, must be set aside on this short ground without going into the merits of the case.

6. Section 37 of the Advocates Act, 1961 reads:

"37. Appeal to the Bar Council of India. (1) Any person aggrieved by an order of the disciplinary committee of a State Bar Council made under Section 35 may, within sixty days of the date of the communication of the order to him, prefer an appeal to the Bar Council of India.

(2) Every such appeal shall be heard by the disciplinary committee of the Bar Council of India which may pass such order thereon as it deems fit"

7. The expression a person aggrieved is not new, nor has it occurred for the first time in the Advocates Act. In fact it occurs in several Indian Acts and in British Statutes for more than a hundred years. In the latter a right of appeal to a person aggrieved is conferred in diverse