SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
S.M. SIKRI, C.J.I., G.K. MITTER, K.S. HEGDE, A.N. GROVER AND P. JAGANMOHAN REDDY, JJ.
U. N. R. Rao, Appellant
Versus
Smt. Indira Gandhi, Respondent.
Civil Appeal No. 196 of 1971, D/-17-3-1971.
Advocates appeared
Appellant in person; Mr. Niren De, Attorney General for India, (M/s. R. H. Dhebar and Ram Panjwani, Advocates, and M/s J. B. Dadachanji, O. C. Mathur and Ravinder Narain, Advocates of M/s. J. B. Dadachanji and Co., with him), for Respondent; Mr. Niren De, Attorney General for India, (M/s. Ram Panjwani, R. H. Dhebar and S. P. Nayar, Advocates, with him), For the Attorney General for India and Union of India.
-held that in view of Article 53(1) any exercise of executive power not in accordance with the Constitution is liable to be set aside.
-held, satisfaction required is in constitutional sense, that is of council of Ministers on whose aid and advice the President/Governor generally exercise all his powers and functions.
-held that in view of Article 53(1) any exercise of executive power not in accordance with the Constitution is liable to be set aside.
-held, satisfaction required is in Constitutional sense, that is of council of Ministers on whose aid and advice the President/Governor generally exercises all his powers and functions.
-held, concept of what is called 2 responsible Governments envisaged in Article 75 (3) means council of Ministers should enjoy confidence of House of People, Article 75 (3) will have full operation till House of People is dissolved. When dissolved, council cannot have confidence of House of People.
-held, while it is not dissolved Article 75(3) will have full operation.
Judgment
SIKRI, CJI.: This appeal by certificate is directed against the judgment of the High Court of Judicature at Madras dismissing Writ Petition No. 63 of 1971 filed by U. N. R. Rao, appellant before us. In this petition the appellant had prayed that a writ of quo warranto be issued to the respondent, Smt. Indira Gandhi, and it be declared that the respondent has no constitutional authority to hold the office of and to function as Prime Minister of India.
2. In brief, the appellant contends that under the Constitution as soon as the House of the People is dissolved under Art. 85 (2) of the Constitution the Council of Ministers, i.e., the Prime Minister and other Ministers, cease to hold office. According to him this follows plainly from the wording of Art. 75 (3), which provides that "the Council of Ministers shall be collectively responsible to the House of the People." How can the Council of Ministers be responsible to the House of the People when it has been dissolved under Art. 85 (2)? According to him no void in the carrying out of Government will be created because the President can exercise the Executive Power of the Union either directly or through officers subordinate to him in accordance with the Constitution as provided in Art. 53 (1) of the Constitution.
3. In constitutional matters it is advisable to decide only those points which necessarily arise for determination on the facts of the case. It seems to us that a very narrow point arises on the facts of the present case. The House of the People was dissolved by the President on 27-12-1970. The respondent was the Prime Minister before the dissolution. Is there anything in the Constitution, and in particular in Art. 75 (3), which renders her carrying on as Prime Minister contrary to the Constitution? It was said that we must interpret Article 75 (3) according to its own terms regardless of the conventions that prevail in the United Kingdom. If the words of an article are clear, notwithstanding any relevant convention, effect will no doubt be given to the words. But it must be remembered that we are interpreting a Constitution and not an Act of Parliament, a Constitution which establishes a Parliamentary system of Government with a Cabinet. In trying to understand one may well keep in mind the conventions prevalent at the time the Constitution was framed.
4. Speaking for the Court (Mukherjea, C. J.) observed in Ram Jawava Kapur v. State of Punjab, (1955) 2 SCR 225 at p. 238.
"The limits within which the executive Government can function under the Indian Constitution can be ascertained without much difficulty by reference to the form of the executive which our Constitution has set-up. Our Constitution, though federal in its structure, is modelled on the British Parliamentary system where the executive is deemed to have the primary responsibility for the formulation of governmental policy and its transmission into law though the condition precedent to the exercise of this responsibility is its retaining the confidence of the legislative branch of the State. The executive function comprises both the determination of the policy as well as carrying it into execution. This evidently includes the initiation of legislation, the maintenance of order, the promotion of social and economic welfare, the direction of foreign policy, in fact the carrying on or supervision of the general administration of the State.
In India, as in England, the executive has to act subject to the control of the legislature, but in what way is this control exercisable by the legislature? Under Article 53 (1) of our Constitution, the executive power of the Union is vested in the President but under Article 75 there is to be a Council of Ministers with the Prime Minister at the head to aid and advise the President in the exercise of his functions. The President has thus been made a formal or constitutional head of the executive and the real executive powers are vested in the Ministers or the Cabinet. The
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