Judgment

SIKRI, CJI.:- This appeal, by certificate granted by the High Court of Gujarat under Article 132 and Article 133 (l) (c) of the Constitution of India, is directed against its judgment and order dismissing the present appellant s petition under Article 226 of the Constitution.

2. The appellant is the owner of Survey Nos. 219/1 and 121 situated on the outskirts of Mahuva in Bhavnagar District. By notification dated April 25, 1969, issued under Section 4 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894, the State Government declared that the above-mentioned lands were needed for the public purpose of construction of an Industrial Estate by the Gujarat Industrial Development Corporation or were likely to be needed for that purpose. On May, 3, 1969 a notice was issued to the appellant by S. O. Collector, Officer on Special Duty, Land Acquisition, informing the appellant that if he had any objection to the acquisition of the lands, he might file objections on or before August 16, 1969. He was further informed that the Officer will hear him or his Counsel at the time of filing the objections. The appellant filed his objections. He took various points, but we are only concerned with one. He pointed out that the Gujarat Industrial Development Corporation

"has come out with ambitious projects for the establishment of the Industrial estate though, in fact, the land already acquired by the Corporation is in excess of the requirement of the Corporation. I say that the corporation is not in possession of such material as would establish genuineness for the establishment of an industrial estate at Mahuva. I, therefore, claim that the responsible officer should be cross-examined by me for the purpose of showing that the proposed acquisition is not for public purpose and that there is no need to acquire the present lands. The other suitable lands are available and the Corporation has not availed of the same and that the acquisition needs to be dropped. I say that the contiguous lands to the lands under the first notification are available and it would be more suitable than the present land. I, therefore, submit that the proposed acquisition is male fide inasmuch as my lands are preferred to the other land owners available immediately near the lands required under the first notification."

He accordingly prayed:

"(a) That the officers of the said Corporation which have sought the acquisition and/or such officer I name hereafter be summoned for the purpose of cross-examination

(b) That personal hearing lie granted."

3. It appears that hearing was fixed for September 18, 1969; this date was extended from time to time till November 18, 1969. The appellant did not appear on these dates nor did he apply for any extension of time. His written objections dated August 17/18, 1969 and dated September 18, 1969 were considered and included in the report, under Section 5-A, to the Government.

4. Three points were pressed by the appellant before the High Court. The principal point that the Gujarat Industrial Development Act, 1962 was beyond the legislative competence of the State Legislature no longer survives as this Court has held this Act to be valid in the case of Ramtanu C. H. Society v. State of Maharashtra, AIR 1970 SC 1771. The second ground pressed before the High Court was that the establishment of Industrial Area by the Corporation was not a public purpose but a private purpose. In our view the High Court was right in holding that this was a public purpose. The third ground raised before the High Court was strongly pressed before us. According to the learned Counsel the report under Section 5-A of the Land Acquisition Act was vitiated because the Collector had not granted an opportunity to the appellant to cross-examine the officers of the Corporation for the purpose of showing that the purpose for which the Corporation sought to acquire the lands was not a public purpose and there was no need to acquire the appellant s land. The High Court relying on its ear