Back
SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
S.M. SIKRI, C.J.I., J.M. SHELAT, A.N. RAY, I.D. DUA, D.G. PALEKAR AND G.K. MITTER, JJ.
P. R. Nayak, Appellant
Versus
Union of India, Respondent.
Civil Appeal No. 875 of 1971, D/- 7-12-1971.
Advocates appeared
M/s. C. K. Daphtary Nad B. R. L. Iyengar Sr. Advocates, (M/s. J. C. Talwar S. C. Patel and Bishamber Lal, Advocates, with them), for Appellant; Mr. Niren De, Attorney-General for India, and Mr. O. P. Malhotra, Sr. Advocate, (M/s. Ram panjwani and S. P. Nayar, Advocates, with them), for Respondent.
India Services (Discipline and Appeal) Rules, 1969 - Rules 3,3(1),4,5,6,7,5(2),7(1),8,9 - Fundamental Rule - Rules 56 (f),56(ff) - Constitution of India,1950 - Articles 14,226,133(1)(c),314 –Government of India Act - Section 96-B - Commissions of Enquiries Act, 1952 - Departmental Enquiry - Disciplinary proceedings - Quashing of Order - Retirement From Services - Managing Director of Indian Refineries Ltd a Public Sector undertaking in October - He was appointed as Chairman and Managing Director of said undertaking and he continued to hold that office till August when he was appointed as Chairman of Oil and Natural Gas Commission - In January he was appointed as Secretary to Government of India in Ministry of Petroleum and Chemicals and in February he was appointed as Secretary in Ministry of Works Housing and Urban Development - In meantime in June reference was made to Central Vigilance Commissioner to inquire into circumstances necessitating change in alignment of pipeline of Indian Oil Corporation in coal-field areas of Bihar and East Bengal - Report submitted by in April did not contain any finding adverse to appellant - It appears that Parliamentary Committee on Public Undertakings had also examined Pipeline Division of Indian Oil Corporation and submitted its report to Parliament on April - As in this report there were some findings adverse to appellant Government framed charges against him and referred them for advice of Central Vigilance Commissioner who for certain personal reasons declined to give any advice - In meanwhile Government had in August appointed a one man Commission consisting of retired Judge of Allahabad High Court under Commissions of Enquiries Act for enquiring into several matters arising out of report of Parliamentary Committee on Public Undertakings - When declined to give his advice Government in Ministry of Petroleum and Chemicals in October referred to Tarkru Commission for advice question whether prima facie charges had been made out against appellant - Whether prima facie charges had been made out against appellant - Whether there is any prima facie basis for these allegations - Whether substantively or temporarily provided that if temporary he is confirmed without reverting to his substantive appointment - Whether permanently or for a specified period - Whether before his retirement or during his re-employment shall after final retirement of officer be deemed to be a proceeding under this article and shall be continued and concluded by authority by which it was commenced in same manner as if officer has continued in service - Held, This Court also in case that word Charges occurring in Rules 5 (2) and 7 of Rules corresponding to Rules 8 and 3 of All India Services Rules did not have same meaning - Word charges in Rule 5 (2) of Rules corresponding to Rule 8 Rules refers to definite charge or charges which are reduced into writing where as words having regard to nature of charges and circumstances in any case occurring in present Rule 3 and corresponding Rule 7 of Rules have a wider meaning denoting accusation or imputations - Ruling in case is that there is power of Government to suspend a member when disciplinary proceedings in shape of inquiry are contemplated and order of suspension in background of charges and circumstances amounts to initiation of disciplinary proceeding - Court considered suspension of a Government servant on ground that a criminal case was pending against him - It was contended in that case suspension pending a criminal proceeding could not be said to be a disciplinary matter - That argument was not accepted - It was said that suspension is of two kinds - It is either a punishment or an interim measure pending a departmental enquiry or pending a criminal proceeding - Suspension as a punishment is a disciplinary matter - Suspension pending a departmental enquiry or pending a criminal proceeding was also to be comprised within words disciplinary matters within meaning of Article 314 - It was then said Take case of suspension pending a departmental enquiry - Purpose of such suspension is generally to facilitate a departmental enquiry and to ensure that while such enquiry is going on-it may relate to serious lapses on part of a public service - He is not in a position to misuse his authority in same way in which he might have been charged to have done so in enquiry - In such a case suspension pending a departmental enquiry cannot be but a matter intimately related to disciplinary matters - Government set up a Commission headed by - Suspension was an express act on part of Government in wake of preliminary enquiry and report made by - Fourth contention on behalf of appellant was that order of suspension was bad inasmuch as there was no order under Fundamental Rule 56 (ff) requiring appellant not to retire - At outset it has to be borne in mind that order of suspension is not under Fundamental Rule 56 (ff) - Order of suspension is under Rule 3 of All India Services Rules Fundamental Rule 56 (ff) is a Rule laying down consequences of an order of suspension - When a valid order of suspension has been made as in present case during period of extension of services of appellant it could not in same breath be said that he is not permitted to retire - Appeal allowed
Certainly. Based on the provided legal document, here are the key points summarized:
The case involves a civil servant, P. R. Nayak, who was a member of the Indian Civil Service and held various high-ranking positions, including Secretary to the Government of India. His service was extended beyond the normal retirement date, which was fixed at 35 years of service from his arrival in India (!) (!) .
The core issue relates to the legality of the order of suspension issued against the appellant during ongoing disciplinary proceedings. The appellant contended that suspension could only be ordered after disciplinary proceedings were formally initiated, not merely when they were contemplated (!) (!) .
The order of suspension was issued on the basis that disciplinary proceedings were contemplated, but no formal charges or initiation of inquiry had yet occurred at that time. The court held that such an order was invalid because suspension under the relevant rules requires actual initiation of disciplinary proceedings, not just contemplation (!) (!) .
The appellant argued that the order of suspension violated the rules and was therefore illegal. The court agreed, emphasizing that suspension must be based on the actual commencement of disciplinary proceedings, and an order based solely on the contemplation of such proceedings is not permissible (!) .
The legal provisions governing the retirement and extension of service of civil servants, particularly the Fundamental Rules, were discussed extensively. The rules specify that civil servants retire after 35 years of service, but they also contain provisions for extension of service, which may be granted with the sanction of the President, and such extension can be for any period, though historically it has not exceeded five years (!) (!) (!) .
The court clarified that the extension of service does not amount to a new appointment or contract but is a continuation of the existing service, permitted under specific rules. The extension is in the nature of a permissible retention of the post, not a new employment (!) (!) .
The appellant's contention that the date of compulsory retirement was fixed and cannot be postponed was rejected. The court observed that the rules allow for extension of service beyond the fixed retirement date, and such extensions are valid if sanctioned properly (!) (!) .
The court also examined the applicability of Fundamental Rule 56 (ff), which deals with the retention of service during suspension on charges of misconduct. The court held that this rule applies during the period of suspension and not only before the final order of disciplinary action, and that the order of suspension during the extension of service was valid (!) (!) .
The appellant argued that the order of suspension was invalid because it was issued before disciplinary proceedings were formally initiated, and thus, he was entitled to retire on the fixed date. The court disagreed, stating that suspension can be ordered when disciplinary proceedings are contemplated, not necessarily after they are formally initiated, provided there is a prima facie basis (!) (!) .
The court emphasized that suspension is a disciplinary measure that can be ordered during the investigation or inquiry process to facilitate the investigation and prevent misuse of authority, and not only after formal charges are framed (!) (!) .
The appellant also contended that the rules were discriminatory and violated constitutional principles. The court found that the rules applied differently to various categories of civil servants due to their distinct service conditions and privileges, and did not violate the principle of equality (!) (!) .
The court ultimately concluded that the suspension order was invalid because it was issued without actual initiation of disciplinary proceedings, and that the appellant's service could be extended legally under the relevant rules. Therefore, the suspension was quashed, and the appeal was allowed (!) (!) .
The case affirms that suspension must be based on the actual start of disciplinary proceedings, and mere contemplation or preliminary investigations do not suffice. It also clarifies the scope of service extension rules and their proper application in the context of disciplinary actions and retirement procedures (!) (!) (!) .
Please let me know if you need further elaboration or specific legal advice based on these points.
Judgment
DUA, J. : (for himself and on behalf of S. M. Sikri, J. M. Shelat and D. G. Palekar, JJ.) : This appeal on certificate of fitness granted by a Division Bench of the High Court of Delhi under Art. 133 (1) (c) of the Constitution is directed against its judgment and order dated May 6, 1971 dismissing the appellant s writ petition under Art. 226 of the Constitution.
2. The appellant joined the Indian Civil Service after being selected pursuant to his success at the competitive examination held in London in 1934. He underwent the necessary period of probation and was thereafter duly admitted to the said Service. He signed the necessary covenant with the then Secretary of State of Indian. He arrived in India on November 25, 1935. It is not disputed before us that according to Fundamental Rule 56 (f) the appellant a member of the Indian Civil Service had to retire after 35years of service counted from the date of his arrival in India subject to proviso that if he had at the end of 35years service held his post for less than five years, he might, with the sanction of the President of India be permitted to retain his post until he had held it for five years. The appellant s date of retirement in the normal course would thus be November 25, 1970 and this is not controverted in this Court.
3. The appellant was appointed as Managing Director of the Indian Refineries Ltd., a Public Sector undertaking in October, 1963. He was appointed as Chairman and Managing Director of the said undertaking and he continued to hold that office till August,1964 when he was appointed as Chairman of the Oil and Natural Gas Commission. In January, 1965 he was appointed as Secretary to the Government of India in the Ministry of Petroleum and Chemicals and in February, 1969 he was appointed as Secretary in the Ministry of Works, Housing and Urban Development. In the meantime in June. 1967 reference was made to Shri S,. N. Rao, the Central Vigilance Commissioner, to inquire into the circumstances necessitating change in the alignment of the pipeline of the Indian Oil Corporation in the coal-field areas of Bihar and East Bengal. The report submitted by Shri S. N. Rao in April, 1970 did not contain any finding adverse to the appellant. It appears that the Parliamentary Committee on Public Undertakings had also examined the Pipeline Division of the Indian Oil Corporation and submitted its report to Parliament on April 30, 1970. As in this report there were some findings adverse to the appellant the Government framed 9 charges against him and referred them for advice of Shri S. Dutt, the Central Vigilance Commissioner, who, for certain personal reasons, declined to give any advice. In the meanwhile the Government had in August, 1970 appointed a one man Commission consisting of Shri J. N. Takru, a retired Judge of the Allahabad High Court under the Commissions of Enquiries Act, 1952, for enquiring into several matters arising out of the report of the Parliamentary Committee on Public Undertakings. When Shri S. Dutt declined to give his advice the Government in the Ministry of Petroleum and Chemicals in October, 1970 referred to the Tarkru Commission for advice, the question whether prima facie charges had been made out against the appellant. The charge-sheet containing nine charges against the appellant were also forwarded to that Commission. On November 7, 1970 the Government of India intimated Shri J. N. Takru that he was further required to suggest if any other charge or charges appeared to him to have been prima facie mad out against the appellant. The Takru Commission examined 14 charges against the appellant and before starting the enquiry required him on November 16, 1970 to submit his written statement in defence. The appellant submitted his explanation in more communications than one. They were dated 7th and 19th December, 1970 and 5th January, 1971. Shri Takru submitted to the Government an interim report on January 13, 1971 in which prima facie case
The main legal point established in the judgment is the binding effect of the settlement between the parties, the waiver of the right to seek re-employment by the workmen, and the entitlement of the ....
A lockout is justified if it is declared in response to an illegal strike or a strike that is in breach of a settlement or award.
The combination of eyewitness testimonies, recovery of the weapon used, and forensic examination results can establish guilt in criminal cases, even based on circumstantial evidence.
The conviction of an accused person under Section 27(3) of the Arms Act is not permissible in law if the accused is also charged with committing murder under Section 302 of the Indian Penal Code.
The court can enhance compensation based on the deceased's income and family dependency, and adjust the multiplier used by the Tribunal if found unjustified.
An indispensable Tool for Legal Professionals, Endorsed by Various High Court and Judicial Officers
Please visit our Training & Support
Center or Contact Us for assistance
Scan Me!
India’s Legal research and Law Firm App, Download now!
For Daily Legal Updates, Join us on :
Back to top
