1971 Supreme(SC) 624

SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
S.M. SIKRI, C.J.I., J.M. SHELAT, I.D. DUA AND G.K. MITTER, JJ.
R.B. Bansilal Abirchand Mills Co. Pvt. Ltd., Appellant
Versus
The Labour Court, Nagpur and others etc., Respondents.
Civil Appeals Nos. 2136 and 2295 of 1966, D/-25-11-1971.
Advocates appeared
Mr. G. B. Pai, Sr. Advocate (Mr. P. C. Bhartari, Advocate, and M/s. J. B. Dadachanji, O. C. Mathur and Ravinder Narain, Advocates of M/s. J. B. Dadachanji and Co. with him), (In C. A. No. 2136 of 1966) and Mr. S. V. Gupte, Sr. Advocate, (M/s. C. N. Nagle and A. G. Ratnaparkhi, Advocates with him), (In C. A. No. 2295 of 1966), for Appellant; Mr. M. C. Bhandare, Sr. Advocate (M/s. V. P. Sathe, Praveen Pareekh, Vineet Kumar and Miss Indira Jai Singh, Advocates, with him), for Respondents ( In Nos. 131 to 142, 144 to 478, 480 to 488, 490 and 492 (in C. A. No. 2136 of 1966).

Headnote:

Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 - Section 33-C (2), 33-C, 2 (kkk), 25-C, 25-E, 10 (1) (d), 7, 7-A, 10 (1) ( c), 40, 10 (1), 33-A, 6-H (2) and 25-FFF - Constitution of India, 1950 - Article 226 and 133 (1) (a) - Coal Mines Provident Fund and Bonus Schemes Act, 1948 - Indian Electricity Act, 1910 – Section 6 - Minimum Wages Act, 1948 - Section 5 (2) and (1) - C. P. and Berar Industrial Disputes (Settlement) Act, 1947 - Company - Partnership Firm - Heavy Loss and Extensive Damage - Insurance Companies - Whether Labour Court had jurisdiction to entertain application for lay-off compensation under S. 33-C (2) of Industrial Disputes Act - Whether having regard to circumstances and established facts there had been a lay-off within meaning of expression in S. 2 (kkk) - Whether compensation under S. 25-C read with S. 25-E of Act was payable to workers, also whether workers were not entitled to compensation because of non-fulfilment of conditions prescribed in S. 25-E - Whether badli workers were entitled to lay-off compensation - Whether quantum of compensation would be governed by first proviso to S. 25-C or whether S. 25-C - Whether workmen had proved that they had presented themselves for work or not in terms of S. 25-E to be able to claim compensation under S. 25-C, excepting with regard to three workmen who gave clear evidence - Whether specified in Second Schedule or Third Schedule - Whether Labour Court was within its jurisdiction to entertain applications which were followed by writ petition - Whether other co-workers will or will not adopt same course - Whether closure had resulted in retrenchment of applicant and whether closure was beyond control of employer - Whether there was really a closure or a lay-off - Whether, on facts, it had jurisdiction to make computation – Held, Fact that a number of workers make claims of identical nature i.e. to compensation for lay-off, arising out of same set of facts and circumstances cannot make any difference to individual workman who prefers claim - Mere fact that a large number of persons makes a claim of same nature against employer, does not change nature of dispute so as to take it out of pale of S. 7 of Act and render dispute one which can only be dealt with by an Industrial Tribunal to which reference can be made by appropriate Government - Claim to compensation of every workman who is laid-off is one which arises under statue itself and S. 25-C provides for a benefit to workman which is capable of being computed in terms of money under S. 33-C (2) of Act - Scheme of Act being to enable a workman to approach a Labour Court for computation of compensation claimed by him in terms of S. 25-C of Act - In substance point urged by appellants was that if a claim is made on basis of a lay-off and the employer contends that there was no lay-off but closure, it is not open to a labour court to entertain an application under S. 33-C (2) - More so it was stated, when dispute was not between a solitary workman on one hand and employer on other but a whole body of workmen ranged against their employer who was faced with numerous applications before Labour Court for computation of benefit in terms of money - In second case Mr. Gupte argued that although his client did not raise question of liability before, there was no question of any concession and he should be allowed to contest his liability on basis of application preferred for urging additional grounds before this Court - As this point was not urged in court below this application must be refused - Last point urged was that in view of standing Orders 19 and 21 quantum of compensation had to be scaled down or measured in terms of the Standing Orders - Under Standing Order 19 employer could, in event of fire, breakdown of machinery etc. stop any machine or machines or department or departments wholly or partially or the whole or a part of the establishment for any period, without notice and without compensation in lieu of notice - Under standing Order 21, any operative played (sic) off under Standing Order 19 was not to be considered as dismissed from service but as temporarily unemployed and was not to be entitled to wages during such unemployment except to extent mentioned in Standing Order - High Court rightly turned down contention in view of S. 25-J of Act under which provisions of Chapter V-A are to have effect notwithstanding anything inconsistent therewith contained in any other law including Standing Orders made under Industrial Employment (Standing Orders) Act, 1946 - Above judgment was concurred in by our late colleague – Court however gave a further hearing to parties at which nothing was addressed to make Court change opinion already formed - Appeal dismissed.