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1977 Supreme(SC) 344

SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
M.H. BEG C.J.I. AND P.N. BHAGWATI, J.
Tharoo Mal, Appellant
Versus
Puran Chand Pandey and others, Respondents.
Civil Appeal No. 1201 of 1977
Decided on 29-11-1977.
Advocates appeared
Mr. Y. S. Chitale, Sr. Advocate (Mr. K. J. John, Advocate with him), for Appellant; Mr. Yogeshwar Prasad, Senior Advocate (Misses Rani Arora and Meera Bail, Advocates with him), for Respondents.

Advocates:
K.J.JOHN, MIRA BAHL, RANI ARORA, Y.S.Chitale, YOGESHAR PRASAD

Headnote:

Constitution of India – Article 136 - Municipalities Act - Section 128/296/299 – Claim of compensation – Jurisdiction - Hence, there seems to us nothing to prevent the Municipal Board from considering any objections which may have been filed even after a fortnight, a period which may, at the most, be construed as a reasonable limit from the publication of the notification after which the persons deemed to be notified could not reasonably complain of want of opportunity to object. The right to object, however, seems to be given at the stage of proposals of the tax only as a concession to requirements of fairness even though the procedure is legislative and not quasi-judicial – Held, appearing on behalf of the Municipal Board, however, pointed out that case (AIR 1965 SC 895) was decided before the proviso to Section 132 (2) was added in 1964. It does appear to us that the effect of the proviso is that, by dispensing with even the publication of the modified proposals, no such right of the appellant is violated as could be considered a condition precedent to the validity of the proceedings. Nevertheless, if the petitioner could have made out a case of such injustice due to some irregularity that we should deem the imposition of the tax to be vitiated by the non-consideration of a vital matter, we could have taken the view that section 135 (3) will not bar consideration of a vital infirmity, in as much as patent injustice has resulted from it, in the imposition of a tax. If it could be argued that there is no imposition of the tax at all as contemplated by law section 135 (3) may not have cured the irregularity. But, no such infirmity has been pointed out to us. The result is that, whatever irregularity there may be in not forwarding the objections of the appellant to the prescribed Authority, as the Board should have done under Section 132 (4) of the Act, the irregularity seems to be cured by an application of the provisions of Section 135 (3) of the Act as the Government had notified the imposition of the tax - Therefore, if there is any gross injustice, which the petitioner has not been able to make out before us, he can still approach the Government for relief in case he can make out a case for relief under Section 137 of the Act - Appeal dismissed

JUDGMENT

BEG, C.J.I. :—The appellant before us by grant of special leave under Art. 136 of the Constitution is a partner in a firm carrying on the business of running a cinema house called "Jai Talkies" in the town of Pilibhit in Uttar Pradesh. The Municipal Board of Pilibhit passed a resolution on 11th of April, 1971, imposing a theatre tax of Rs. 25/- per show under Section 128 (1) (iii-a) read with Sections 296 and 299 of the Municipalities Act (hereinafter referred to as the Act). The resolution was duly published in a Hindi newspaper on 16 May, 1972, as required by Section 94 (3) read with S. 131 (1) (a) of the Act. The preliminary proposals for imposition of a tax were framed under S. 131 of the Act which reads as follows:

"131. Framing of preliminary proposals.- (1) Where a board desires to impose a tax, it shall, by special resolution, frame proposals specifying-

(a) the tax, being one of the taxes described in sub-section (1) of Section 128, which it desires to impose;

(b) the persons or class of persons to be made liable, and the description of property or other taxable thing or circumstances in respect of which they are to be made liable, except where and in so far as any such class or description is already sufficiently defined under Cl. (a) or by this Act;

(c) the amount or rate leviable from each such person or class of persons;

(d) any other matter referred to in Section 153, which the State Government requires by rule to be specified.

(2) The Board shall also prepare a draft of the rules which it desires the State Government to make in respect of the matters, referred to in Section 153.

(3) The Board shall, thereupon publish in the manner prescribed in S. 94 the proposals framed under sub-s. (1) and the draft rules framed under sub-section (2) along with a notice in the form set forth in Schedule III."

2. Section 132 of the Art then lays down:

"132. Procedure subsequent to framing proposals.- (1) Any inhabitant of the municipality may, within a fortnight from the publication of the said notice, submit to the board an objection in writing to all or any of the proposals framed under the preceding section, and the board shall take any objection so submitted into consideration and pass orders thereon by special resolution.

(2) If the board decides to modify its proposals or any of them, it shall publish modified proposals and (if necessary) revised draft rules along with a notice indicating that the proposals and rules (if any) are in modification of proposals and rules previously published for objection:

Provided that no such publication shall be necessary where the modification is confined to reduction in the amount or rate of the tax originally proposed.

(3) Any objections which may be received to the modified proposals shall be dealt with in the manner prescribed in sub-section (1).

(4) When the board has finally settled its proposals, it shall submit them along with the objection (if any) made in connection therewith to the prescribed authority."

3. It is evident from S. 132 (1) of the Act that the time given to the residents within the municipal limits to file their objections is a fortnight from the publication of the resolution, as required by S. 94 (1) of the Act. Apparently, a fortnight is considered a reasonable time so that objections may be submitted for consideration to the Municipal Board. As was pointed out by one of us (Beg, C. J.) in Niranjan Lal Bhargava v. State of U. P., 1969 All LJ 295 with regard to almost identically framed provisions of Sections 199 to 203 of the U. P. Nagar Mahapalika Adhiniyam, 1959, the procedure for the imposition of the tax is legislative and not quasi-judicial. Hence, there seems to us nothing to prevent the Municipal Board from considering any objections which may have been filed even after a fortnight, a period which may, at the most, be construed as a reasonable limit from the publication of the notification after which the persons deemed to be notified could not reasonably com



















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