Judgment

BHAGWATI, C.J.I. :- This is a rather unusual appeal in two respects. In the first place, it is preferred by the Advocate-General of Bihar, the highest Law Officer in the State and leader of the Bar by virtue of his official position and secondly, it is not directed against any order of the High Court with a view to its reversal or modification but it merely seeks expunction of certain remarks made by the High Court against the appellant, it arises out of an unfortunate incident which happened in the court of Mr. Justice S. K. Jha and which in our opinion, could have been avoided with a little tact and understanding. We do not propose to enquire as to who was at fault in this regrettable incident - whether the learned Judge or the appellant- since any finding reached by us as a result of such enquiry would either affect the dignity of the judicial institution or the position and prestige of the high office of Advocate General.. We would like to avoid either consequence because the dignity of the judicial institution which alone can ensure the confidence and respect of the people is as much dear to us as the position of prestige occupied by the office of Advocate-General of a State. Let us state the facts giving rise to the present appeal.

2. On 6th November 1984, a writ petition bearing CWJC No. 4100 of 1984 was placed for admission before Mr. Justice S.K. Jha sitting as a single Judge in the High Court of Patna. The writ petition was admitted by him but no notice. was ordered to issue since all the respondents were represented by Government Pleader No. 1. It seems that Government Pleader No. 1 had already accepted notice and filed a counter-affidavit on behalf of the respondents. There were three respondents, namely, the State of Bihar, the Director of Primary Education, Bihar, and Shri Pramod Ban Bihari Singh, Regional Deputy Director of Education, Patna Division. The learned Judge while admitting the writ petition made an order that if the services of the petitioners in the writ petition were being utilised in any manner, they should be paid their minimum legal dues. It seems that some doubt was felt in regard to the true effect of this portion of the order dated 6th November 1984 and an application for clarification was, therefore, made on behalf of the petitioners and this application came up for hearing before the learned Judge on 15th February 1985. The learned counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioners as well as the respondents were present and they were heard on the application and after hearing them, the learned Judge passed an Order on 15th February 1985 pointing out that the Order passed by him on 6th November 1984 did not require any clarification but with a view to erring on the safe side, the learned Judge directed that "all such teachers from whom work was being taken shall be paid their legal dues" and "the authorities concerned shall in duty bound pay to the petitioners the B.A. trained scale which they were getting earlier and against which post their work is being utilised". This Order made by the learned Judge was not carried out by the respondents and the petitioners were compelled to file an application for contempt, viz., MJC No. 173/85. The learned Judge took up the application for contempt for hearing on 6th December 1985. The learned Judge found that the attitude of respondent No. 3 was defiant and he accordingly sent for the appellant and requested him in his capacity as Advocate-General "to look into the matter personally and to see that the matter with regard to the contempt may not end in some unseemly result against the contemner", i.e. respondent No. 3. The appellant obviously was not bound to intervene in the matter and he could have easily left the contempt application to be decided by the learned Judge on merits, but as a responsible Law Officer, he, in deference to the request of the learned Judge took upon himself to see that the Order dated 15th February 1985 passed by the lear