JUDGMENT

SHARMA, J. :— This appeal by special, leave arises out of a suit filed by the respondents for setting aside the decree in an earlier suit being Suit No. 61-A of 1955 instituted by Dammu Lal, husband of the respondent No. I and father of respondents Nos. 2 to 12, for eviction of the appellants from a building in Raipur which is in their, occupation as tenants. Dammu Lal also prayed for a decree for arrears of rent and damages. The prayer for eviction was allowed along with a money decree for Rs. 260/- as arrears of rent and Rs. 137/- as damages. The tenants filed an appeal which was numbered as Civil Appeal No. 7-A of 1965. During the pendency of the appeal Dammu Lal died, and his legal representatives were substituted as respondents. Some of his children were minor who were placed under the guardianship of their mother Smt. Sugandhibai, respondent No. 1. An application purporting to be a compromise petition on behalf of all the parties was filed before the Court which was recorded and the suit was disposed of in its terms by the appellate Court on 23-4-1966. According to the compromise the entire decree was set aside and the suit was dismissed, with the parties bearing their own costs. The respondents have challenged the compromise decree by the present suit.

2. The trial Court dismissed the suit. On appeal the first appellate Court reversed the decision, set aside the compromise decree and directed the Civil Appeal No. 7-A of 1965 to be disposed of afresh in accordance with law. By the impugned judgment the High Court dismissed the second appeal preferred by the appellants.

3. Mr. Kacker, the learned counsel appearing in support of the appeal, placed the facts relevant to the several questions raised by the parties and decided by the Courts below and contended that the decision of the High Court is illegal on several grounds. We do not consider it necessary to go into all the questions disposed of by the courts below as the respondents are, in our view, entitled to succeed in the suit on one of the several points urged on their behalf which is discussed below.

4. As has been stated earlier, some of the party respondents in Civil Appeal No. 7-A of 1965 including Kamal Kumar, one of the sons of Dammu Lal, were minor and were represented by Mr. Mokasdar, Advocate. In view of the provisions of Order XXXII, Rule 7 of the Code of Civil Procedure, it was essential for the Court to have granted permission to the guardian to enter into the compromise only after considering all the relevant circumstances. From the records of the case it appears that the court before recording the compromise sanctioned leave in the following words:-

"As the appellant is prepared to forgo the entire cost of the proceedings, it is in the interest of the minors and benefit of the minors that this appeal be compromised. The minor respondents are represented by senior counsel and his opinion is that it will be in the interest of the minor to compromise the appeal. In view of this, I have no reason to disagree with him. I am satisfied that the compromise is in the interest of the minors, hence, I allow the application and grant the necessary permission under Order 32, Rule 7, C. P.C. to the learned counsel of the minor respondents to compromise the appeal."

On the face of it, the compromise was one sided whereby the minors were giving up their right under the trial Courts decree both in respect to eviction as well as arrears of rent and damages. It is said that as a consideration for the compromise the appellants were giving up their right to claim costs which might have been decreed by the appellate Court in case of their success on merits. According to the respondents case which has been accepted by the two Courts below the guardian of the minors was guilty of gross negligence in entering into the compromise by failing to take into account the interest of the minors. On behalf of the appellants it has been contended that during the pendency of Civil App