SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
SABYASACHI MUKHARJI, CJI., AND K.N. SAIKIA, J.
B.L. Samdaria, Petitioner
Versus
Harak Chand Jain and others, Respondents
Special Leave Petn. No. 7826 of 1987, D/- 13-8-1990.
Constitution of India - Article 136 - Advocates Act, 1961 - Section 36B - Order of Disciplinary Committee of Bar Council – Appeal against - Habituated to ignore all Code all Professional – Professional Misconduct – Order of Suspension - Respondent No. 1 had filed a complaint against Advocate-petitioner before Bar Council of Rajasthan - Petitioner had first filed claim petition under Motor Vehicles Act through his own junior Advocate - It was stated that claimant expired after filing of claim petition and that petitioner filed application and Vakalatnama on behalf of legal representatives ignoring very serious rules of professional conduct, namely, that he could not take brief on behalf of claimants legal representatives as he was already a counsel for opposite party - Documents annexed indicated that he filed vakalatnama and affidavit on behalf of legal representatives and insurance company - These constitute, according to the respondent No. 1, serious professional and other misconduct - Held, Aggrieved thereby, petitioner seeks intervention of this Court under Art. 136 of Constitution of India – Court have perused order of Bar Council of India - We are, in substance, in agreement with findings of Disciplinary Committee of Bar Council of India and we find no ground for interference - Review did not lie - It has to be reiterated that Disciplinary Committee of Bar Council did not dismiss application for review on technical ground but examined matter on merits - While we uphold findings as to guilt of petitioner, as petitioner has served his sentence, that is to say, remained in suspension for all this period, we are of opinion that in facts and circumstances of this case, sufficient punishment would be deemed to have been meted out to petitioner - We transform the sentence undergone, that is to say, period already spent in suspension, which in our opinion, is sufficient punishment in this case and rest of punishment, that is to say, barring petitioner for remaining period need not be given effect to and, therefore, is cancelled - Modify order by stating that suspension period already undergone by petitioner would be substituted to order of suspension directed by Disciplinary Committee of Bar Council of India - Petition dismissed.
Judgment
This is a petition under Article 136 of the Constitution of India against the judgment and order of the Disciplinary Committee of the Bar Council of India dated 30th January, 1987.
2. Respondent No. 1 had filed a complaint dated 10th February, 1982 against the Advocate-petitioner (hereinafter referred to as the petitioner) before the Bar Council of Rajasthan. In the complaint, respondent No. 1 stated that he had come to know that the petitioner seems to be habituated to ignore all Code all Professional and other conduct. That in a particular Civil Misc. Application in the Court of the District Judge, Ajmer, the petitioner had first filed the claim petition under the Motor Vehicles Act through his own junior Shri Lekh Raj Ojha, Advocate. It was stated that the claimant Smt. Chandu Bai expired after filing of the claim petition and that the petitioner filed application and Vakalatnama on behalf of the legal representatives ignoring the very serious rules of professional conduct, namely, that he could not take brief on behalf of the claimants legal representatives as he was already a counsel for the opposite party. The documents annexed indicated that he filed vakalatnama and affidavit on behalf of the legal representatives and the insurance company. These constitute, according to the respondent No. 1, serious professional and other misconduct. It was further stated that the petitioner had already been punished in a case by the Disciplinary Committee of Bar Council and another was pending before the Disciplinary Committee. The petitioner, filed a rejoinder. As the Bar Council of Rajasthan could not disposed of the complaint within a period of one year, it stood automatically transferred to the Bar Council of India under Sec. 36B of the Advocates Act, 1961 (hereinafter called as the Act). The Disciplinary Committee of the Bar Council of India disposed of the complaint by an order dated 8th September, 1985.
3. The Disciplinary Committee of the Bar Council of India exonerated the petitioner of the first charge but found him guilty of the second charge. It was the case of the petitioner that the respondent-complainant had nothing to do with the subject-matter of the complaint made by him. He was not at all the person who was affected by the alleged misconduct on the part of the petitioner. The complaint was investigated and the petitioner was found guilty. The Bar Council of India categorically found that it was not believable that Smt. Chandu Bai engaged Shri Lekh Raj Ojha who was a novice in the profession to file the claim petition. It was the petitioner who had filed the application for bringing the legal representatives of the said deceased Smt. Chandu Bai on records and it was further noted Shri Lekh Raj Ojha had left the office of the petitioner before May, 1980. The petitioner failed to produce the most material witnesses like Shri Lekh Raj Ojha and Shri Arun Sharma, advocates and his clerk or typist, etc. The petitioner did not comply with the order of the State Bar Council of Rajasthan which directed him to produce the cash book, an adverse inference could be drawn. It was the case of the petitioner that the Disciplinary Committee of the Bar Council of India arrived at its findings without taking into account all the relevant facts and material documents and without taking into account pleaded facts.
4. It was the case of the petitioner that Shri Lekh Raj Ojha was using the office of the petitioner in 1979, as an Advocate. TheDisciplinary Committee, according to the petitioner, did not at all consider or refer to the State Roll of Advocates, published by the Bar Council of Rajasthan, containing the Biodata of Shri Lekh Raj Ojha, Advocate and that is the reason why the Bar Council came to wrong conclusion that Shri Lekh Raj Ojha was a beginner to whom Smt. Chandu Bai could not have entrusted her case.
5. The petitioners case was that this was an unwarranted inference based on no evidence. According to the petitioner had
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