JUDGMENT

MOHAN, J. :—Leave granted.

2. This anneal by special leave is directed against the judgment dated 28-5-91 of the High Court of Kerala in C.R.P. No. 1752 of 1990-D.

3. The short facts leading to this appeal are as under:

The petition schedule shed and the premises were obtained by the appellant and the second respondent under a partition of the year 1959, The second respondent is the mother of the appellant. In 1969, the premises were let out to the first respondent by the husband of the second respondent on a monthly rent of Rs. 15. On 24-1-1969 a rent deed was executed (Ex. A 1). After the death of the husband of the second respondent the first respondent paid rent up to September 1976. Thereafter she committed default in payment of rent. A notice was issued by the second respondent terminating the tenancy with effect from 20-4-77 and demanded vacant possession with arrears of rent.

4. On 14-2-78, the second respondent relinquished her entire right in favour of the appellant. Thereupon, the appellant obtained absolute right over the property. She filed a petition for eviction on two grounds: (i) the first respondent committed default in payment of rent and (ii) she will be entitled to recover possession of the petition schedule shed for demolition. By an order dated 28-6-82 the Rent Controller directed eviction on the ground of arrears of rent. However, the claim for recovery of building for demolition was disallowed.

5. Aggrieved by the order of the Rent Controller, the appellant preferred an appeal before the Appellate Court. By its order dated 14-12-83 the finding of the trial Court was reversed in so far as the bona fide need was concerned and the order of eviction was confirmed on this ground as well. Thereupon, the first respondent filed a revision under Section 20 of the Kerala Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1965 (hereinafter referred to as the Act) before the District Court, Kollam. That was dismissed on 24-6-85. The first respondent preferred a further revision before the High Court under Section 115 of the Civil Procedure Code (hereinafter referred to as the Code). The High Court by its judgment dated 21-8-86 set aside the finding of the Appellate Court and the Revisional Court and the matter was remitted to the trial Court.

6. On remit, the Rent Controller dismissed the petition filed by the appellant. Hence, the appellant filed an appeal to the District Court. By its order dated 30th of June, 1990 it directed eviction of the first respondent on the ground of bona fide need under Section 11(3) of the Act. The first respondent aggrieved by the order of eviction preferred a revision. The Division Bench of the High Court set aside the order of eviction holding that the landlady was not successful in proving her case of bona fide need. It is under these circumstances, this appeal by special leave has come to be preferred.

7. Learned counsel for the appellant would urge that the High Court had misconceived the scope of revisional jurisdiction. Having held that under Section 20 of the Act, a re-appreciation of the evidence as such was not called for, yet the High Court went into the factual details and re-appreciated the entire evidence as though it was an Appellate Court.

8. Notwithstanding the fact that Section 20 of the Act conferring revisional jurisdiction of the High Court is widely worded, such a jurisdiction cannot be converted into an appellate jurisdiction. This Court in Rai Chand Jain v. Chandra Kanta Khosla (1991) 1 SCC 422, has clearly pointed but the scope of such revisional jurisdiction and has held that it cannot act as a second court of appeal. Therefore, the impugned order is liable to be set aside. Without prejudice to the above, it is submitted that this Court in Aundal Ammal v. Sadasivan Pillai, AIR 1987 SC 203 has held that no second revision is permissible to the High Court either under Section 115 of the Code or under Section 20 of the Act. The District Court has exercised the revisional