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1994 Supreme(SC) 830

SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
M.N. VENKATACHALIAH, C.J.I. AND B.P. JEEVAN REDDY, J.
State of U.P. and others, Appellants v. Km. Ramona Perhar, Respondent.
Civil Appeal No. 5874 of 1994 (arising out of S.L.P. (C) No. 9732 of 1994)
Decided on 2-9-1994.

Advocates:
H.K.PURI, R.B.MISHRA, RACHNA GUPTA, SUNIL GUPTA

Headnote:

Indian Companies Act, 1956 - Section 617 - Essential Commodities Act, 1955 - Section 16(2) - Constitution of India - Article 12 - Hard Coke - Fixation Of Price Of Hard Coke - Respondent, carries on business of foundry casting and for that purpose it has to buy hard coke from appellant - Production and disposal of coal and coke are controlled and regulated initially framed by Central Government of Defence of India Rules and being continued in force -In exercise of powers conferred by Order, Central Government issued a notification fixing prices at which different types of coal and coke, including hard coke, would be sold - Alleging that despite such fixation of price of hard coke by statutory notification appellant was demanding and, for that matter, realising, besides price, service charges respondent filed a writ petition in the Patna High Court wherein it contended that such action on part of appellant, which was a State within meaning was wholly arbitrary and illegal and, accordingly, prayed for appropriate relief - In contesting petition appellant submitted that coal and coke were different commodities and in view of fact that respondent was required to be supplied foundry hardcoke, which had a specified size, it had to put in some extra work and effort like shifting and sizing after production of coke in plant, and that necessarily meant extra expenditure - According to appellant recovery of such expenditure was not barred by notification and, on contrary, notification permitted such recovery – Held, Contention that since respondent had not contracted for supply of special size it was not bound to pay for same cannot be accepted as, in view of definition of size under Order, appellant is obligated to sell only according to specifications of ISI - Note referred to in table of ISI notification does not come in aid as it only empowers ISI to specify different size ranges for special uses besides those specified in table and has no bearing to issue involved in this appeal. Coming now to impugned judgment we find that in negativing contention of appellant based on Note 14, High Court observed that said Note had no manner of application to facts of case as respondent did not purchase special size of coal - Unfortunately, in making above observation High Court failed to notice definition of size under Order and report of ISI in this regard - Appeal allowed.

JUDGMENT

Leave granted. Heard counsel for both the parties.

2. The appeal is preferred against the judgment of a learned single Judge of the Allahabad High Court allowing the writ petition filed by the respondent.

3. The respondent obtained admission in a private medical college in Karnataka (J.J.M. Medical College, Davangere) in July, 1990. The said college is said to be recognised by the Indian Medical Council. Sometime, in early 1992, the respondent applied to the Government of Uttar Pradesh for transferring her to the medical college at Allahabad. This request was rejected following the policy enunciated by the Government of Uttar Pradesh that no one from outside the State shall be permitted to be transferred to a medical college within the State. Thereupon the respondent approached the High Court of Allahabad by way of the present writ petition. On April 2, 1992, it appears, the learned Standing Counsel for the State of Uttar Pradesh was asked to obtain instructions in the matter. Within five days, i.e., on April 7, 1992, the writ petition came up again for orders before S. C. Verma, J. The learned Judge observed that though the learned Standing Counsel was asked to obtain instructions, he has neither filed a counter affidavit nor has obtained any specific instructions to oppose the writ petition. The learned Judge granted him three more weeks to file a counter-affidavit and at the same time made the following direction :

"The respondent No. 3 is directed to provisionally admit the petitioner to second professional M.B.B.S. course. The petitioner may be allowed to presume (pursue?) her studies in the said course. The result of the examination shall not be declared until further orders of this court.

The provisional admission is required to be made on 5 per cent vacancies in accordance with the provisions of regulations framed under the Indian Medical Council Act."

4. The order speaks for itself. To expect the Standing Counsel to obtain instructions in the matter within five days was really not practicable nor was the matter of such urgency that it could not wait for three more weeks which was granted to the learned Standing Counsel on that date to file the counter-affidavit. The learned Judge has not even indicated prima facie that the policy of the Uttar Pradesh State Government not to permit transfer of students from outside the State is bad and, if so, why. Assuming that such a transfer is permissible, the question would arise, who among all the applicants is more deserving. No effort was made by the learned Judge to find out whether there are any other students similarly placed who may be seeking such transfer and who among them is more deserving or more meritorious, as the case may be. A mandatory interim order, which had the consequence of displacing the student from a private college in Karnataka to a government college in Allahabad was passed as a matter of routine. This Court has emphasised in several decisions that passing of interim orders - more particularly of a mandatory nature like the present one - is neither a matter of course nor a matter of charity. The power to grant interim orders is coupled with the duty to consider all the relevant facts and legal principles relevant in that behalf. Admissions to educational institutions should not be granted by interim orders - at any rate, not without fully hearing the respondents.

5. The writ petition ultimately came up before V. Bahuguna, J. on November 12, 1992. The writ petition was allowed under a short order which reads thus :

"Heard learned counsel for the parties. The State Government allowed the transfer of the petitioner, consequently the Principal passed an order on 13-8-1992 admitting the petitioner in M.L.N. Medical College, for the II Professional Course of M.B.B.S. This order of State Government has been passed in subsequent to the order of this court dated 7-4-1992. This court has permitted a provisional admission to the petitioner with the right to appea






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