2004 Supreme(SC) 1485

2005(1) Supreme 656
Supreme Court of India
(From Allahabad High Court)
R.C. Lahoti, CJI, G.P. Mathur & P.K. Balasubramanyan, JJ.
U.P. State Road Transport Corporation —Appellant
versus
State of U.P. and Anr. —Respondents
Civil Appeal No. 6341 of 2002
With
C.A.Nos. 6342-6343/2002, 6344-6345/2002, 6347-6348/2002, 6350-6351/2002, 6353-6354/2002, 8575/2002, 4196/2003, 5258/2003, C.A.No. 7679/2004 @ SLP (Civil) No. 21557/2002 & C.A.No. 7681/2004 @ SLP (Civil) No. 19034/2003
Decided on 29-11-2004
Counsel for the Parties :
For the Appearing Parties : Ghulam E. Vahanvati, Solicitor General (NP), Sudhir Chandra Agarwal, Dr. A.M. Singhvi, K.K. Venugopal, (NP), Harish N. Salve, (NP), Sudhir Chandra, Ranjit Kumar, Dinesh Dwivedi, (NP), Sr. Advocates, Pramod Swarup, Praveen Swarup, Ms. Pareena Swarup, Ms. Rachna Gupta, Dr. Indra Pratap Singh, D.K. Garg, B.S. Billowria, Rohit Pandey, D.K. Gupta, N.P. Midha, Sunil K. Jain, Manish Kumar, S. Borthakur, Dr. (Mrs.) Vipin Gupta, Ms. Rani Chhabra, Ms. Sudha Pal, Ms. Seema Nair, Sunil Gupta, Additional Advocate General, for State of U.P., Pramod Dayal, Arohi Bhalla, R.C. Verma, (NP), Rajnish Prasad, Kamlendra Mishra, Jeevan Prakash, Y.P. Dhingra, Manish Shankar Srivastava, Advocates.

Important pointThe Supreme Court having specifically considered the question in two earlier decisions as to whether the draft scheme had lapsed under sub-sec. (4) of Section 100 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 and having recorded a clear finding that the scheme had not lapsed, it was not at all open to the High Court to examine the said question all over again and to hold that the draft scheme had lapsed.

Headnote:(i) Motor Vehicles Act, 1939—Section 68-C—Motor Vehicles Act, 1988—Section 100(4)—Scheme to nationalize Saharanpur-Shahdara-Delhi route—Uttar Pradesh State Road Transport Corporation prepared a draft scheme—It was published on 29-9-1959 u/s 68-C of the Act—Objections—Supreme Court quashed the scheme by the judgment dated 23-8-1985 on ground that delay of 26 years in disposing of ­objections had resulted in violation of Articles 14 and 19(1)(g) of the Constitution—Fresh scheme covering in all 39 routes published on 13-2-1986 u/s 68-C of the Act—Objections filed against the scheme—Before the objections could be finally decided, Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 came into force repealing the 1939 Act—Competent Authority held that the proposed scheme had lapsed by virtue of Section 100(4) of the 1988 Act—Writ Petition—Whether High Court was justified in holding that the scheme had lapsed—(No).

       Held : In our opinion, having regard to the earlier litigation and the decisions of this Court rendered with regard to the scheme in question, i.e. which was published under Section 68-C of the old Act on 13.2.1986, the view taken by the High Court that the same had lapsed is wholly erroneous in law. As mentioned earlier, the competent authority had at an earlier stage held that the scheme had lapsed by virtue of sub-section (4) of Section 100 of the 1988 Act and the writ petition filed by UPSRTC against the said ­decision had been dismissed by the High Court on 16.3.1990. The aforesaid decision of the High Court holding that the scheme had lapsed was challenged in Ram Krishna Verma’s case (supra) and the Court specifically considered the question as to whether the draft scheme dated 13.2.1986 had lapsed under sub-section (4) of Section 100 of the 1988 Act. A clear finding was recorded that the scheme had not lapsed (Paras 7 and 8)

       This Court having specifically considered the question in two earlier decisions as to whether the draft scheme dated 13.2.1986 had lapsed under sub-section (4) of Section 100 of the Act and having recorded a clear finding that the scheme had not lapsed, it was not at all open to the High Court to examine the said question all over again and to hold that the draft scheme had lapsed. The decision rendered by this Court concluded the controversy and it was not permissible to any party or to any authority/tribunal or court, including the High Court to re-open the issue and to record a contrary finding. We are clearly of the opinion that the High Court committed manifest error of law in re-examining the question and recording a finding, which is totally in variance with the earlier decisions of this Court. There is another aspect of the matter. The competent authority heard the objections in view of the directions issued by this Court in Gajraj Singh’s case. It was clearly provided in the judgment that the draft scheme shall meet the fate consistent with the decisions on objections and the draft scheme dated 29.5.1993 shall be accordingly modified. In the writ petitions which was filed in the High Court, what was assailed was the decision of the competent authority. Therefore, the scope of the writ petition was very narrow and the High Court could only examine whether the competent authority had considered the objections in accordance with the directions issued by this Court. In such a writ petition, the High Court could not have gone into the question as to whether the scheme had lapsed under sub-section (4) of Section 100 of the Act. The view taken by the High Court that the scheme had lapsed is, therefore, wholly uncalled for and beyond the scope of the writ petition. (Paras 12 and 13)

       The contention of Shri Singhvi that the traveling public will suffer great hardship if the scheme is allowed to stand on account of the fact that UPSRTC does not have sufficient number of buses to run on the routes in question, does not appear to have any substance, in view of the clear stand of UPSRTC that it is now making profit and will induct more buses on the routes in question. By virtue of Section 103(1-A) of the Motor Vehicles Act (as amended in the State of U.P.), the UPSRTC can enter into agreements with bus owners to ply their buses on the nationalized routes. Such an arrangement may be beneficial to the existing private operators. On overall consideration of the matter, we are clearly of the opinion that the factors sought to be highlighted by Shri Singhvi cannot be taken into consideration to have the approved scheme annulled and nullified. (Para 17)

       (ii) Civil Procedure Code, 1908—Section 11—Res judicata—Principle of—Need of giving a finality to judicial decisions—Res judicata applies also as between two stages in the same litigation.

       Held : The principle of res judicata is based on the need of giving a finality to judicial decisions. The principle which prevents the same case being twice litigated is of general application and is not limited by the specific words of Section 11 of Code of Civil Procedure in this respect. Res judicata applies also as between two stages in the same litigation to this extent that a court, whether the trial court or a higher court having at an earlier stage decided a matter in one way will not allow the parties to re-agitate the matter again at a subsequent stage of the same proceedings. (Para 11)