2005 Supreme(SC) 779

2005(4) Supreme 221
Supreme Court of India
(From Himachal Pradesh High Court)
R.C. Lahoti, CJI, Y.K. Sabharwal & G.P. Mathur, JJ.
Kailash Chand & Anr. —Appellants
versus
Dharam Das —Respondent
Civil Appeal No. 390 of 2004
Decided on 4-5-2005
Counsel for the Parties :
For the Appellants : Dhruv Mehta, Mohit Chaudhary, Harshvardhan Jha, Advocates­ for M/s. K.L. Mehta & Co., Advocates.
For the Respondent : Rajesh Gupta, Harpreet Singh, Puneet Taneja and Ajay Choudhry, Advocates.

Important point
While the tenants need to be protected, the Courts would not ordinarily deny the relief to the landlord, who genuinely and bona fide requires the premises in occupation of the tenant for occupation by himself or for the members of his family, unless they feel convinced that the so called requirement of the landlord was a ruse for getting rid of an inconvenient tenant or was otherwise malafide.

Headnote:Himachal Pradesh Urban Rent Control Act, 1987—Section 14(3)(a)(i), 14(3), third proviso—Eviction petition under Section 14(3)(a)(i) on ground of bona fide requirement—Compromise between parties—Tenant shifted from first floor of the building to the ground floor—Landlords filed another application against tenant seeking his eviction from the ground floor accommodation in his possession—Landlord’s case that subsequent to induction to tenant in the ground floor, appellant got married and was blessed with a female child—Family of appellant 1 residing in a rented residential accommodation in that city —Upper floor accommodation continued to be in occupation of family of appellant 2—Rent Controller directed appellant to be evicted—Appeal—Whether third proviso to Section 14(3) of the Act can be applied to the facts of the case to deny relief to appellants—(No)—Whether order of eviction passed by Rent Controller could have been sustained by the High Court—(Yes).

       Held : In our opinion, the third proviso has no application to the facts of the present case and this we say for two reasons. First, the third proviso would apply when an order for eviction has been passed under clause (a) or (b) and possession is obtained by the landlord pursuant to that order. In this case, the parties entered into a compromise and, therefore, an occasion for the Appellate ­Authority passing an order for eviction did not arise. Secondly, by virtue of settlement arrived at between the parties, the landlords did not obtain possession of the building; the tenant shifted from one part of the building to ­another part of the same building. The ­tenant did not ‘vacate’ the building. ‘Vacate’, normally, means to go away, to leave. (Para 11)

       Life is not static and so the law cannot afford to be static. The third proviso cannot be so interpreted as to restrict the right conferred by sub-Section (3)(a)(i) on the landlord to be exercisable only “once in a life time”. The proviso has to be read as providing a statutory expression of a situation which would otherwise have been held to be mala fides of a requirement. A landlord, having obtained possession of any building to satisfy a requirement, cannot again and again plead the same set of circumstances or similar circumstances for evicting tenants one after other. That is what the third proviso aims at providing. The proviso cannot be interpreted to mean that in spite of the requirement having undergone a change or a new requirement unrelated to the previous one having come into existence, the landlord would yet be denied relief under sub-Section (3)(a)(i) merely because at some point of time in the past he had resorted to this provision for seeking an eviction. Such an interpretation is too rigid an interpretation and would cause such hardship to the landlord as the Legislature cannot be said to have intended. (Para 14)

       Sub-Section (3)(a)(i) contemplates an order of eviction being made against tenant in the case of a residential building if the same was required by the landlord for his own occupation. The two provisos appended to sub-clause (i) of clause (a) of sub-section (3) of Section 14 place two restrictions on the right of the landlord to seek eviction. These are:-

       (i) the landlord must not be in occupation of another residential building owned by him in the urban area concerned;

       (ii) the landlord having another residential building of his own in the urban area concerned though not in occupation thereof on the date of the filing of the application, must not have vacated such a building without sufficient cause within five years of the date of the filing of the application.

       In short, availability of another residential building of his own in the same urban area would disentitle the landlord from seeking eviction of the tenant on the ground of his requirement for his own occupation if he is in occupation of such another building or has vacated such another building within five years. On a plain reading, the availability of another building by reference to the first proviso disentitles the landlord from seeking eviction if the building satisfies these tests: (i) it is another building; (ii) it is residential in nature; (iii) it is in occupation of landlord; (iv) it is owned by him; and (v) it is situated in the same urban area in which another building in occupation of the tenant is situated. The building referred to in the second proviso, availability whereof disentitles the landlord to seek eviction is not in occupation of the landlord. In all other manner it has to be a building satisfying the tests as above, and in addition, it must be a building vacated by landlord within five years of the date of filing of the application and that too without sufficient cause. The applicability of any of the two provisos would not be attracted if the landlord is occupying or has vacated another residential building which is rented or is not owned by the landlord. (Paras 19 and 20)

       In our opinion, the first Proviso would come into play only if the landlord is occupying another residential building of his own in the same urban area and such building is considered by the Court as reasonably enough and suitable to satisfy the proven requirement of the landlord. Hence, the first Proviso would not apply in the case before us. It is impractical and unreasonable to hold that the accommodation which is already fully occupied and actually in use of appellant No. 2, though technically in occupation of both the landlords can satisfy the requirement of appellant No. 1 and his family as well. Rightly the tenant has not urged the plea that the landlord being in occupation of other parts of the building excluding the portion in occupation of the tenant would attract applicability of the first proviso so as to disentitle the landlord from seeking his eviction on the ground of requirement of appellant No. 1 who is actually living in a rented house. (Para 21)

       The landlords were earlier litigating for eviction of the tenant from the upper floor. In the first round of litigation, they succeeded and yet the fruits of the decree were denied to them on account of pendency of the appeal. They thought it proper to shift the tenant from the first floor to the ground floor so as to satisfy their own requirement as it existed on that date. The tenant also agreed to occupy the ground floor for residence as he was in dire need of some space to live though the premises were not fit for human residence and could not be termed ‘residential’. This is ‘sufficient cause’ within the meaning of the second proviso. Circumstances changed. Subsequent events took place. The family of appellant No. 1 enlarged. A new requirement came into existence which did not exist earlier. The bona fides of such requirement of the landlords cannot be doubted. The expression ‘his own occupation’ as occurring in sub-clause (i) of clause (a) of section (3) is not to be assigned a narrow meaning. It has to be read liberally and given a practical meaning. ‘His own occupation’ does not mean occupation by the landlord alone and as an individual. (Paras 24 and 25)

       On a perusal of the pleadings and the findings arrived at by the Rent Controller and the Appellate Authority (which findings have not been dislodged by the High Court), the picture which emerges may briefly be projected. The tenant was in occupation of the upper floor of the building before and during the first round of litigation. Through the compromise arrived at during the pendency of the appeal, the tenant agreed to take one room, one kitchen and one covered passage accommodation situated on the ground floor under the new tenancy at a new rate of rent with effect from 1.10.1986. The arrangement made by the compromise having been implemented, the family of the appellant No. 2 - one out of the two landlords, who are two brothers, actually occupied the entire first floor and also a part of the ground floor. The appellant No. 2, who is the brother of appellant No. 1 herein and was impleaded as a performa defendant before the Rent Controller and the Appellate Authority, is running a shop on the ground floor and is also using a portion of the ground floor as godown and staircase. The upper floor accommodation consists of two rooms, one kitchen and one open veranda which is being used by appellant No. 2 with his family members namely his wife and three school going children. Appellant No. 1 is staying in a rented accommodation for the reason that the wives of the two brothers not carrying on well with each other to permit their living together and also on account of paucity of accommodation. During the pendency of the proceedings another female child was born to appellant No. 1 and thus by the time the appeal came to be decided by the Appellate Authority on 1.3.1988, appellant No. 1 had two children, as has been noted by the Appellate Authority. As an upshot of the above discussion we hold that the High Court was not right in applying third proviso to the facts of the case and deny the relief of eviction to the appellants. The first and the second proviso also do not come in the way of appellants. Their case of requirement within the meaning of Section 14(3)(a)(i) is fully made out. (Paras 27 and 28)