2005 Supreme(SC) 1068

2005(5) Supreme 754
Supreme Court of India
(From Allahabad High Court)
Arijit Pasayat & H.K. Sema, JJ.
Sangeeta Singh —Appellant
versus
Union of India and Ors. —Respondents
Civil Appeal No. 8737 of 2003
With
C.A. Nos. 8739/2003, 8740/2003, 8741/2003 and 8742/2003
Decided on 23-8-2005
Counsel for the Parties :
For the Appearing Parties : K.P. Pathak, Additional Solicitor General, Vijay Hansaria, Sr. Advocate, Rakesh K. Khanna, Dr. Rashmi Khanna, Shashank Shekhar, Surya Kant, H.K. Puri, R.D. Upadhyay, Munendra Kumar Singh, A.K. Singh, R.K. Singh, Ms. Minakshi Sarma, Shiv Prakash Pandey, Ms. Niranjana Singh, Rudreshwar Singh, T.A. Khan, B.V. Balram Das, Advocates.

Important point
Court cannot read anything into a statutory provision or a stipulated condition which is plain and unambiguous.

Headnote:Constitution of India—Article 136 —Interpretation of statutory provision or a stipulated condition—Court can not read anything into which is plain and unambiguous—Two principles of construction—One relating to casus omissus and other in regard to reading the statute as a whole—Casus omissus cannot be supplied by Court except in case of clear necessity and when reason for that was found in four corners of the statute—Writ petitions to challenge selection of appellants for retail dealer­ship of Indian Oil Corporation Ltd.—Writ petitioners were also applicants for dealership—One of the grounds for challenge in writ petition was that relatives of selected applicants were already holding letters of intent for dealership—Successful persons took stand that persons already holding dealership did not come within the enumerated prohibited category—High Court held that terms and condition of grant of dealership mentioned that if daughter-in-law held dealership then father-in-law was disqualified as not to be applied in literal term and intention was to be seen and found that if father-in-law had already a dealership, daughter-in-law was ineligible—High Court judgment could not be main­tained and was liable to be set aside—High Court since had not dealt with any other issue, matter remitted.

       Held : The High Court, however, held that no doubt the terms and conditions of grant of dealership mention that if daughter-in-law holds dealership then the father-in-law is disqualified. A literal or narrow meaning should not be given and if the father-in-law holds a dealership, daughter-in-law is also disqualified. A literal interpretation need not be given to the requirement, but the intention has to be seen. It was observed that the intention of the prohibition criteria for awarding of dealership was that if a close relative is already holding a dealership, relatives of such persons should not be granted a dealership. If father-in-law is a close relation to the daughter-in-law reverse is also true and, therefore, the daughter-in-law is ineligible if the father-in-law had already a dealership. (Para 2)

       It is well settled principle in law that the Court cannot read anything into a statutory provision or a stipulated condition which is plain and unambiguous. A statute is an edict of the Legislature. The language employed in a statute is the determinative factor of legis­lative intent. Similar is the position for condi­tions stipulated in advertisements. (Para 4)

       While interpreting a provision the Court only interprets the law and cannot legislate it. If a provision of law is misused and subjected to the abuse of process of law, it is for the legislature to amend, modify or repeal it, if deemed necessary. (See Commissioner of Sales Tax, M.P. v. Popular Trading Company, Ujjain (2000 (5) SCC 511). The legislative casus omissus cannot be supplied by judicial interpretative process. (Para 8)

       The golden rule for construing all written instruments has been thus stated: “The grammatical and ordinary sense of the words is to be adhered to unless that would lead to some absurdity or some repugnance or inconsistency with the rest of the instrument, in which case the grammatical and ordinary sense of the words may be modified, so as to avoid that absurdity and inconsistency, but no further” (See Grey v. Pearson (1857 (6) H.L. Cas. 61). The latter part of this “golden rule” must, however, be applied with much caution. “if,” remarked Jervis, C.J., “the pre­cise words used are plain and unambigu­ous in our judgment, we are bound to construe them in their ordinary sense, even though it lead, in our view of the case, to an absurdity or manifest injustice. Words may be modified or varied where their import is doubtful or obscure. But we assume the functions of legislators when we depart from the ordinary meaning of the precise words used, merely because we see, or fancy we see, an absurdity or manifest injustice from an adherence to their literal meaning” (See Abley v. Dale 11, C.B. 378). In the aforesaid background the High Court’s judgment cannot be maintained and is set aside. However, writ petitioner in writ petition No. 24966/2000 has taken the plea that other grounds were highlighted in the writ petition to show as to how the selected person was ineligible. The High Court has not dealt with any other issue and has disposed of only on the ground that the father-in-law was holding dealership, thereby rendering daughter-in-law ineligible. We, therefore, remit the matter to the High Court for consideration of other issues raised. (Paras 11, 12 and 13)