2005 Supreme(SC) 1272

2005(7) Supreme 345
Supreme Court of India
(From Punjab and Haryana High Court)
R.C. Lahoti, CJI, G.P. Mathur & P.K. Balasubramanyan, JJ.
Rakesh Vij —Appellant
versus
Raminder Pal Singh Sethi —Respondent
Civil Appeal No. 2894 of 2001
With
Writ Petition (Civil) No. 234 of 2003, Civil Appeal Nos. 7049/2001, 3551/2002, 7920-7921/2002 and S.L.P. (Civil) No. 20444/2001
Decided on 30-9-2005
Counsel for the Parties :
For the Appearing Parties : Amarendra Sharan and Mohan Parasaran, Additional Solicitor General, Sudhir Chandra, A.K. Chopra, Sr. Advocates, Sanjay Karol, Sr. Advocate (NP), M.L. Varma, Sr. Advocate (NP), Sudhir Chandra, Sr. Advocates, Achintya Dvivedi, Manoj Swarup, Somiran Sharma, S.A. Haseeb, S.M. Sarin, P.N. Puri, Gopi Chand, Rakesh Joshi, Rajinder Singh, Himanshu Upadhyaya, Vikas Mahajan, Jaswant Rai Aggarwal, Bhaskar Y. Lulkarni, R.K. Talwar, Amit Talwar, Yash Pal Dhingra, Samir Ali Khan, Amit Anand Jiwary, Navin Prakash, Gaurav Dhingra, Chiadanand D.L., Ms. Kamini Jaiswal, Ms. Shomila Bakshi, Ms. Inklee Barooah, Balbir Singh Gupta, Ms. S. Janani, Advocate (NP), D.N. Goburdhan, K.L. Kohli, V.C. Mahajan, M.K. Dua, S.M. Sarin, Rajesh Khurana, Vimal Chandra S. Dave, Advocate (NP), R.K. Kapoor, Vikash Jain, M.K. Verma and Anis Ahmed Khan, Advocates.

Important point
In the Union Territory of Chandigarh a landlord can seek eviction of a tenant from a non-residential building on the ground of his own use.

Headnote:(i) East Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Act, 1949—Section 2(hh), 13 and 15—East Punjab Urban Rent Restriction (Extension to Chandigarh) Act, 1974 as amended by 1982 Act—Sections 1, 2, 3 and 4—Eviction petition on ground of bona fide requirement—Non residential building is a shop-cum-flat—Whether in Union Territory of Chandigarh a landlord can seek eviction of his tenant from a shop-cum-flat on ground of his own use—(Yes)—The Act has to be interpreted in a just and equitable manner—To completely deprive a landlord of his right to seek eviction of a tenant from a non residential building even on ground of his own use for all times to come would be highly unjust and inequitable to him.

       Held : Section 2 of the Chandigarh Extension Act defines the words “the Act” as the East Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Act, 1949 as it is extended to, and was in force in certain areas in the pre-reorganization State of Punjab immediately before the first day of November, 1966. In view of Section 3 of the Chandigarh Extension Act “the Act”, which would mean the East Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Act, 1949 as extended to and was in force will be deemed to have been in force in the Union Territory of Chandigarh with effect from 4th day of November, 1972. The words “as it extended to and was in force in” are very significant. Though as a matter of fact certain amendments had been made to East Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Act, 1949 by the Amendment Act, 1956, whereby Section 13(3)(a)(ii) had been amended and the words “non-residential building” occurring therein had been deleted, but the said amendment having been found to be violative of Article 14 of the Constitution and having been struck down cannot be taken notice of or read as the amendment itself was stillborn and dead from the very inception. Therefore, what the Parliament extended and applied to the Union Territory of Chandigarh by means of Chandigarh Extension Act was the East Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Act, 1949 as it existed prior to its amendment by the Amendment Act, 1956. Something which was stillborn or dead from the very inception cannot be read in “the Act”, as Section 3 does not say anything except to make the 1949 Act applicable to the Union Territory of Chandigarh with effect from the 4th day of November, 1972. (Para 12)

       It is well known principle of interpretation of statute that full effect must be given to a statutory fiction and it should be carried to its logical conclusion. In view of the mandate contained in clause (2) of Article 13 of the Constitution Section 3 of the Chandigarh Extension Act cannot be interpreted to mean that the Parliament while extending and applying the East Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Act, 1949 to the Union Territory of Chandigarh also applied those provisions which were stillborn or were dead from the very inception. The mandate of Article 13(2) of the Constitution will equally apply to the Parliament when it is functioning as a Legislature for making an Act. The Parliament cannot be deemed to have taken into consideration something which was stillborn or dead. (Para 13)

       In our opinion, the principle of law underlying legislation by incorporation or legislation by reference has not much relevance in the present case. We do not have to examine the effect of any amendment or repeal of any enactment. Section 3 of the Chandigarh Extension Act makes the East Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Act, 1949, subject to the modification specified in the Schedule, applicable to the Union Territory of Chandigarh with effect form 4.11.1972. It is not a case where any specific section or provision of the 1949 Act may have been made applicable, but the provisions of the entire 1949 Act have been extended and made applicable to the Union Territory of Chandigarh. It is in fact a case of extension of an Act to a territory to which it was previously not applicable. (Para 21)

       The ultimate question is what is “the Act”. For ascertaining the meaning of the words “the Act” we have to refer back to Section 2, viz., the East Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Act, 1949 and the provisions of this 1949 Act have to be seen and examined as they stood on the date when the eviction petition was filed or till the continuance of the litigation culminating in the final judgment. On the date when the eviction petition was filed or at any stage subsequent thereto including the date when the matter was heard and is being decided by this Court, it is not possible to read the East Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Act, 1949 in a manner in which it was amended by the Amendment Act, 1956 but has to be read as it originally stood which contained a provision giving right to a landlord to seek eviction of a tenant from a non residential building on the ground of his own use. This is so because in Harbilas Rai Bansal (supra) the provisions of the Amendment Act, 1956 were held to be violative of Article 14 of the Constitution and were struck down. Therefore, read in any manner the inevitable consequence is that the word “the Act” occurring in Section 2 of the Chandigarh Extension Act has to be read as the East Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Act, 1949 as it stood before the Amendment Act, 1956. The result that follows is that in the Union Territory of Chandigarh it is open to a landlord to seek eviction of a tenant from a non residential building on the ground of his own use. (Para 23)

       (ii) East Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Act, 1949—Sections 2(hh) and 15—East Punjab Urban Rent Restriction (Extension to Chandigarh) Act, 1974 as amended by 1982 Act—Sections 1, 2, 3 and 4—Eviction petition for personal use of premises—Shop-cum-flat—Respondent, co-owner of premises is a Dental Surgeon—He filed an eviction petition alleging that he was having a clinic in Sector 16A, Chandigarh but owner of the said premises had filed an eviction petition against him which is pending adjudication before the Rent Controller—Respondent wanted to set up a bigger dental clinic with modern gadgets for which space available in rented premises was wholly inadequate—Maintainability of eviction petition challenged—Whether in the Union Territory of Chandigarh a landlord can seek eviction of a tenant from a non residential building on ground of his own use—(Yes)—Section 3 of the Chandigarh Extension Act not only made the 1949 Act applicable to Union Territory of Chandigarh but gave it retrospective effect by virtue of the deeming provision.

       Held : To completely deprive a landlord of his right to seek eviction of a tenant from a non residential building even on the ground of his own use for all times to come would be highly unjust and inequitable to him. In the present case the Rent Controller and the Appellate Authority have recorded concurrent finding of fact that the respondent landlord bona fide needs the premises in question for his own use and this finding has been affirmed in revision by the High Court. In this view of the matter we do not find any illegality in the impugned orders. The appeal is accordingly dismissed with costs. The appellant-tenant is granted six months time to vacate the premises subject to his filing the usual undertaking within one month. (Paras 24 and 25)

       (iii) Interpretation of Statutes—Rule of literal construction—If there is nothing to modify, alter or qualify the language which the statute contains—It must be construed in the ordinary and natural meaning of the words and sentences. (Para 14)

       (iv) Interpretation of Statutes—Legislation by Reference—Legislation by Incorporation—Distinction—Determination whether a legislation was by way of incorporation or reference is more a matter of construction by Courts—Effect of any amendment or repeal of any enactment.

       Held : Adopting or applying an earlier or existing Act by competent Legislature to a later Act is an accepted device of Legislation. If the adopting Act refers to certain provisions of an earlier existing Act, it is known as legislation by reference. Whereas if the provisions of another Act are bodily lifted and incorporated in the Act, then it is known as legislation by incorporation. The determination whether a legislation was by way of incorporation or reference is more a matter of construction by the courts keeping in view the language employed by the Act, the purpose of referring or incorporating provisions of an existing Act and the effect of it on the day-to-day working. Reason for it is the courts’ prime duty to assume that any law made by the Legislature is enacted to serve public purpose. (Para 19)