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2006 Supreme(SC) 242

2006(3) Supreme 125
Supreme Court of India
(From Gauhati High Court)
Arijit Pasayat and Tarun Chatterjee, JJ.
Haridas Das —Appellant
versus
Smt. Usha Rani Banik & Ors. —Respondents
Civil Appeal No. 7948 of 2004
Decided on 21-3-2006
Counsel for the Parties :
For the Appellant : A.K. Ganguli, Sr. Advocate, Ms. B. Basak, Chanchal Kumar Ganguli, Advocates.
For the Respondents : Shib Shankar Sirkar, Sr. Advocate, P.K. Chakravarty, Advocates, Apu Banik, In-Person (on behalf of Mrs. Usha Rani Banik).

Important pointRehearing of a dispute is not permissible in exercise of review jurisdiction.

Headnote:Civil Procedure Code, 1908—Order XLVII Rule 1—Review—Rehearing of dispute not permissible because a party had not highlighted all aspects of the case or could perhaps had argued them more forcefully and or cited binding precedents—Respondent No. 1 in review petition the original owner of suit property entered into oral agreement for its sale with appellant and appellant paid Rs. 45000/- out of total agreed consideration of Rs. 46000/- —Appellant paid Rs. 1000/- also and required respondent to execute sale deed—In view of threatened dispossession appellant filed title suit seeking confirmation of possession and injunction—Interim order to maintain status quo was passed—Appellant also filed suit for specific performance—During pendency of proceedings, respondent executed sale deed in favour of respondent No. 3 (Respondent No. 1 in present case)—Appellant filed title suit for setting aside sale deed—Trial Court decreed suit—1st appellate Court set aside the decree—High Court in second appeal restored trial Court decree—On a review application filed by respondent, judgment was reviewed by High Court holding title suit barred by Order 2 Rule 2 CPC—Appeal—High Court erred in accepting prayer for review and impugned judgment was liable to be set aside.

       Held : In order to appreciate the scope of a review, Section 114 of the CPC has to be read, but this section does not even adumbrate the ambit of interference excepted of the Court since it merely states that it "may make such order thereon as it thinks fit." The parameters are prescribed in Order XLVII of the CPC and for the purposes of this lis, permit the defendant to press for a rehearing "on account of some mistake or error apparent on the face of the records or for any other sufficient reason". The former part of the rule deals with a situation attributable to the applicant, and the latter to a jural action which is manifestly incorrect or on which two conclusions are not possible. Neither of them postulate a rehearing of the dispute because a party had not highlighted all the aspects of the case or could perhaps have argued them more forcefully and/or cited binding precedents to the Court and thereby enjoyed a favourable verdict. This is amply evident from the explanation in Rule 1 of the Order XLVII which states that the fact that the decision on a question of law on which the judgment of the Court is based has been reversed or modified by the subsequent decision of a superior Court in any other case, shall not be a ground for the review of such judgment. Where the order in question is appealable the aggrieved party has adequate and efficacious remedy and the Court should exercise the power to review its order with the greatest circumspection. (Para 13)

       When the aforesaid principles are applied to the background facts of the present case, the position is clear that the High Court had clearly fallen in error in accepting the prayer for review. First, the crucial question which according to the High Court was necessary to be adjudicated was the question whether the Title Suit No. 201 of 1985 was barred by the provisions of Order II Rule 2 CPC. This question arose in Title Suit No. 1 of 1986 and was irrelevant so far as Title Suit No. 2 of 1987 is concerned. Additionally, the High Court erred in holding that no prayer for leave under Order II Rule 2 CPC was made in the plaint in Title Suit No. 201 of 1985. The claim of oral agreement dated 19.8.1982 is mentioned in para 7 of the plaint, and at the end of the plaint it has been noted that right to institute suit for specific performance was reserved. That being so the High Court has erroneously held about infraction of Order II Rule 2 CPC. This was not a case where Order II of Rule 2 CPC has any application. The order of the High Court is clearly contrary to law as laid down by this Court. The judgment of the High Court in review application is set aside. (Paras 20 and 21)

Judgment

Arijit Pasayat, J.—Challenge in this appeal is to the order passed by a learned Single Judge of the Gauhati High Court on an application for review under Order XLVII Rule 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (in short the ‘CPC’). The application was filed by respondent No. 1 for review of the judgment and order dated 21.8.2002 passed in Second Appeal No. 12 of 1993. The Second Appeal was allowed by the High Court by the judgment and order, reversing the judgment and order passed in Title Appeal No. 6/90 and affirming the judgment and decree dated 19.1.1989 passed in Title Suit No. 2 of 1987.

2. Reference to the factual background, as projected by the appellant in some detail would be necessary because the High Court has referred to the factual background to modify the judgment passed by the High Court in the Second Appeal and directed its dismissal. As a consequence the judgment and decree passed by the First Appellate Court was affirmed and that of the learned Munsif in the Title Suit was reversed.

3. One Kalipada Das, (respondent No. 1 in the review petition) the original owner of the suit property, entered into an oral agreement with the appellant on 19.8.1982 and on the same day, the appellant paid a sum of Rs. 14,000/- towards the agreed consideration of Rs. 46,000/- to sell his portion of the suit property, with a dwelling house standing thereon. The possession of the suit property was also handed over to the appellant, with a promise that a sale deed would be executed in favour of the appellant within three years. Again on 23.8.1982 the appellant paid a further sum of Rs.31,000/-. In essence Rs. 45,000/- was paid leaving only a nominal sum of Rs.1,000/- to be paid at the time of execution of the sale deed.

4. As the time for execution of the sale deed was nearing, the appellant learnt that the said Kalipada Das with a view to defeat the appellant’s right was trying to sell part of the property to one Chunnilal Deb and to mortgage part of the suit property with the Housing Board of Karimganj. He started openly threatening the appellant to dis-possess him of the suit property. The appellant paid the balance amount of Rs. 1,000/- and asked Kalipada to execute the registered sale deed in his favour in respect of the property. In view of threatened dispossession, the appellant with a view to protect his possession of the suit property filed Title Suit No. 201/85 along with connected Miscellaneous Case No. 65/85, inter alia, seeking confirmation of possession over the suit land and premises, and for permanent injunction restraining Kalipada Das from dispossessing the appellant and from selling the suit property to any third party. In the said plaint the appellant exclusively reversed his right to file another suit for getting the sale deed executed.

5. By an interim order Kalipada Das was directed to maintain status quo in respect of the suit property. The suit was dismissed for default, but later was restored by an order passed by learned Munsif.

6. The appellant filed another suit being Title Suit No. 1 of 1986 (re-numbered as 13/90) for specific performance of the agreement for sale and for the execution of the proper deed of sale in respect of the suit property.

7. During the pendency of the said proceedings, Kalipada Das executed and registered a sale deed in favour of one Usha Rani Banik, defendant No. 3 - Respondent No. 1 herein, while the possession of the suit property still remained with the appellant. Immediately thereafter, the appellant filed Title Suit No. 2 of 1987 for cancellation of the said sale deed as the same was illegal, fraudulent and void. The respondent No. 1 also filed a suit being Title Suit No. 22/87 for declaration of her title to the suit property on the basis of the sale deed.

8. Title Suit No. 2 of 1987 filed by the appellant was decreed whereby the sale deed executed in favour of the Respondent No. 1 was cancelled. Against the said decree, the respondent No. 1 preferred an appeal before lea






























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